From: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>
To: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>, g@linux.dev
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net,
martin.lau@kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
rppt@kernel.org, yosryahmed@google.com,
Yi Lai <yi1.lai@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 bpf] lib/buildid: handle memfd_secret() files in build_id_parse()
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2024 09:35:33 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <oeoujpsqousyabzgnnavwoinq6lrojbdejvblxdwtav7o5wamw@6dyfuoc7725j> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <a1501f7a-80b3-4623-ab7b-5f5e0c3f7008@redhat.com>
On Thu, Oct 17, 2024 at 11:18:34AM GMT, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 17.10.24 00:16, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> > From memfd_secret(2) manpage:
> >
> > The memory areas backing the file created with memfd_secret(2) are
> > visible only to the processes that have access to the file descriptor.
> > The memory region is removed from the kernel page tables and only the
> > page tables of the processes holding the file descriptor map the
> > corresponding physical memory. (Thus, the pages in the region can't be
> > accessed by the kernel itself, so that, for example, pointers to the
> > region can't be passed to system calls.)
> >
> > So folios backed by such secretmem files are not mapped into kernel
> > address space and shouldn't be accessed, in general.
> >
> > To make this a bit more generic of a fix and prevent regression in the
> > future for similar special mappings, do a generic check of whether the
> > folio we got is mapped with kernel_page_present(), as suggested in [1].
> > This will handle secretmem, and any future special cases that use
> > a similar approach.
> >
> > Original report and repro can be found in [0].
> >
> > [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/ZwyG8Uro%2FSyTXAni@ly-workstation/
> > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAJD7tkbpEMx-eC4A-z8Jm1ikrY_KJVjWO+mhhz1_fni4x+COKw@mail.gmail.com/
> >
> > Reported-by: Yi Lai <yi1.lai@intel.com>
> > Suggested-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@google.com>
> > Fixes: de3ec364c3c3 ("lib/buildid: add single folio-based file reader abstraction")
> > Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
> > ---
> > lib/buildid.c | 5 ++++-
> > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/lib/buildid.c b/lib/buildid.c
> > index 290641d92ac1..90df64fd64c1 100644
> > --- a/lib/buildid.c
> > +++ b/lib/buildid.c
> > @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
> > #include <linux/elf.h>
> > #include <linux/kernel.h>
> > #include <linux/pagemap.h>
> > +#include <linux/set_memory.h>
> > #define BUILD_ID 3
> > @@ -74,7 +75,9 @@ static int freader_get_folio(struct freader *r, loff_t file_off)
> > filemap_invalidate_unlock_shared(r->file->f_mapping);
> > }
> > - if (IS_ERR(r->folio) || !folio_test_uptodate(r->folio)) {
> > + if (IS_ERR(r->folio) ||
> > + !kernel_page_present(&r->folio->page) ||
> > + !folio_test_uptodate(r->folio)) {
> > if (!IS_ERR(r->folio))
> > folio_put(r->folio);
> > r->folio = NULL;
>
> As replied elsewhere, can't we take a look at the mapping?
>
> We do the same thing in gup_fast_folio_allowed() where we check
> secretmem_mapping().
Responded on the v1 but I think we can go with v1 of this work as
whoever will be working on unmapping folios from direct map will need to
fix gup_fast_folio_allowed(), they can fix this code as well. Also it
seems like some arch don't have kernel_page_present() and builds are
failing.
Andrii, let's move forward with the v1 patch.
>
>
> --
> Cheers,
>
> David / dhildenb
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-17 16:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-16 22:16 Andrii Nakryiko
2024-10-16 22:21 ` Yosry Ahmed
2024-10-16 23:57 ` Shakeel Butt
2024-10-17 8:59 ` Daniel Borkmann
2024-10-17 9:18 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-10-17 16:35 ` Shakeel Butt [this message]
2024-10-17 17:35 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-10-17 17:54 ` Heiko Carstens
2024-10-17 18:23 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-10-17 11:07 ` kernel test robot
2024-10-17 11:59 ` kernel test robot
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