From: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
To: "Srivatsa S. Bhat" <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu>
Cc: "Dave Hansen" <dave@sr71.net>, "Wanpeng Li" <kernellwp@gmail.com>,
"Andi Kleen" <ak@linux.intel.com>,
linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org,
"Piotr Luc" <piotr.luc@intel.com>, "Mel Gorman" <mgorman@suse.de>,
arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org,
"Alexander Sergeyev" <sergeev917@gmail.com>,
"Brian Gerst" <brgerst@gmail.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
MickaëlSalaün <mic@digikod.net>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Joe Konno" <joe.konno@linux.intel.com>,
"Laura Abbott" <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
"Will Drewry" <wad@chromium.org>,
gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Jia Zhang" <qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Linus Torvalds" <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
"David Woodhouse" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
"KarimAllah Ahmed" <karahmed@amazon.de>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RESEND] Spectre-v2 (IBPB/IBRS) and SSBD fixes for 4.4.y
Date: Tue, 24 Jul 2018 00:06:19 +0200 (CEST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1807232357440.997@cbobk.fhfr.pm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <153156030832.10043.13438231886571087086.stgit@srivatsa-ubuntu>
On Sat, 14 Jul 2018, Srivatsa S. Bhat wrote:
> This patch series is a backport of the Spectre-v2 fixes (IBPB/IBRS)
> and patches for the Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability to 4.4.y
> (they apply cleanly on top of 4.4.140).
FWIW -- not sure how much inspiration you took from our SLE 4.4-based
tree, but most of the stuff is already there for quite some time
(including the non-upstream IBRS on kernel boundary on SKL+, trampoline
stack for PTI (which the original port didn't have), etc).
The IBRS SKL+ stuff has not been picked up by Greg, as it's non-upstream,
and the trampoline stack I believe was pointed out to stable@, but noone
really sat down and did the port (our codebase is different than 4.4.x
stable base), but it definitely should be done if someone has to put 100%
trust into the PTI port (either that, or at least zeroing out the kernel
thread thread stack ... we used to have temporarily that before we
switched over to proper entry trampoline in this version as well).
Thanks,
--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-07-23 22:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-07-14 9:25 Srivatsa S. Bhat
2018-07-14 9:28 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 015/101] x86/cpufeature, x86/mm/pkeys: Add protection keys related CPUID definitions Srivatsa S. Bhat
2018-07-15 11:04 ` Patch "[PATCH 4.4.y 015/101] x86/cpufeature, x86/mm/pkeys: Add protection keys related CPUID definitions" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-07-14 9:31 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 041/101] x86/mm: Factor out LDT init from context init Srivatsa S. Bhat
2018-07-23 9:22 ` Patch "x86/mm: Factor out LDT init from context init" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-07-14 9:32 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 042/101] x86/mm: Give each mm TLB flush generation a unique ID Srivatsa S. Bhat
2018-07-23 9:22 ` Patch "x86/mm: Give each mm TLB flush generation a unique ID" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-07-15 11:26 ` [RESEND] Spectre-v2 (IBPB/IBRS) and SSBD fixes for 4.4.y Greg KH
2018-07-16 8:02 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat
2018-07-23 11:26 ` Greg KH
2018-07-23 17:27 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat
2018-07-23 22:06 ` Jiri Kosina [this message]
2018-07-24 20:13 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat
2018-07-24 22:02 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-07-26 23:09 ` Kees Cook
2018-08-02 19:22 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat
2018-08-02 22:22 ` Kees Cook
2018-08-03 23:20 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat
2018-08-07 13:49 ` Greg KH
2018-08-07 19:08 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat
2018-08-07 19:15 ` Greg KH
2018-08-07 19:19 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat
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