linux-mm.kvack.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>
To: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,  Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
	Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>,
	 Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>,
	Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>,
	 Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
	 bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	cgroups@vger.kernel.org,  linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Meta kernel team <kernel-team@meta.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] memcg: nmi-safe kmem charging
Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 12:12:48 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <mzrsx4x5xluljyxy5h5ha6kijcno3ormac3sobc3k7bkj5wepr@cuz2fluc5m5d> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2e2f0568-3687-4574-836d-c23d09614bce@suse.cz>

I forgot to CC Tejun, so doing it now.

On Mon, May 12, 2025 at 05:56:09PM +0200, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
> On 5/10/25 01:28, Shakeel Butt wrote:
> > BPF programs can trigger memcg charged kernel allocations in nmi
> > context. However memcg charging infra for kernel memory is not equipped
> > to handle nmi context. This series adds support for kernel memory
> > charging for nmi context.
> > 
> > The initial prototype tried to make memcg charging infra for kernel
> > memory re-entrant against irq and nmi. However upon realizing that
> > this_cpu_* operations are not safe on all architectures (Tejun), this
> 
> I assume it was an off-list discussion?
> Could we avoid this for the architectures where these are safe, which should
> be the major ones I hope?

Yes it was an off-list discussion. The discussion was more about the
this_cpu_* ops vs atomic_* ops as on x86 this_cpu_* does not have lock
prefix and how I should prefer this_cpu_* over atomic_* for my series on
objcg charging without disabling irqs. Tejun pointed out this_cpu_* are
not nmi safe for some archs and it would be better to handle nmi context
separately. So, I am not that worried about optimizing for NMI context
but your next comment on generic_atomic64_* ops is giving me headache.

> 
> > series took a different approach targeting only nmi context. Since the
> > number of stats that are updated in kernel memory charging path are 3,
> > this series added special handling of those stats in nmi context rather
> > than making all >100 memcg stats nmi safe.
> 
> Hmm so from patches 2 and 3 I see this relies on atomic64_add().
> But AFAIU lib/atomic64.c has the generic fallback implementation for
> architectures that don't know better, and that would be using the "void
> generic_atomic64_##op" macro, which AFAICS is doing:
> 
>         local_irq_save(flags);                                          \
>         arch_spin_lock(lock);                                           \
>         v->counter c_op a;                                              \
>         arch_spin_unlock(lock);                                         \
>         local_irq_restore(flags);                                       \
> 
> so in case of a nmi hitting after the spin_lock this can still deadlock?
> 
> Hm or is there some assumption that we only use these paths when already
> in_nmi() and then another nmi can't come in that context?
> 
> But even then, flush_nmi_stats() in patch 1 isn't done in_nmi() and uses
> atomic64_xchg() which in generic_atomic64_xchg() implementation also has the
> irq_save+spin_lock. So can't we deadlock there?

I was actually assuming that atomic_* ops are safe against nmis for all
archs. I looked at atomic_* ops in include/asm-generic/atomic.h and it
is using arch_cmpxchg() for CONFIG_SMP and it seems like for archs with
cmpxchg should be fine against nmi. I am not sure why atomic64_* are not
using arch_cmpxchg() instead. I will dig more.

I also have the followup series on objcg charging without irq almost
ready. I will send it out as rfc soon.

Thanks a lot for awesome and insightful comments.
Shakeel


  reply	other threads:[~2025-05-12 19:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-05-09 23:28 Shakeel Butt
2025-05-09 23:28 ` [PATCH 1/4] memcg: add infra for nmi safe memcg stats Shakeel Butt
2025-05-09 23:28 ` [PATCH 2/4] memcg: add nmi-safe update for MEMCG_KMEM Shakeel Butt
2025-05-09 23:28 ` [PATCH 3/4] memcg: nmi-safe slab stats updates Shakeel Butt
2025-05-09 23:28 ` [PATCH 4/4] memcg: make objcg charging nmi safe Shakeel Butt
2025-05-13 22:25   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-05-14 16:46     ` Shakeel Butt
2025-05-10  1:26 ` [PATCH 0/4] memcg: nmi-safe kmem charging Andrew Morton
2025-05-10  3:11   ` Shakeel Butt
2025-05-10  7:00     ` Harry Yoo
2025-05-12 14:52     ` Vlastimil Babka
2025-05-12 15:56 ` Vlastimil Babka
2025-05-12 19:12   ` Shakeel Butt [this message]
2025-05-13  7:15     ` Vlastimil Babka
2025-05-13 11:41       ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-05-13 22:17         ` Shakeel Butt
2025-05-14  7:11           ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-05-15  1:49           ` Shakeel Butt

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=mzrsx4x5xluljyxy5h5ha6kijcno3ormac3sobc3k7bkj5wepr@cuz2fluc5m5d \
    --to=shakeel.butt@linux.dev \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=ast@kernel.org \
    --cc=bigeasy@linutronix.de \
    --cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=cgroups@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=hannes@cmpxchg.org \
    --cc=kernel-team@meta.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=mhocko@kernel.org \
    --cc=muchun.song@linux.dev \
    --cc=roman.gushchin@linux.dev \
    --cc=tj@kernel.org \
    --cc=vbabka@suse.cz \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox