From: Maxwell Bland <mbland@motorola.com>
To: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>,
Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Pierre Langlois <pierre.langlois@arm.com>,
Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/15] pkeys-based page table hardening
Date: Mon, 14 Apr 2025 17:43:20 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <fv3ijx6vcha2hfn5m2py4h73ympmgbur6wruwoej5pbz2lhjfc@t5j7gfa5j674> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <107650bf-a8c1-4a71-a302-2e80abd5d062@arm.com>
On Fri, Apr 04, 2025 at 09:57:02AM +0200, Kevin Brodsky wrote:
> On 28/03/2025 17:15, Maxwell Bland wrote:
> Overall this seems worth investigating. I wonder, have you considered
> how accessors would find the shadow memory? It could of course be linked
> directly from task_struct, but then nothing prevents that pointer from
> being corrupted. I can't think of another cheap way to link $p$ though.
> This is not a full-blown shadow memory approach, so I'm not sure we can
> reserve a whole chunk of the address space for that purpose.
Hi, apologies for the delay again, I had much fire to put out last week.
I saw you posted a V4 for this, so I'll close out this chain.
W.r.t. the above, it may be possible to segment the RB tree in vmalloc.c
and designate an allocation region for this purpose. I did something
similar to enforce PXNTable-across-vmalloc a year or so ago which ended
up successful on a production device.
I plan to experiment a bit with different approaches and will probably
send the code to the mailing list once/if I get something together (also
if it isn't pre-empted by someone smarter and faster doing something
better). (-:
> Indeed. For experimenting a Coccinelle script to convert direct access
> to certain members to a function call is probably easier :)
This does keep it in-kernel, which is nice, and I will keep this in mind
as I write.
Thank you for the discussion and patch, as well as the newest one!
- Maxwell Bland
prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-04-14 22:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-02-03 10:18 Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/15] mm: Introduce kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/15] set_memory: Introduce set_memory_pkey() stub Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/15] arm64: mm: Enable overlays for all EL1 indirect permissions Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/15] arm64: Introduce por_set_pkey_perms() helper Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/15] arm64: Implement asm/kpkeys.h using POE Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/15] arm64: set_memory: Implement set_memory_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/15] arm64: Enable kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/15] mm: Introduce kernel_pgtables_set_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-06 19:01 ` Linus Walleij
2025-02-07 14:33 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/15] mm: Introduce kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/15] mm: Allow __pagetable_ctor() to fail Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/15] mm: Map page tables with privileged pkey Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/15] arm64: kpkeys: Support KPKEYS_LVL_PGTABLES Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/15] arm64: mm: Guard page table writes with kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 14/15] arm64: Enable kpkeys_hardened_pgtables support Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 15/15] mm: Add basic tests for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-06 22:41 ` [RFC PATCH v3 00/15] pkeys-based page table hardening Kees Cook
2025-02-10 14:23 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-13 14:54 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-03-06 16:23 ` Maxwell Bland
2025-03-13 12:32 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-03-19 21:54 ` Maxwell Bland
2025-03-25 17:11 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-03-28 16:15 ` Maxwell Bland
2025-04-04 7:57 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-14 22:43 ` Maxwell Bland [this message]
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