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From: "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>
To: "Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	"Kent Overstreet" <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
Cc: "Mark Rutland" <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	"Linux Kernel Mailing List" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	"linux-bcachefs@vger.kernel.org" <linux-bcachefs@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Kent Overstreet" <kent.overstreet@gmail.com>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Uladzislau Rezki" <urezki@gmail.com>,
	"hch@infradead.org" <hch@infradead.org>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 07/32] mm: Bring back vmalloc_exec
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2023 13:42:44 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ff2006db-cd13-48c4-bc5b-1864f9ec9149@app.fastmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <37d2378e-72de-e474-5e25-656b691384ba@intel.com>

Hi all-

On Tue, Jun 20, 2023, at 11:48 AM, Dave Hansen wrote:
>>> No, I'm saying your concerns are baseless and too vague to
>>> address.
>> If you don't address them, the NAK will stand forever, or at least
>> until a different group of people take over x86 maintainership.
>> That's fine with me.
>
> I've got a specific concern: I don't see vmalloc_exec() used in this
> series anywhere.  I also don't see any of the actual assembly that's
> being generated, or the glue code that's calling into the generated
> assembly.
>
> I grepped around a bit in your git trees, but I also couldn't find it in
> there.  Any chance you could help a guy out and point us to some of the
> specifics of this new, tiny JIT?
>

So I had a nice discussion with Kent on IRC, and, for the benefit of everyone else reading along, I *think* the JITted code can be replaced by a table-driven approach like this:

typedef unsigned int u32;
typedef unsigned long u64;

struct uncompressed
{
    u32 a;
    u32 b;
    u64 c;
    u64 d;
    u64 e;
    u64 f;
};

struct bitblock
{
    u64 source;
    u64 target;
    u64 mask;
    int shift;
};

// out needs to be zeroed first
void unpack(struct uncompressed *out, const u64 *in, const struct bitblock *blocks, int nblocks)
{
    u64 *out_as_words = (u64*)out;
    for (int i = 0; i < nblocks; i++) {
        const struct bitblock *b;
        out_as_words[b->target] |= (in[b->source] & b->mask) << b->shift;
    }
}

void apply_offsets(struct uncompressed *out, const struct uncompressed *offsets)
{
    out->a += offsets->a;
    out->b += offsets->b;
    out->c += offsets->c;
    out->d += offsets->d;
    out->e += offsets->e;
    out->f += offsets->f;
}

Which generates nice code: https://godbolt.org/z/3fEq37hf5

It would need spectre protection in two places, I think, because it's almost most certainly a great gadget if the attacker can speculatively control the 'blocks' table.  This could be mitigated (I think) by hardcoding nblocks as 12 and by masking b->target.

In contrast, the JIT approach needs a retpoline on each call, which could be more expensive than my entire function :)  I haven't benchmarked them lately.


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-06-20 20:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-05-09 16:56 [PATCH 00/32] bcachefs - a new COW filesystem Kent Overstreet
2023-05-09 16:56 ` [PATCH 07/32] mm: Bring back vmalloc_exec Kent Overstreet
2023-05-09 18:19   ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2023-05-09 20:15     ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-09 20:46   ` Christoph Hellwig
2023-05-09 21:12     ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2023-05-09 21:29       ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-10  6:48         ` Eric Biggers
2023-05-12 18:36           ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-13  1:57             ` Eric Biggers
2023-05-13 19:28               ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-14  5:45               ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-14 18:43                 ` Eric Biggers
2023-05-15  5:38                   ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-15  6:13                     ` Eric Biggers
2023-05-15  6:18                       ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-15  7:13                         ` Eric Biggers
2023-05-15  7:26                           ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-21 21:33                             ` Eric Biggers
2023-05-21 22:04                               ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-15 10:29                 ` David Laight
2023-05-10 11:56         ` David Laight
2023-05-09 21:43       ` Darrick J. Wong
2023-05-09 21:54         ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-11  5:33           ` Theodore Ts'o
2023-05-11  5:44             ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-13 13:25       ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2023-05-14 18:39         ` Christophe Leroy
2023-05-14 23:43           ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-15  4:45             ` Christophe Leroy
2023-05-15  5:02               ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-10 14:18   ` Christophe Leroy
2023-05-10 15:05   ` Johannes Thumshirn
2023-05-11 22:28     ` Kees Cook
2023-05-12 18:41       ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-16 21:02         ` Kees Cook
2023-05-16 21:20           ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-16 21:47             ` Matthew Wilcox
2023-05-16 21:57               ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-17  5:28               ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-17 14:04                 ` Mike Rapoport
2023-05-17 14:18                   ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-17 15:44                     ` Mike Rapoport
2023-05-17 15:59                       ` Kent Overstreet
2023-06-17  4:13             ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-17 15:34               ` Kent Overstreet
2023-06-17 19:19                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-17 20:08                   ` Kent Overstreet
2023-06-17 20:35                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-19 19:45                 ` Kees Cook
2023-06-20  0:39                   ` Kent Overstreet
2023-06-19  9:19   ` Mark Rutland
2023-06-19 10:47     ` Kent Overstreet
2023-06-19 12:47       ` Mark Rutland
2023-06-19 19:17         ` Kent Overstreet
2023-06-20 17:42           ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-20 18:08             ` Kent Overstreet
2023-06-20 18:15               ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-20 18:48                 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-20 20:18                   ` Kent Overstreet
2023-06-20 20:42                   ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2023-06-20 22:32                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-20 22:43                       ` Nadav Amit
2023-06-21  1:27                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-15 20:41 ` [PATCH 00/32] bcachefs - a new COW filesystem Pavel Machek
2023-06-15 21:26   ` Kent Overstreet

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