From: "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>
To: "Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"Kent Overstreet" <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
Cc: "Mark Rutland" <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
"Linux Kernel Mailing List" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
"linux-bcachefs@vger.kernel.org" <linux-bcachefs@vger.kernel.org>,
"Kent Overstreet" <kent.overstreet@gmail.com>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Uladzislau Rezki" <urezki@gmail.com>,
"hch@infradead.org" <hch@infradead.org>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 07/32] mm: Bring back vmalloc_exec
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2023 13:42:44 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ff2006db-cd13-48c4-bc5b-1864f9ec9149@app.fastmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <37d2378e-72de-e474-5e25-656b691384ba@intel.com>
Hi all-
On Tue, Jun 20, 2023, at 11:48 AM, Dave Hansen wrote:
>>> No, I'm saying your concerns are baseless and too vague to
>>> address.
>> If you don't address them, the NAK will stand forever, or at least
>> until a different group of people take over x86 maintainership.
>> That's fine with me.
>
> I've got a specific concern: I don't see vmalloc_exec() used in this
> series anywhere. I also don't see any of the actual assembly that's
> being generated, or the glue code that's calling into the generated
> assembly.
>
> I grepped around a bit in your git trees, but I also couldn't find it in
> there. Any chance you could help a guy out and point us to some of the
> specifics of this new, tiny JIT?
>
So I had a nice discussion with Kent on IRC, and, for the benefit of everyone else reading along, I *think* the JITted code can be replaced by a table-driven approach like this:
typedef unsigned int u32;
typedef unsigned long u64;
struct uncompressed
{
u32 a;
u32 b;
u64 c;
u64 d;
u64 e;
u64 f;
};
struct bitblock
{
u64 source;
u64 target;
u64 mask;
int shift;
};
// out needs to be zeroed first
void unpack(struct uncompressed *out, const u64 *in, const struct bitblock *blocks, int nblocks)
{
u64 *out_as_words = (u64*)out;
for (int i = 0; i < nblocks; i++) {
const struct bitblock *b;
out_as_words[b->target] |= (in[b->source] & b->mask) << b->shift;
}
}
void apply_offsets(struct uncompressed *out, const struct uncompressed *offsets)
{
out->a += offsets->a;
out->b += offsets->b;
out->c += offsets->c;
out->d += offsets->d;
out->e += offsets->e;
out->f += offsets->f;
}
Which generates nice code: https://godbolt.org/z/3fEq37hf5
It would need spectre protection in two places, I think, because it's almost most certainly a great gadget if the attacker can speculatively control the 'blocks' table. This could be mitigated (I think) by hardcoding nblocks as 12 and by masking b->target.
In contrast, the JIT approach needs a retpoline on each call, which could be more expensive than my entire function :) I haven't benchmarked them lately.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-20 20:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-05-09 16:56 [PATCH 00/32] bcachefs - a new COW filesystem Kent Overstreet
2023-05-09 16:56 ` [PATCH 07/32] mm: Bring back vmalloc_exec Kent Overstreet
2023-05-09 18:19 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2023-05-09 20:15 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-09 20:46 ` Christoph Hellwig
2023-05-09 21:12 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2023-05-09 21:29 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-10 6:48 ` Eric Biggers
2023-05-12 18:36 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-13 1:57 ` Eric Biggers
2023-05-13 19:28 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-14 5:45 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-14 18:43 ` Eric Biggers
2023-05-15 5:38 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-15 6:13 ` Eric Biggers
2023-05-15 6:18 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-15 7:13 ` Eric Biggers
2023-05-15 7:26 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-21 21:33 ` Eric Biggers
2023-05-21 22:04 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-15 10:29 ` David Laight
2023-05-10 11:56 ` David Laight
2023-05-09 21:43 ` Darrick J. Wong
2023-05-09 21:54 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-11 5:33 ` Theodore Ts'o
2023-05-11 5:44 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-13 13:25 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2023-05-14 18:39 ` Christophe Leroy
2023-05-14 23:43 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-15 4:45 ` Christophe Leroy
2023-05-15 5:02 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-10 14:18 ` Christophe Leroy
2023-05-10 15:05 ` Johannes Thumshirn
2023-05-11 22:28 ` Kees Cook
2023-05-12 18:41 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-16 21:02 ` Kees Cook
2023-05-16 21:20 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-16 21:47 ` Matthew Wilcox
2023-05-16 21:57 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-17 5:28 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-17 14:04 ` Mike Rapoport
2023-05-17 14:18 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-05-17 15:44 ` Mike Rapoport
2023-05-17 15:59 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-06-17 4:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-17 15:34 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-06-17 19:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-17 20:08 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-06-17 20:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-19 19:45 ` Kees Cook
2023-06-20 0:39 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-06-19 9:19 ` Mark Rutland
2023-06-19 10:47 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-06-19 12:47 ` Mark Rutland
2023-06-19 19:17 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-06-20 17:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-20 18:08 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-06-20 18:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-20 18:48 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-20 20:18 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-06-20 20:42 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2023-06-20 22:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-20 22:43 ` Nadav Amit
2023-06-21 1:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-15 20:41 ` [PATCH 00/32] bcachefs - a new COW filesystem Pavel Machek
2023-06-15 21:26 ` Kent Overstreet
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