linux-mm.kvack.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm/secretmem: make it on by default
Date: Mon, 15 May 2023 08:08:08 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ff19a404-e059-ce7e-4a4c-27804503bf07@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230515083400.3563974-1-rppt@kernel.org>

Hi,

On 5/15/23 01:34, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> From: "Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>
> 
> Following the discussion about direct map fragmentaion at LSF/MM [1], it
> appears that direct map fragmentation has a negligible effect on kernel
> data accesses. Since the only reason that warranted secretmem to be
> disabled by default was concern about performance regression caused by
> the direct map fragmentation, it makes perfect sense to lift this
> restriction and make secretmem enabled.
> 
> secretmem obeys RLIMIT_MEMBLOCK and as such it is not expected to cause
> large fragmentation of the direct map or meaningfull increase in page
> tables allocated during split of the large mappings in the direct map.
> 
> The secretmem.enable parameter is retained to allow system
> administrators to disable secretmem at boot.
> 
> Switch the default setting of secretem.enable parameter to 1.

Nit:                            secretmem.enable

Maybe fix up while applying.

> 
> Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/931406/ [1]
> Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
> ---
>  mm/secretmem.c | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c
> index 0b502625cd30..974b32ba8b9d 100644
> --- a/mm/secretmem.c
> +++ b/mm/secretmem.c
> @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
>  #define SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK	(0x0)
>  #define SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK	SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK
>  
> -static bool secretmem_enable __ro_after_init;
> +static bool secretmem_enable __ro_after_init = 1;
>  module_param_named(enable, secretmem_enable, bool, 0400);
>  MODULE_PARM_DESC(secretmem_enable,
>  		 "Enable secretmem and memfd_secret(2) system call");

-- 
~Randy


  reply	other threads:[~2023-05-15 15:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-05-15  8:34 Mike Rapoport
2023-05-15 15:08 ` Randy Dunlap [this message]
2023-05-16 10:52 ` David Hildenbrand

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=ff19a404-e059-ce7e-4a4c-27804503bf07@infradead.org \
    --to=rdunlap@infradead.org \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=rppt@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox