From: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, Liam.Howlett@oracle.com,
vbabka@suse.cz, jannh@google.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, ebpqwerty472123@gmail.com,
paul@paul-moore.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com,
jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org,
syzbot+91ae49e1c1a2634d20c0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] mm: Split locks in remap_file_pages()
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2024 16:42:04 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <fa8cad07-c6d5-42aa-b58b-27ddbf86c1c5@lucifer.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241018144710.3800385-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
On Fri, Oct 18, 2024 at 04:47:10PM +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
>
> Commit ea7e2d5e49c0 ("mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in
> remap_file_pages()") fixed a security issue, it added an LSM check when
> trying to remap file pages, so that LSMs have the opportunity to evaluate
> such action like for other memory operations such as mmap() and mprotect().
>
> However, that commit called security_mmap_file() inside the mmap_lock lock,
> while the other calls do it before taking the lock, after commit
> 8b3ec6814c83 ("take security_mmap_file() outside of ->mmap_sem").
>
> This caused lock inversion issue with IMA which was taking the mmap_lock
> and i_mutex lock in the opposite way when the remap_file_pages() system
> call was called.
>
> Solve the issue by splitting the critical region in remap_file_pages() in
> two regions: the first takes a read lock of mmap_lock and retrieves the VMA
> and the file associated, and calculate the 'prot' and 'flags' variable; the
> second takes a write lock on mmap_lock, checks that the VMA flags and the
> VMA file descriptor are the same as the ones obtained in the first critical
> region (otherwise the system call fails), and calls do_mmap().
>
> In between, after releasing the read lock and taking the write lock, call
> security_mmap_file(), and solve the lock inversion issue.
Great description!
>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Fixes: ea7e2d5e49c0 ("mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()")
> Reported-by: syzbot+91ae49e1c1a2634d20c0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/66f7b10e.050a0220.46d20.0036.GAE@google.com/
> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> (Calculate prot and flags earlier)
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Other than some nits below:
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
I think you're definitely good to un-RFC here.
> ---
> mm/mmap.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
> 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
> index 9c0fb43064b5..762944427e03 100644
> --- a/mm/mmap.c
> +++ b/mm/mmap.c
> @@ -1640,6 +1640,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size,
> unsigned long populate = 0;
> unsigned long ret = -EINVAL;
> struct file *file;
> + vm_flags_t vm_flags;
>
> pr_warn_once("%s (%d) uses deprecated remap_file_pages() syscall. See Documentation/mm/remap_file_pages.rst.\n",
> current->comm, current->pid);
> @@ -1656,12 +1657,53 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size,
> if (pgoff + (size >> PAGE_SHIFT) < pgoff)
> return ret;
>
> - if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm))
> + if (mmap_read_lock_killable(mm))
> + return -EINTR;
I'm kinda verbose generally, but I'd love a comment like:
/*
* Look up VMA under read lock first so we can perform the security
* without holding locks (which can be problematic). We reacquire a
* write lock later and check nothing changed underneath us.
*/
> +
> + vma = vma_lookup(mm, start);
> +
> + if (!vma || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) {
> + mmap_read_unlock(mm);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_READ ? PROT_READ : 0;
> + prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE ? PROT_WRITE : 0;
> + prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC ? PROT_EXEC : 0;
> +
> + flags &= MAP_NONBLOCK;
> + flags |= MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED | MAP_POPULATE;
> + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
> + flags |= MAP_LOCKED;
> +
> + /* Save vm_flags used to calculate prot and flags, and recheck later. */
> + vm_flags = vma->vm_flags;
> + file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
> +
> + mmap_read_unlock(mm);
> +
Maybe worth adding a comment to explain why you're doing this without the
lock so somebody looking at this later can understand the dance?
> + ret = security_mmap_file(file, prot, flags);
> + if (ret) {
> + fput(file);
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> +
Again, being verbose, I'd put something here like:
/* OK security check passed, take write lock + let it rip */
> + if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm)) {
> + fput(file);
> return -EINTR;
> + }
>
> vma = vma_lookup(mm, start);
>
> - if (!vma || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
> + if (!vma)
> + goto out;
> +
I'd also add something like:
/* Make sure things didn't change under us. */
> + if (vma->vm_flags != vm_flags)
> + goto out;
> +
And drop this newline to group them together (super nitty I know, sorry!)
> + if (vma->vm_file != file)
> goto out;
>
> if (start + size > vma->vm_end) {
> @@ -1689,25 +1731,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size,
> goto out;
> }
>
> - prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_READ ? PROT_READ : 0;
> - prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE ? PROT_WRITE : 0;
> - prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC ? PROT_EXEC : 0;
> -
> - flags &= MAP_NONBLOCK;
> - flags |= MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED | MAP_POPULATE;
> - if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
> - flags |= MAP_LOCKED;
> -
> - file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
> - ret = security_mmap_file(vma->vm_file, prot, flags);
> - if (ret)
> - goto out_fput;
> ret = do_mmap(vma->vm_file, start, size,
> prot, flags, 0, pgoff, &populate, NULL);
> -out_fput:
> - fput(file);
> out:
> mmap_write_unlock(mm);
> + fput(file);
> if (populate)
> mm_populate(ret, populate);
> if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(ret))
> --
> 2.34.1
>
These are just nits, this looks good to me!
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-18 15:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-18 14:47 Roberto Sassu
2024-10-18 15:05 ` Jann Horn
2024-10-18 15:42 ` Lorenzo Stoakes [this message]
2024-10-18 15:45 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-10-18 15:50 ` Roberto Sassu
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