From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, simon.guinot@sequanux.org,
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akpm@linux-foundation.org, davem@davemloft.net
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 15/32] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot
Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2017 10:07:00 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <f8c57c98-4d42-4bfe-f05f-37c607a81a42@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170324171257.lgvqcdqec3nla5nb@pd.tnic>
Hi Boris,
On 03/24/2017 12:12 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
>> }
>>
>> +static inline int __init early_set_memory_decrypted(void *addr,
>> + unsigned long size)
>> +{
>> + return 1;
> ^^^^^^^^
>
> return 1 when !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT ?
>
> The non-early variants return 0.
>
I will fix it and use the same return value.
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(void *addr,
>> + unsigned long size)
>> +{
>> + return 1;
>> +}
>> +
>> #define __sme_pa __pa
>> + unsigned long pfn, npages;
>> + unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)vaddr & PAGE_MASK;
>> +
>> + /* We are going to change the physical page attribute from C=1 to C=0.
>> + * Flush the caches to ensure that all the data with C=1 is flushed to
>> + * memory. Any caching of the vaddr after function returns will
>> + * use C=0.
>> + */
>
> Kernel comments style is:
>
> /*
> * A sentence ending with a full-stop.
> * Another sentence. ...
> * More sentences. ...
> */
>
I will update to use kernel comment style.
>> + clflush_cache_range(vaddr, size);
>> +
>> + npages = PAGE_ALIGN(size) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>> + pfn = slow_virt_to_phys((void *)addr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>> +
>> + return kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(init_mm.pgd, pfn, addr, npages,
>> + flags & ~sme_me_mask);
>> +
>> +}
>> +
>> +int __init early_set_memory_decrypted(void *vaddr, unsigned long size)
>> +{
>> + unsigned long flags = get_pte_flags((unsigned long)vaddr);
>
> So this does lookup_address()...
>
>> + return early_set_memory_enc_dec(vaddr, size, flags & ~sme_me_mask);
>
> ... and this does it too in slow_virt_to_phys(). So you do it twice per
> vaddr.
>
> So why don't you define a __slow_virt_to_phys() helper - notice
> the "__" - which returns flags in its second parameter and which
> slow_virt_to_phys() calls with a NULL second parameter in the other
> cases?
>
I will look into creating a helper function. thanks
-Brijesh
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-03-27 15:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-03-02 15:12 [RFC PATCH v2 00/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/32] x86: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 16:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 21:01 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-04 10:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-06 20:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/32] KVM: SVM: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/32] KVM: SVM: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 0:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/32] x86: Use encrypted access of BOOT related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 19:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/32] x86/pci: Use memremap when walking setup data Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 20:42 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 21:15 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-07 0:03 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-13 20:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/32] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/32] x86: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory page Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 14:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 20:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:32 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/32] x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data Brijesh Singh
2017-03-08 8:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/32] x86: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-03-08 10:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/32] x86: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/32] x86: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-09 14:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-09 16:13 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-09 16:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 16:35 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 14:28 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 15:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 16:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 16:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/32] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV by setting the SEV_ENABLE CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-03-09 19:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/32] x86: mm: Provide support to use memblock when spliting large pages Brijesh Singh
2017-03-10 11:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 22:41 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 13:15 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 22:25 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 10:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 10:47 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 10:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 11:03 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 11:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 14:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-18 16:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-06 14:05 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-06 17:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-06 18:37 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-07 11:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-07 14:50 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 12:28 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/32] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-03-24 17:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-27 15:07 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/32] x86: kvm: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 11:06 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-28 18:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 15:21 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-29 15:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/32] x86: kvmclock: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/32] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk Brijesh Singh
2017-03-29 15:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 17:08 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/32] crypto: ccp: Introduce the AMD Secure Processor device Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 17:39 ` Mark Rutland
2017-03-02 19:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 13:55 ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/32] crypto: ccp: Add Platform Security Processor (PSP) interface support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 21/32] crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) " Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 22/32] kvm: svm: prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 23/32] kvm: introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:25 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 24/32] kvm: x86: prepare for SEV guest management API support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:33 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 25/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_START command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 26/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:48 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:20 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 27/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 28/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV GUEST_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 29/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV DEBUG_DECRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:54 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:41 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-17 11:09 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 30/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 11:03 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:34 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 31/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_MEASURE command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 32/32] x86: kvm: Pin the guest memory when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:38 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:17 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 20:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 20:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 21:15 ` Brijesh Singh
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