From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm/userfaultfd: provide unmasked address on page-fault
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 2021 09:59:35 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <f5ea62e1-cf21-6bd8-37f8-1a0f9637402c@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <E2ADE3F0-74B1-4D1D-80AE-0BBC49D932E6@gmail.com>
On 09.10.21 00:02, Nadav Amit wrote:
>
>
>> On Oct 8, 2021, at 1:05 AM, David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 08.10.21 01:50, Nadav Amit wrote:
>>> From: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
>>> Userfaultfd is supposed to provide the full address (i.e., unmasked) of
>>> the faulting access back to userspace. However, that is not the case for
>>> quite some time.
>>> Even running "userfaultfd_demo" from the userfaultfd man page provides
>>> the wrong output (and contradicts the man page). Notice that
>>> "UFFD_EVENT_PAGEFAULT event" shows the masked address.
>>> Address returned by mmap() = 0x7fc5e30b3000
>>> fault_handler_thread():
>>> poll() returns: nready = 1; POLLIN = 1; POLLERR = 0
>>> UFFD_EVENT_PAGEFAULT event: flags = 0; address = 7fc5e30b3000
>>> (uffdio_copy.copy returned 4096)
>>> Read address 0x7fc5e30b300f in main(): A
>>> Read address 0x7fc5e30b340f in main(): A
>>> Read address 0x7fc5e30b380f in main(): A
>>> Read address 0x7fc5e30b3c0f in main(): A
>>> Add a new "real_address" field to vmf to hold the unmasked address. It
>>> is possible to keep the unmasked address in the existing address field
>>> (and mask whenever necessary) instead, but this is likely to cause
>>> backporting problems of this patch.
>>
>> Can we be sure that no existing users will rely on this behavior that has been the case since end of 2016 IIRC, one year after UFFD was upstreamed?
>
> Let me to blow off your mind: how do you be sure that the current behavior does not make applications to misbehave? It might cause performance issues as it did for me or hidden correctness issues.
>
Fair point, but now we can speculate what's more likely:
Having an app rely on >4 year old kernel behavior just after the feature
was released or having and app rely on kernel behavior that was the case
for the last 4 years?
<offtopic>
Someone once told me about the unwritten way to remove things from the
kernel. 1) Silently break it upstream 2) Wait 2 kernel releases 3)
Propose removal of the feature because it's broken and nobody complained.
<\offtopic>
You might ask "why does David even care?", here is why:
For the records, I *do* have a prototype from last year that breaks with
this new behavior as far as I can tell: using uffd in the context of
virtio-balloon in QEMU. I just pushed the latest state to a !private
github tree:
https://github.com/davidhildenbrand/qemu/tree/virtio-balloon-uffd
In that code, I made sure that I'm only dealing with 4k pages (because
that's the only thing virtio-balloon really can deal with), and during
the debugging I figured that the kernel always returns 4k aligned page
fault addresses, so I didn't care about masking. I'll reuse the
unmodified fault address for UFFDIO_ZEROPAGE()/UFFDIO_COPY()/... which
should then fail because:
"
EINVAL The start or the len field of the ufdio_range structure
was not a multiple of the system page size; or len was
zero; or the specified range was otherwise invalid.
"
If I'm too lazy to read all documentation, I'm quite sure that there are
other people that don't. I don't care to much if this patch breaks that
prototype, it's just a prototype after all, but I am concerned that we
might break other users in a similar way.
>> I do wonder what the official ABI nowadays is, because man pages aren't necessarily the source of truth.
>
> Documentation/admin-guide/mm/userfaultfd.rst says: "You get the address of the access that triggered the missing page
> event”.
>
> So it is a bug.
The least thing I would expect in the patch description is a better
motivation ("who cares and why" -- I know you have a better motivation
that making the doc correct :) ) and a discussion on the chances of this
actually breaking other apps (see my example).
I'd sleep better if we'd glue the changed behavior to a new feature
flag, but that's just my 2 cents.
--
Thanks,
David / dhildenb
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-10-09 7:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-10-07 23:50 Nadav Amit
2021-10-08 8:05 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-10-08 22:02 ` Nadav Amit
2021-10-09 7:59 ` David Hildenbrand [this message]
2021-10-10 5:29 ` Mike Rapoport
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