From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>,
Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] s390: kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1529!
Date: Wed, 24 Aug 2022 14:07:16 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <f5a81962-cd95-a47b-5710-900b7932bf56@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YwYThOGeyIv4b8IB@bfoster>
On 24.08.22 14:03, Brian Foster wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> When running a fuzzer workload to test an unrelated patch[1], I've been
> reproducing the VM_BUG_ON() splat below[2] on s390x. I've narrowed the
> problem down to a deterministic reproducer. The code for that is also
> appended below[3].
>
> The splat occurs because during fork() we end up down in
> copy_present_pte() -> page_try_dup_anon_rmap() ->
> page_needs_cow_for_dma() for a !is_cow mapping, so copy_page_range()
> didn't acquire the ->write_protect_seq seqlock as expected. After
> digging into this a bit, I _think_ this boils down to a bug in the s390
> arch fault code dealing with a write fault to a !VM_WRITE mapping..
>
> The sequence of events implemented by the reproducer that leads to this:
>
> 1. Create a shmem segment and attach it SHM_RDONLY. This causes
> do_mmap() to set up a !VM_WRITE mapping, but also clear
> (VM_MAYWRITE|VM_SHARED) on the mapping because the backing shmem file is
> read-only.
>
> 2. Take a write fault on the mapping in kernel mode (via getrlimit() in
> this case). The write fault ultimately causes getrlimit() to fail with a
> bad access error, but not before the generic fault code creates an
> anon_vma mapping for the page.
>
> This occurs because first do_dat_exception() calls handle_mm_fault()
> with FAULT_FLAG_WRITE via the following logic:
>
> access = VM_ACCESS_FLAGS;
> ...
> if (access == VM_WRITE || is_write)
> flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
> ...
> if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & access)))
> goto out_up;
> ...
> fault = handle_mm_fault(...);
>
> So the FAULT_FLAG_WRITE fault proceeds because is_write is true and
> ->vm_flags has read or exec permission (but not VM_WRITE). This
> eventually gets down into do_cow_fault() -> finish_fault() ->
> do_set_pte(), the latter of which calls page_add_new_anon_rmap() because
> this is a write fault to a !shared mapping.
>
> Note this is immediately followed by a do_protection_exception() that
> uses access = VM_WRITE and thus fails the above check and returns with
> VM_FAULT_BADACCESS. So I think this ultimately DTRT wrt to failing the
> syscall to userspace, but the do_dat_exception() handling sets up an
> unexpected situation for fork()..
>
> 3. fork() -> dup_mm() comes across this mapping with ->anon_vma set (so
> vma_needs_copy() returns true), but is_cow_mapping() returns false
> because VM_MAYWRITE is cleared. From there we fall down into the page
> table copying path described by the BUG splat.
>
> This problem doesn't occur on x86 seemingly because we don't call into
> handle_mm_fault() for a write fault to a !VM_WRITE mapping, which is
> specifically checked in access_error(). Therefore, something like the
> patch below[4] seems to prevent the problem on s390. However, the access
> checking logic looks wonky enough to me that I wonder whether it
> warrants a closer look from s390 experts. For example, does this code
> need to care about any flags/context beyond write or read faults vs.
> write or !write mappings? I don't have enough context to reason about
> it. Could somebody more familiar with these two s390 exception variants
> chime in?
>
> Finally, note that so far I've only really tested the patch against the
> reproducer. I'm happy to try and form it into a proper patch and test
> further after some feedback... thanks.
>
> Brian
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-s390/20220816155407.537372-1-bfoster@redhat.com
> [2] BUG splat:
>
> kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1529!
> monitor event: 0040 ilc:2 [#1] SMP
> Modules linked in: rfkill sunrpc ghash_s390 prng xts aes_s390 des_s390 libdes sha3_512_s390 sha3_256_s390 vfio_ccw sha512_s390 mdev vfio_iommu_type1 vfio xfs libcrc32c virtio_blk virtio_net net_failover failover dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod pkey zcrypt
> CPU: 1 PID: 1401 Comm: shmem-fork-test Not tainted 6.0.0-rc2+ #20
> Hardware name: IBM 8561 LT1 400 (KVM/Linux)
> Krnl PSW : 0704c00180000000 0000000014928240 (copy_pte_range+0xa40/0xe58)
> R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:0 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3
> Krnl GPRS: 000003ff85b80000 000000000000000c 0000000000000000 000003ff85b80000
> 0000000091c5f31f 0000000087d70640 000000008160e800 00000372024717c0
> 000003ff85b80000 0000000000000000 00000000831c9c00 0000000091c5f31f
> 00000000823ada00 0000000087d70640 00000000149279c2 0000038000773880
> Krnl Code: 0000000014928232: c0e5fffff48f brasl %r14,0000000014926b50
> 0000000014928238: a7f4fd43 brc 15,0000000014927cbe
> #000000001492823c: af000000 mc 0,0
> >0000000014928240: b904005b lgr %r5,%r11
> 0000000014928244: a7f4ffde brc 15,0000000014928200
> 0000000014928248: e310f0e80004 lg %r1,232(%r15)
> 000000001492824e: a7f4ff17 brc 15,000000001492807c
> 0000000014928252: ec3800091c7c cgij %r3,28,8,0000000014928264
> Call Trace:
> [<0000000014928240>] copy_pte_range+0xa40/0xe58
> ([<00000000149279c2>] copy_pte_range+0x1c2/0xe58)
> [<000000001492e258>] copy_page_range+0x510/0x770
> [<00000000146f3896>] dup_mmap+0x47e/0x6c0
> [<00000000146f3b52>] dup_mm+0x7a/0x278
> [<00000000146f5a48>] copy_process+0x1298/0x1a48
> [<00000000146f62fe>] kernel_clone+0x5e/0x3c0
> [<00000000146f6742>] __do_sys_clone+0x5a/0x68
> [<00000000146f67e0>] __s390x_sys_clone+0x40/0x50
> [<0000000014f68dac>] __do_syscall+0x1d4/0x200
> [<0000000014f78c22>] system_call+0x82/0xb0
> Last Breaking-Event-Address:
> [<0000000014927a46>] copy_pte_range+0x246/0xe58
> Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oops
>
> [3] minimal reproducer:
>
> #include <unistd.h>
> #include <sys/shm.h>
> #include <sys/resource.h>
>
> int main()
> {
> int id;
> void *p;
>
> id = shmget(IPC_PRIVATE, 4096, IPC_CREAT);
> p = shmat(id, NULL, SHM_RDONLY);
> getrlimit(RLIMIT_AS, p);
> fork();
> return 0;
> }
>
> [4] RFC patch:
>
> diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/fault.c b/arch/s390/mm/fault.c
> index 13449941516c..c12722da1558 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/mm/fault.c
> +++ b/arch/s390/mm/fault.c
> @@ -418,6 +418,8 @@ static inline vm_fault_t do_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int access)
> fault = VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
> if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & access)))
> goto out_up;
> + if ((flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
> + goto out_up;
>
> if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
> address &= HPAGE_MASK;
>
Heh, we might have identified this independently just recently:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220816113359.33843f54@thinkpad/T/#u
Can you take a look if that proposed small change also fixes the issue?
--
Thanks,
David / dhildenb
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-08-24 12:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-08-24 12:03 Brian Foster
2022-08-24 12:07 ` David Hildenbrand [this message]
2022-08-24 12:57 ` Brian Foster
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