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From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, simon.guinot@sequanux.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	rkrcmar@redhat.com, matt@codeblueprint.co.uk,
	linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, linus.walleij@linaro.org,
	gary.hook@amd.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	paul.gortmaker@windriver.com, hpa@zytor.com, cl@linux.com,
	dan.j.williams@intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
	sfr@canb.auug.org.au, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, bhe@redhat.com, xemul@parallels.com,
	joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
	piotr.luc@intel.com, mingo@redhat.com, msalter@redhat.com,
	ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com, dyoung@redhat.com,
	thomas.lendacky@amd.com, jroedel@suse.de, keescook@chromium.org,
	arnd@arndb.de, toshi.kani@hpe.com,
	mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com, luto@kernel.org,
	devel@linuxdriverproject.org, bhelgaas@google.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mchehab@kernel.org, iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com,
	labbott@fedo.suse.de
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 14/32] x86: mm: Provide support to use memblock when spliting large pages
Date: Thu, 6 Apr 2017 09:05:03 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <f46ff1e1-1cc7-1907-74a0-e2709fa1e5fb@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170317101737.icdois7sdmtutt6b@pd.tnic>

Hi Boris,

On 03/17/2017 05:17 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 16, 2017 at 11:25:36PM +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>> The kvmclock memory is initially zero so there is no need for the
>> hypervisor to allocate anything; the point of these patches is just to
>> access the data in a natural way from Linux source code.
>
> I realize that.
>
>> I also don't really like the patch as is (plus it fails modpost), but
>> IMO reusing __change_page_attr and __split_large_page is the right thing
>> to do.
>
> Right, so teaching pageattr.c about memblock could theoretically come
> around and bite us later when a page allocated with memblock gets freed
> with free_page().
>
> And looking at this more, we have all this kernel pagetable preparation
> code down the init_mem_mapping() call and the pagetable setup in
> arch/x86/mm/init_{32,64}.c
>
> And that code even does some basic page splitting. Oh and it uses
> alloc_low_pages() which knows whether to do memblock reservation or the
> common __get_free_pages() when slabs are up.
>

I looked into arch/x86/mm/init_{32,64}.c and as you pointed the file contains
routines to do basic page splitting. I think it sufficient for our usage.

I should be able to drop the memblock patch from the series and update the
Patch 15 [1] to use the kernel_physical_mapping_init().

The kernel_physical_mapping_init() creates the page table mapping using
default KERNEL_PAGE attributes, I tried to extend the function by passing
'bool enc' flags to hint whether to clr or set _PAGE_ENC when splitting the
pages. The code did not looked clean hence I dropped that idea. Instead,
I took the below approach. I did some runtime test and it seem to be working okay.

[1] http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=148846773731212&w=2

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 7df5f4c..de16ef4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
  #include <linux/mm.h>
  #include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
  #include <linux/swiotlb.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
  
  #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
  #include <asm/fixmap.h>
@@ -22,6 +23,8 @@
  #include <asm/bootparam.h>
  #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
  
+#include "mm_internal.h"
+
  extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;
  int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long, pmdval_t);
  void __init __early_pgtable_flush(void);
@@ -258,6 +261,72 @@ static void sme_free(struct device *dev, size_t size, void *vaddr,
         swiotlb_free_coherent(dev, size, vaddr, dma_handle);
  }
  
+static int __init early_set_memory_enc_dec(resource_size_t paddr,
+                                          unsigned long size, bool enc)
+{
+       pte_t *kpte;
+       int level;
+       unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, vaddr_next;
+
+       vaddr = (unsigned long)__va(paddr);
+       vaddr_next = vaddr;
+       vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
+
+       /*
+        * We are going to change the physical page attribute from C=1 to C=0.
+        * Flush the caches to ensure that all the data with C=1 is flushed to
+        * memory. Any caching of the vaddr after function returns will
+        * use C=0.
+        */
+       clflush_cache_range(__va(paddr), size);
+
+       for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = vaddr_next) {
+               kpte = lookup_address(vaddr, &level);
+               if (!kpte || pte_none(*kpte) )
+                       return 1;
+
+               if (level == PG_LEVEL_4K) {
+                       pte_t new_pte;
+                       unsigned long pfn = pte_pfn(*kpte);
+                       pgprot_t new_prot = pte_pgprot(*kpte);
+
+                       if (enc)
+                               pgprot_val(new_prot) |= _PAGE_ENC;
+                       else
+                               pgprot_val(new_prot) &= ~_PAGE_ENC;
+
+                       new_pte = pfn_pte(pfn, canon_pgprot(new_prot));
+                       pr_info("  pte %016lx -> 0x%016lx\n", pte_val(*kpte),
+                               pte_val(new_pte));
+                       set_pte_atomic(kpte, new_pte);
+                       vaddr_next = (vaddr & PAGE_MASK) + PAGE_SIZE;
+                       continue;
+               }
+
+               /*
+                * virtual address is part of large page, create the page
+                * table mapping to use smaller pages (4K). The virtual and
+                * physical address must be aligned to PMD level.
+                */
+               kernel_physical_mapping_init(__pa(vaddr & PMD_MASK),
+                                            __pa((vaddr_end & PMD_MASK) + PMD_SIZE),
+                                            0);
+       }
+
+       __flush_tlb_all();
+       return 0;
+}
+
+int __init early_set_memory_decrypted(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
+{
+       return early_set_memory_enc_dec(paddr, size, false);
+}
+
+int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
+{
+       return early_set_memory_enc_dec(paddr, size, true);
+}
+

> So what would be much cleaner, IMHO, is if one would reuse that code to
> change init_mm.pgd mappings early without copying pageattr.c.
>
> init_mem_mapping() gets called before kvm_guest_init() in setup_arch()
> so the guest would simply fixup its pagetable right there.
>

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-04-06 14:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-03-02 15:12 [RFC PATCH v2 00/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/32] x86: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 16:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 21:01     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-04 10:11       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-06 18:11         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-06 20:54           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/32] KVM: SVM: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/32] KVM: SVM: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07  0:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/32] x86: Use encrypted access of BOOT related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 19:03     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/32] x86/pci: Use memremap when walking setup data Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 20:42   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 21:15     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-07  0:03       ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-13 20:08         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/32] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/32] x86: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory page Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 14:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 20:04     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:32       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:55         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/32] x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data Brijesh Singh
2017-03-08  8:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/32] x86: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-03-08 10:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/32] x86: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/32] x86: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-09 14:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-09 16:13     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-09 16:29       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 16:35         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:16           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 14:28             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 15:09               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 16:11                 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 16:29                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/32] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV by setting the SEV_ENABLE CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-03-09 19:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/32] x86: mm: Provide support to use memblock when spliting large pages Brijesh Singh
2017-03-10 11:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 22:41     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 13:15       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 22:25         ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 10:17           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 10:47             ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 10:56               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 11:03                 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 11:33                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 14:45                     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-18 16:37                       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-06 14:05             ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-04-06 17:25               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-06 18:37                 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-07 11:33                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-07 14:50                     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 12:28   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/32] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-03-24 17:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-27 15:07     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/32] x86: kvm: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 11:06   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-28 18:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 15:21     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-29 15:32       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/32] x86: kvmclock: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/32] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk Brijesh Singh
2017-03-29 15:14   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 17:08     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/32] crypto: ccp: Introduce the AMD Secure Processor device Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 17:39   ` Mark Rutland
2017-03-02 19:11     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 13:55       ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/32] crypto: ccp: Add Platform Security Processor (PSP) interface support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 21/32] crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) " Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 22/32] kvm: svm: prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 23/32] kvm: introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:25   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 24/32] kvm: x86: prepare for SEV guest management API support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:33   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 25/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_START command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 26/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:48   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:20     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 27/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 28/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV GUEST_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 29/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV DEBUG_DECRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:54   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:41     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-17 11:09       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 30/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 11:03   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:34     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 31/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_MEASURE command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 32/32] x86: kvm: Pin the guest memory when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:38   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:17     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 20:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 20:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 21:15   ` Brijesh Singh

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