From: "Liam R. Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
To: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, jannh@google.com,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, vbabka@suse.cz,
lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com, adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org,
oleg@redhat.com, avagin@gmail.com, benjamin@sipsolutions.net,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, jorgelo@chromium.org, sroettger@google.com,
hch@lst.de, ojeda@kernel.org, thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de,
adobriyan@gmail.com, johannes@sipsolutions.net,
pedro.falcato@gmail.com, hca@linux.ibm.com, willy@infradead.org,
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linus.walleij@linaro.org, Jason@zx2c4.com, deller@gmx.de,
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aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com, mike.rapoport@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v5 1/7] mseal, system mappings: kernel config and header change
Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2025 20:10:43 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ex3y7knp5kmubeauwktvv4fdjqya7ndatzm7ht4gf773c72hc3@y4ow7k54fttj> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <tfoitovawb6zwr7nvwfo2mnbahgtnoo6umvecj5mgtie4b5vuf@sloraia3ppfy>
* Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> [250213 19:14]:
> * Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org> [250213 17:00]:
> > On Thu, Feb 13, 2025 at 12:54 PM Liam R. Howlett
> > <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> wrote:
> >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > VM_SEALED isn't defined in 32-bit systems, and mseal.c isn't part of
> > > > > > the build. This is intentional. Any 32-bit code trying to use the
> > > > > > sealing function or the VM_SEALED flag will immediately fail
> > > > > > compilation. This makes it easier to identify incorrect usage.
> > > > >
> > > > > So you are against using the #define because the VM_SYSTEM_SEAL will be
> > > > > defined, even though it will be VM_NONE? This is no worse than a
> > > > > function that returns 0, and it aligns better with what we have today in
> > > > > that it can be put in the list of other flags.
> > > >
> > > > When I was reading through all of this and considering the history of
> > > > its development goals, it strikes me that a function is easier for the
> > > > future if/when this can be made a boot-time setting.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Reworking this change to function as a boot-time parameter, or whatever,
> > > would not be a significant amount of work, if/when the time comes.
> > > Since we don't know what the future holds, it it unnecessary to engineer
> > > in a potential change for a future version when the change is easy
> > > enough to make later and keep the code cleaner now.
> > >
> > Sure, I will put the function in mm.h for this patch. We can find a
> > proper place when it is time to implement the boot-time parameter
> > change.
> >
> > The call stack for sealing system mapping is something like below:
> >
> > install_special_mapping (mm/mmap.c)
> > map_vdso (arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c)
> > load_elf_binary (fs/binfmt_elf.c)
> > load_misc_binary (fs/binfmt_misc.c)
> > bprm_execve (fs/exec.c)
> > do_execveat_common
> > __x64_sys_execve
> > do_syscall_64
> >
> > IMO, there's a clear divide between the API implementer and the API user.
> > mm and mm.h are the providers, offering the core mm functionality
> > through APIs/data structures like install_special_mapping().
> >
> > The exe layer (bprm_execve, map_vdso, etc) is the consumer of the
> > install_special_mapping.
> > The logic related to checking if sealing system mapping is enabled
> > belongs to the exe layer.
>
> Since this is an all or nothing enabling, there is no reason to have
> each caller check the same thing and do the same action. You should put
> the logic into the provider - they all end up doing the same thing.
>
> Also, this is a compile time option so it doesn't even need to be
> checked on execution - just apply it in the first place, at the source.
> Your static inline function was already doing this...?
>
> I'm confused as to what you are arguing here because it goes against
> what you had and what I suggested. The alternative you are suggesting
> is more code, more instructions, and the best outcome is the same
> result.
I think I understand what you are saying now: the interface to
install_special_mapping() needs to take the vma flag, as it does today.
What I don't understand is that what you proposed and what I proposed
both do that.
What I'm saying is that, since system mappings are enabled, we can
already know implicitly by having VM_SYSTEM_SEAL either VM_NONE or
VM_SEAL.
Turning this:
@@ -264,11 +266,12 @@ static int map_vdso(const struct vdso_image *image, unsigned long addr)
/*
* MAYWRITE to allow gdb to COW and set breakpoints
*/
+ vm_flags = VM_READ|VM_EXEC|VM_MAYREAD|VM_MAYWRITE|VM_MAYEXEC;
+ vm_flags |= mseal_system_mappings();
vma = _install_special_mapping(mm,
text_start,
image->size,
- VM_READ|VM_EXEC|
- VM_MAYREAD|VM_MAYWRITE|VM_MAYEXEC,
+ vm_flags,
&vdso_mapping);
to this:
/*
* MAYWRITE to allow gdb to COW and set breakpoints
*/
vma = _install_special_mapping(mm,
text_start,
image->size,
VM_READ|VM_EXEC|
- VM_MAYREAD|VM_MAYWRITE|VM_MAYEXEC,
+ VM_MAYREAD|VM_MAYWRITE|VM_MAYEXEC|
+ VM_SYSTEM_SEAL,
&vdso_mapping);
No unsigned long vm_flags needed. It's easier to read and I don't think
it's any more hidden than the vm_flags |= function call option.
>
> >
> > >
> > > > If mm maintainers prefer a #define for now, that's fine of course. The
> > > > value of VM_SYSTEM_SEAL can be VM_NONE on 32-bit.
> > >
> > > Thanks. I think having a flag with VM_NONE on 32-bit is just as sane as
> > > a "flags |= system_seal()" call that unconditionally returns 0 on
> > > 32-bit.
> > >
> > Consider the case below in src/third_party/kernel/v6.6/fs/proc/task_mmu.c,
> >
> > #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
> > [ilog2(VM_SEALED)] = "sl",
> > #endif
> >
> > If #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT is missing, it won't be detected during compile time.
> >
> > Setting VM_SEALED to VM_NONE could simplify the coding in some cases
> > (get/set case), but it might make other cases error prone.
> >
> > I would prefer to not have VM_SEALED for 32 bit.
>
> But what I posted leaves VM_SEALED undefined for 32 bit, it defines
> VM_SYSTEM_SEALED which can be placed, for instance, into
> _install_special_mapping() arguments directly. Reducing the change to
> just adding a new flag to the list. And it's applied to all system
> mappings based on if it's enabled on compile or not.
>
> Also:
> include/linux/mm.h:#define VM_NONE 0x00000000
> so, I'm not sure what evaluation you are concerned about? It would be
> defined as 0.
>
> Thanks,
> Liam
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-02-14 1:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-02-12 3:21 [RFC PATCH v5 0/7] mseal system mappings jeffxu
2025-02-12 3:21 ` [RFC PATCH v5 1/7] mseal, system mappings: kernel config and header change jeffxu
2025-02-12 3:31 ` Randy Dunlap
2025-02-12 3:40 ` Jeff Xu
2025-02-12 15:05 ` Liam R. Howlett
2025-02-13 17:15 ` Jeff Xu
2025-02-13 18:29 ` Liam R. Howlett
2025-02-13 20:11 ` Kees Cook
2025-02-13 20:54 ` Liam R. Howlett
2025-02-13 22:00 ` Jeff Xu
2025-02-14 0:14 ` Liam R. Howlett
2025-02-14 1:10 ` Liam R. Howlett [this message]
2025-02-14 14:39 ` Jeff Xu
2025-02-14 14:59 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2025-02-14 15:18 ` Jeff Xu
2025-02-12 3:21 ` [RFC PATCH v5 2/7] selftests: x86: test_mremap_vdso: skip if vdso is msealed jeffxu
2025-02-12 13:03 ` Thomas Weißschuh
2025-02-13 14:14 ` Jeff Xu
2025-02-13 19:28 ` Kees Cook
2025-02-13 22:20 ` Jeff Xu
2025-02-14 2:52 ` Kees Cook
2025-02-14 14:15 ` Jeff Xu
2025-02-12 3:21 ` [RFC PATCH v5 3/7] mseal, system mappings: enable x86-64 jeffxu
2025-02-12 3:21 ` [RFC PATCH v5 4/7] mseal, system mappings: enable arm64 jeffxu
2025-02-12 3:21 ` [RFC PATCH v5 5/7] mseal, system mappings: enable uml architecture jeffxu
2025-02-12 3:21 ` [RFC PATCH v5 6/7] mseal, system mappings: uprobe mapping jeffxu
2025-02-12 3:21 ` [RFC PATCH v5 7/7] mseal, system mappings: update mseal.rst jeffxu
2025-02-12 11:24 ` [RFC PATCH v5 0/7] mseal system mappings Lorenzo Stoakes
2025-02-12 12:37 ` Pedro Falcato
2025-02-12 14:01 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2025-02-12 14:08 ` Johannes Berg
2025-02-13 19:59 ` Pedro Falcato
2025-02-13 20:47 ` Kees Cook
2025-02-18 23:18 ` Pedro Falcato
2025-02-19 13:46 ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2025-02-19 17:17 ` enh
2025-02-23 2:05 ` Jeff Xu
2025-02-12 22:05 ` Kees Cook
2025-02-13 14:20 ` Jeff Xu
2025-02-13 18:35 ` Liam R. Howlett
2025-02-13 19:34 ` Kees Cook
2025-02-13 20:10 ` Liam R. Howlett
2025-02-13 14:19 ` Jeff Xu
2025-02-12 3:32 jeffxu
2025-02-12 3:32 ` [RFC PATCH v5 1/7] mseal, system mappings: kernel config and header change jeffxu
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