From: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
To: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Liam R. Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, jeffxu@chromium.org,
oliver.sang@intel.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/7] mm/mprotect: Replace can_modify_mm with can_modify_vma
Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2024 07:51:15 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ecf95db2-520d-416c-8bd7-d4e812449f74@lucifer.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240817-mseal-depessimize-v3-3-d8d2e037df30@gmail.com>
On Sat, Aug 17, 2024 at 01:18:30AM GMT, Pedro Falcato wrote:
> Avoid taking an extra trip down the mmap tree by checking the vmas
> directly. mprotect (per POSIX) tolerates partial failure.
Pretty sure this also applies to any such mXXX() operation, though I
haven't read the formalised POSIX spec. But in practice, this is how it is
:)
>
> Signed-off-by: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
> ---
> mm/mprotect.c | 12 +++---------
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
> index 446f8e5f10d9..0c5d6d06107d 100644
> --- a/mm/mprotect.c
> +++ b/mm/mprotect.c
> @@ -611,6 +611,9 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vma_iterator *vmi, struct mmu_gather *tlb,
> unsigned long charged = 0;
> int error;
>
> + if (!can_modify_vma(vma))
> + return -EPERM;
> +
I'm glad to get rid of the unlikely() too, imo these should _only_ be added
based on actual data to back them up rather than because the programmer
instinctively 'feels' that something is unlikely from the compiler's point
of view.
> if (newflags == oldflags) {
> *pprev = vma;
> return 0;
> @@ -769,15 +772,6 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
> }
> }
>
> - /*
> - * checking if memory is sealed.
> - * can_modify_mm assumes we have acquired the lock on MM.
> - */
> - if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(current->mm, start, end))) {
> - error = -EPERM;
> - goto out;
> - }
> -
This will allow the vm_ops->mprotect() caller to run on the vma before
initiating the mprotect() fixup, a quick survey suggests that sgx uses this
to see if mprotect() should be permitted in sgx_vma_mprotect() (so fine),
and um uses it to actually do an mprotect() call on host memory (honestly
fine too).
Looking at the struct vm_operations_struct declaration I see:
/*
* Called by mprotect() to make driver-specific permission
* checks before mprotect() is finalised. The VMA must not
* be modified. Returns 0 if mprotect() can proceed.
*/
int (*mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start,
unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags);
Which explicitly says DO NOT MODIFY THE VMA.
So we're good.
> prev = vma_prev(&vmi);
> if (start > vma->vm_start)
> prev = vma;
>
> --
> 2.46.0
>
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-08-21 6:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-08-17 0:18 [PATCH v3 0/7] mm: Optimize mseal checks Pedro Falcato
2024-08-17 0:18 ` [PATCH v3 1/7] mm: Move can_modify_vma to mm/vma.h Pedro Falcato
2024-08-19 20:15 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-08-19 21:00 ` Pedro Falcato
2024-08-21 6:31 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-08-17 0:18 ` [PATCH v3 2/7] mm/munmap: Replace can_modify_mm with can_modify_vma Pedro Falcato
2024-08-19 20:22 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-08-21 6:40 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-08-21 16:15 ` Jeff Xu
2024-08-21 16:23 ` Pedro Falcato
2024-08-21 16:33 ` Jeff Xu
2024-08-21 17:02 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-08-21 18:25 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-08-21 17:00 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-08-17 0:18 ` [PATCH v3 3/7] mm/mprotect: " Pedro Falcato
2024-08-19 20:33 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-08-21 6:51 ` Lorenzo Stoakes [this message]
2024-08-17 0:18 ` [PATCH v3 4/7] mm/mremap: " Pedro Falcato
2024-08-19 20:34 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-08-21 6:53 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-08-17 0:18 ` [PATCH v3 5/7] mseal: Replace can_modify_mm_madv with a vma variant Pedro Falcato
2024-08-19 20:32 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-08-21 8:41 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-08-17 0:18 ` [PATCH v3 6/7] mm: Remove can_modify_mm() Pedro Falcato
2024-08-19 20:32 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-08-21 8:42 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-08-17 0:18 ` [PATCH v3 7/7] selftests/mm: add more mseal traversal tests Pedro Falcato
2024-08-18 6:36 ` Pedro Falcato
2024-08-20 15:45 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-08-21 8:47 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-08-21 15:56 ` Jeff Xu
2024-08-21 16:20 ` Pedro Falcato
2024-08-21 16:27 ` Jeff Xu
2024-08-21 17:28 ` Pedro Falcato
2024-08-21 17:36 ` Pedro Falcato
2024-08-21 23:37 ` Pedro Falcato
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