From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] proc: prevent a task from writing on its own /proc/*/mem
Date: Sat, 26 May 2018 10:53:04 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <df12287e-7c19-61a6-b94a-5b7186a1e2a3@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAJHCu1LgSUJdiZEfParCH7aLERWM1bgwC7e8wQKgmkNE01_4KA@mail.gmail.com>
On 5/26/2018 10:30 AM, Salvatore Mesoraca wrote:
> 2018-05-26 17:48 GMT+02:00 Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>:
>> On Sat, May 26, 2018 at 04:50:46PM +0200, Salvatore Mesoraca wrote:
>>> Prevent a task from opening, in "write" mode, any /proc/*/mem
>>> file that operates on the task's mm.
>>> /proc/*/mem is mainly a debugging means and, as such, it shouldn't
>>> be used by the inspected process itself.
>>> Current implementation always allow a task to access its own
>>> /proc/*/mem file.
>>> A process can use it to overwrite read-only memory, making
>>> pointless the use of security_file_mprotect() or other ways to
>>> enforce RO memory.
>> You can do it in security_ptrace_access_check()
> No, because that hook is skipped when mm == current->mm:
> https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.17-rc6/source/kernel/fork.c#L1111
>
>> or security_file_open()
> This is true, but it looks a bit overkill to me, especially since many of
> the macros/functions used to handle proc's files won't be in scope
> for an external LSM.
> Is there any particular reason why you prefer it done via LSM?
If you did a Yama style LSM it would be easy to configure.
Even though it might make no sense to allow this behavior,
someone, somewhere is counting on it.
>
> Thank you,
>
> Salvatore
> --
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>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-26 17:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-26 14:50 Salvatore Mesoraca
2018-05-26 15:48 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2018-05-26 17:30 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2018-05-26 17:53 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2018-05-26 17:58 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2018-05-27 0:31 ` Kees Cook
2018-05-27 1:33 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-05-27 14:41 ` Kees Cook
2018-05-28 9:32 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2018-05-28 9:06 ` Jann Horn
2018-05-28 9:33 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
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