From: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, cl@linux.com, penberg@kernel.org,
rientjes@google.com, iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, joe.jin@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] mm: slub: fix corrupted freechain in deactivate_slab()
Date: Fri, 17 Apr 2020 18:56:51 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d9ebb540-b3ec-a29a-1d7a-2f5762010b53@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200417181219.bef9b2f9ade92bf3798e3622@linux-foundation.org>
On 4/17/20 6:12 PM, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Mon, 30 Mar 2020 20:14:50 -0700 Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com> wrote:
>
>> The slub_debug is able to fix the corrupted slab freelist/page. However,
>> alloc_debug_processing() only checks the validity of current and next
>> freepointer during allocation path. As a result, once some objects have
>> their freepointers corrupted, deactivate_slab() may lead to page fault.
>>
>> Below is from a test kernel module when
>> 'slub_debug=PUF,kmalloc-128 slub_nomerge'. The test kernel corrupts the
>> freepointer of one free object on purpose. Unfortunately, deactivate_slab()
>> does not detect it when iterating the freechain.
>>
>> ...
>>
>> --- a/mm/slub.c
>> +++ b/mm/slub.c
>> @@ -2082,6 +2082,20 @@ static void deactivate_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
>> void *prior;
>> unsigned long counters;
>>
>> + if ((s->flags & SLAB_CONSISTENCY_CHECKS) &&
>> + !check_valid_pointer(s, page, nextfree)) {
>> + /*
>> + * If 'nextfree' is invalid, it is possible that
>> + * the object at 'freelist' is already corrupted.
>> + * Therefore, all objects starting at 'freelist'
>> + * are isolated.
>> + */
>> + object_err(s, page, freelist, "Freechain corrupt");
>> + freelist = NULL;
>> + slab_fix(s, "Isolate corrupted freechain");
>> + break;
>> + }
>> +
>> do {
>> prior = page->freelist;
>> counters = page->counters;
>
> We could do it this way:
>
> --- a/mm/slub.c~mm-slub-fix-corrupted-freechain-in-deactivate_slab-fix
> +++ a/mm/slub.c
> @@ -2083,6 +2083,7 @@ static void deactivate_slab(struct kmem_
> void *prior;
> unsigned long counters;
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_DEBUG
> if ((s->flags & SLAB_CONSISTENCY_CHECKS) &&
> !check_valid_pointer(s, page, nextfree)) {
> /*
> @@ -2096,6 +2097,7 @@ static void deactivate_slab(struct kmem_
> slab_fix(s, "Isolate corrupted freechain");
> break;
> }
> +#endif
>
> do {
> prior = page->freelist;
>
> But it's a bit ugly. How about this?
Sorry that I did not realize check_valid_pointer() requires CONFIG_SLAB_DEBUG.
Yes, it is much better to encapsulate it into freelist_corrupted() and just
return false when CONFIG_SLAB_DEBUG is not involved. The check_object() has
similar implementation.
Should I resend with your "Signed-off-by" or you would just fix it when applying?
It is the first time I submit a patch to mm so that I am not familiar with the
mm policy/process.
Thank you very much for the feedback!
Dongli Zhang
>
> --- a/mm/slub.c~mm-slub-fix-corrupted-freechain-in-deactivate_slab-fix
> +++ a/mm/slub.c
> @@ -650,6 +650,20 @@ static void slab_bug(struct kmem_cache *
> va_end(args);
> }
>
> +static bool freelist_corrupted(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
> + void *freelist, void *nextfree)
> +{
> + if ((s->flags & SLAB_CONSISTENCY_CHECKS) &&
> + !check_valid_pointer(s, page, nextfree)) {
> + object_err(s, page, freelist, "Freechain corrupt");
> + freelist = NULL;
> + slab_fix(s, "Isolate corrupted freechain");
> + return true;
> + }
> +
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> static void slab_fix(struct kmem_cache *s, char *fmt, ...)
> {
> struct va_format vaf;
> @@ -1400,6 +1414,11 @@ static inline void inc_slabs_node(struct
> static inline void dec_slabs_node(struct kmem_cache *s, int node,
> int objects) {}
>
> +static bool freelist_corrupted(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
> + void *freelist, void *nextfree)
> +{
> + return false;
> +}
> #endif /* CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG */
>
> /*
> @@ -2083,19 +2102,13 @@ static void deactivate_slab(struct kmem_
> void *prior;
> unsigned long counters;
>
> - if ((s->flags & SLAB_CONSISTENCY_CHECKS) &&
> - !check_valid_pointer(s, page, nextfree)) {
> - /*
> - * If 'nextfree' is invalid, it is possible that
> - * the object at 'freelist' is already corrupted.
> - * Therefore, all objects starting at 'freelist'
> - * are isolated.
> - */
> - object_err(s, page, freelist, "Freechain corrupt");
> - freelist = NULL;
> - slab_fix(s, "Isolate corrupted freechain");
> + /*
> + * If 'nextfree' is invalid, it is possible that the object at
> + * 'freelist' is already corrupted. So isolate all objects
> + * starting at 'freelist'.
> + */
> + if (freelist_corrupted(s, page, freelist, nextfree))
> break;
> - }
>
> do {
> prior = page->freelist;
> _
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-04-18 1:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-03-31 3:14 Dongli Zhang
2020-04-12 22:20 ` Dongli Zhang
2020-04-18 1:12 ` Andrew Morton
2020-04-18 1:56 ` Dongli Zhang [this message]
2020-04-18 20:04 ` Andrew Morton
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