From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: "Stephen Röttger" <sroettger@google.com>
Cc: jeffxu@chromium.org, luto@kernel.org, jorgelo@chromium.org,
keescook@chromium.org, groeck@chromium.org, jannh@google.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, jeffxu@google.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] Memory Mapping (VMA) protection using PKU - set 1
Date: Wed, 17 May 2023 08:07:07 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d8f2d5c2-6650-c2a6-3a20-25583eee579b@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAEAAPHa=zYyjV5RqvPryRsW7VqY9cJC_-CJW6HKczY0iVsy-bg@mail.gmail.com>
On 5/17/23 03:51, Stephen Röttger wrote:
> On Wed, May 17, 2023 at 12:41 AM Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> wrote:
>> Can't run arbitrary instructions, but can make (pretty) arbitrary syscalls?
>
> The threat model is that the attacker has arbitrary read/write, while other
> threads run in parallel. So whenever a regular thread performs a syscall and
> takes a syscall argument from memory, we assume that argument can be attacker
> controlled.
> Unfortunately, the line is a bit blurry which syscalls / syscall arguments we
> need to assume to be attacker controlled.
Ahh, OK. So, it's not that the *attacker* can make arbitrary syscalls.
It's that the attacker might leverage its arbitrary write to trick a
victim thread into turning what would otherwise be a good syscall into a
bad one with attacker-controlled content.
I guess that makes the readv/writev-style of things a bad idea in this
environment.
>>> Sigreturn is a separate problem that we hope to solve by adding pkey
>>> support to sigaltstack
>>
>> What kind of support were you planning to add?
>
> We’d like to allow registering pkey-tagged memory as a sigaltstack. This would
> allow the signal handler to run isolated from other threads. Right now, the
> main reason this doesn’t work is that the kernel would need to change the pkru
> state before storing the register state on the stack.
>
>> I was thinking that an attacker with arbitrary write access would wait
>> until PKRU was on the userspace stack and *JUST* before the kernel
>> sigreturn code restores it to write a malicious value. It could
>> presumably do this with some asynchronous mechanism so that even if
>> there was only one attacker thread, it could change its own value.
>
> I’m not sure I follow the details, can you give an example of an asynchronous
> mechanism to do this? E.g. would this be the kernel writing to the memory in a
> syscall for example?
I was thinking of all of the IORING_OP_*'s that can write to memory or
aio(7).
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-05-17 15:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-05-15 13:05 jeffxu
2023-05-15 13:05 ` [PATCH 1/6] PKEY: Introduce PKEY_ENFORCE_API flag jeffxu
2023-05-16 23:14 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-16 23:55 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-17 11:07 ` Stephen Röttger
2023-05-15 13:05 ` [PATCH 2/6] PKEY: Add arch_check_pkey_enforce_api() jeffxu
2023-05-18 21:43 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-18 22:51 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-19 0:00 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-19 11:22 ` Stephen Röttger
2023-05-15 13:05 ` [PATCH 3/6] PKEY: Apply PKEY_ENFORCE_API to mprotect jeffxu
2023-05-16 20:07 ` Kees Cook
2023-05-16 22:23 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-16 23:18 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-16 23:36 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-17 4:50 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-15 13:05 ` [PATCH 4/6] PKEY:selftest pkey_enforce_api for mprotect jeffxu
2023-05-15 13:05 ` [PATCH 5/6] KEY: Apply PKEY_ENFORCE_API to munmap jeffxu
2023-05-16 20:06 ` Kees Cook
2023-05-16 22:24 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-16 23:23 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-17 0:08 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-15 13:05 ` [PATCH 6/6] PKEY:selftest pkey_enforce_api for munmap jeffxu
2023-05-15 14:28 ` [PATCH 0/6] Memory Mapping (VMA) protection using PKU - set 1 Dave Hansen
2023-05-15 15:03 ` Stephen Röttger
2023-05-16 7:06 ` Stephen Röttger
2023-05-16 22:41 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-17 10:51 ` Stephen Röttger
2023-05-17 15:07 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2023-05-17 15:21 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-17 15:29 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-17 23:48 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-18 15:37 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-18 20:20 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-18 21:04 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-19 11:13 ` Stephen Röttger
2023-05-24 20:15 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-16 20:08 ` Kees Cook
2023-05-16 22:17 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-16 22:30 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-16 23:39 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-17 10:49 ` Stephen Röttger
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