From: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>,
Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>,
"Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
<linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>, <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>,
Guohanjun <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 3/6] arm64: add uaccess to machine check safe
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 21:41:28 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d8cb8cec-5530-c0e7-3bd3-bcd47e9bf4e1@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZbjlFXVC_ZPYbKhR@FVFF77S0Q05N>
在 2024/1/30 20:01, Mark Rutland 写道:
> On Tue, Jan 30, 2024 at 07:14:35PM +0800, Tong Tiangen wrote:
>> 在 2024/1/30 1:43, Mark Rutland 写道:
>>> On Mon, Jan 29, 2024 at 09:46:49PM +0800, Tong Tiangen wrote:
>>> Further, this change will also silently fixup unexpected kernel faults if we
>>> pass bad kernel pointers to copy_{to,from}_user, which will hide real bugs.
>>
>> I think this is better than the panic kernel, because the real bugs
>> belongs to the user process. Even if the wrong pointer is
>> transferred, the page corresponding to the wrong pointer has a memroy
>> error.
>
> I think you have misunderstood my point; I'm talking about the case of a bad
> kernel pointer *without* a memory error.
>
> For example, consider some buggy code such as:
>
> void __user *uptr = some_valid_user_pointer;
> void *kptr = NULL; // or any other bad pointer
>
> ret = copy_to_user(uptr, kptr, size);
> if (ret)
> return -EFAULT;
>
> Before this patch, when copy_to_user() attempted to load from NULL it would
> fault, there would be no fixup handler for the LDR, and the kernel would die(),
> reporting the bad kernel access.
>
> After this patch (which adds fixup handlers to all the LDR*s in
> copy_to_user()), the fault (which is *not* a memory error) would be handled by
> the fixup handler, and copy_to_user() would return an error without *any*
> indication of the horrible kernel bug.
>
> This will hide kernel bugs, which will make those harder to identify and fix,
> and will also potentially make it easier to exploit the kernel: if the user
> somehow gains control of the kernel pointer, they can rely on the fixup handler
> returning an error, and can scan through memory rather than dying as soon as
> they pas a bad pointer.
I should understand what you mean. I'll think about this and reply.
Many thanks.
Tong.
>
>> In addition, the panic information contains necessary information
>> for users to check.
>
> There is no panic() in the case I am describing.
>
>>> So NAK to this change as-is; likewise for the addition of USER() to other ldr*
>>> macros in copy_from_user.S and the addition of USER() str* macros in
>>> copy_to_user.S.
>>>
>>> If we want to handle memory errors on some kaccesses, we need a new EX_TYPE_*
>>> separate from the usual EX_TYPE_KACESS_ERR_ZERO that means "handle memory
>>> errors, but treat other faults as fatal". That should come with a rationale and
>>> explanation of why it's actually useful.
>>
>> This makes sense. Add kaccess types that can be processed properly.
>>
>>>
>>> [...]
>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/extable.c b/arch/arm64/mm/extable.c
>>>> index 478e639f8680..28ec35e3d210 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/arm64/mm/extable.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/extable.c
>>>> @@ -85,10 +85,10 @@ bool fixup_exception_mc(struct pt_regs *regs)
>>>> if (!ex)
>>>> return false;
>>>> - /*
>>>> - * This is not complete, More Machine check safe extable type can
>>>> - * be processed here.
>>>> - */
>>>> + switch (ex->type) {
>>>> + case EX_TYPE_UACCESS_ERR_ZERO:
>>>> + return ex_handler_uaccess_err_zero(ex, regs);
>>>> + }
>>>
>>> Please fold this part into the prior patch, and start ogf with *only* handling
>>> errors on accesses already marked with EX_TYPE_UACCESS_ERR_ZERO. I think that
>>> change would be relatively uncontroversial, and it would be much easier to
>>> build atop that.
>>
>> OK, the two patches will be merged in the next release.
>
> Thanks.
>
> Mark.
> .
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-30 13:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-01-29 13:46 [PATCH v10 0/6]arm64: add machine check safe support Tong Tiangen
2024-01-29 13:46 ` [PATCH v10 1/6] uaccess: add generic fallback version of copy_mc_to_user() Tong Tiangen
2024-01-29 13:46 ` [PATCH v10 2/6] arm64: add support for machine check error safe Tong Tiangen
2024-01-29 17:51 ` Mark Rutland
2024-01-30 10:57 ` Tong Tiangen
2024-01-30 13:07 ` Mark Rutland
2024-01-30 13:22 ` Tong Tiangen
2024-01-29 13:46 ` [PATCH v10 3/6] arm64: add uaccess to machine check safe Tong Tiangen
2024-01-29 17:43 ` Mark Rutland
2024-01-30 11:14 ` Tong Tiangen
2024-01-30 12:01 ` Mark Rutland
2024-01-30 13:41 ` Tong Tiangen [this message]
2024-01-29 13:46 ` [PATCH v10 4/6] mm/hwpoison: return -EFAULT when copy fail in copy_mc_[user]_highpage() Tong Tiangen
2024-01-29 13:46 ` [PATCH v10 5/6] arm64: support copy_mc_[user]_highpage() Tong Tiangen
2024-01-29 20:45 ` Andrey Konovalov
2024-01-30 10:31 ` Mark Rutland
2024-01-30 13:50 ` Tong Tiangen
2024-01-29 13:46 ` [PATCH v10 6/6] arm64: introduce copy_mc_to_kernel() implementation Tong Tiangen
2024-01-30 10:20 ` Mark Rutland
2024-01-30 13:56 ` Tong Tiangen
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