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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
	Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>, Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
	Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>,
	"Liguori, Anthony" <aliguori@amazon.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 01/17] mm/gup: Fixup p*_access_permitted()
Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2017 19:21:45 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d205cddd-33bc-029c-a004-bc74d82853a5@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFzehO00PH-WQuHJroRddiRMyLhO66b4Cv2sJA=7D2CeAw@mail.gmail.com>

On 12/15/2017 06:52 PM, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 15, 2017 at 6:48 PM, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote:
>> Treating protection key bits as "escalate to page fault and let that
>> deal with the checks" should be fine
> 
> Well, it's *semantically* fine and I think it's the right model from
> that standpoint.

It's _close_ to fine.  :)

Practically, we're going to have two classes of things in the world:
1. Things that are protected with protection keys and have non-zero bits
   in the pkey PTE bits.
2. Things that are _not_ protected will have zeros in there.

But, in the hardware, *everything* has a pkey.  0 is the default,
obviously, but the hardware treats it the same as all the other values.
So, if we go checking for the "pkey bits being set", and have behavior
diverge when they are set, we end up with pkey=0 being even more special
compared to the rest.

This might be OK, but it's going to be interesting to document and write
tests for it.  I'm already dreading the manpage updates.

> However, since the main use case of protection keys is probably
> databases (Dave?) and since those also might be performance-sensitive
> about direct-IO doing page table lookups, it might not be great in
> practice.

Yeah, databases are definitely the heavy-hitters that care about it.

But, these PKRU checks are cheap.  I forget the actual cycle counts, but
I remember thinking that it's pretty darn cheap to read PKRU.  In the
grand scheme of doing a page table walk and incrementing an atomic, it's
surely in the noise for direct I/O to large pages, which is basically
guaranteed for the database guys.

I did some get_user_pages() torture tests (on small pages IIRC) before I
put the code in and could not detect a delta from the code being there
or not.

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-12-16  3:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-12-14 11:27 [PATCH v2 00/17] x86/ldt: Use a VMA based read only mapping Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 01/17] mm/gup: Fixup p*_access_permitted() Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 12:41   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 14:37     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 20:44       ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-14 20:54         ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 21:18           ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15  5:04           ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-15  6:09             ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-15  7:51               ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-16  0:20                 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  0:29                   ` Dan Williams
2017-12-16  1:10                     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  1:25                       ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-16  2:28                         ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  2:48                           ` Al Viro
2017-12-16  2:52                             ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  3:00                               ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  3:21                               ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2017-12-16  1:29                       ` Dan Williams
2017-12-16  0:31                   ` Al Viro
2017-12-16  1:05                     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-15  8:00             ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15 10:25               ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15 11:38                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15 16:38                   ` Dan Williams
2017-12-18 11:54                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-18 18:42                       ` Dan Williams
2017-12-15 14:04       ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 02/17] mm: Exempt special mappings from mlock(), mprotect() and madvise() Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:19   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 17:36     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-02 16:44       ` Dmitry Safonov
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 03/17] arch: Allow arch_dup_mmap() to fail Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:22   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 04/17] x86/ldt: Rework locking Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 05/17] x86/ldt: Prevent ldt inheritance on exec Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:32   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 06/17] x86/ldt: Do not install LDT for kernel threads Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 19:43   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 21:27     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 07/17] mm/softdirty: Move VM_SOFTDIRTY into high bits Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 08/17] mm/x86: Allow special mappings with user access cleared Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 09/17] mm: Provide vm_special_mapping::close Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 10/17] selftest/x86: Implement additional LDT selftests Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 11/17] selftests/x86/ldt_gdt: Prepare for access bit forced Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:20   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 19:43     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 21:22       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 21:44         ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 21:48           ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 22:02             ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 22:14               ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 22:24                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 22:52                   ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 22:11             ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 22:15               ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 22:30                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 22:23           ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-14 22:50             ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 12/17] mm: Make populate_vma_page_range() available Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 13/17] x86/mm: Force LDT desc accessed bit Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:21   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 14/17] x86/ldt: Reshuffle code Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:23   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 16:31     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-14 16:32       ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-14 16:34         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 17:47           ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 15/17] x86/ldt: Prepare for VMA mapping Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 16/17] x86/ldt: Add VMA management code Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 17/17] x86/ldt: Make it read only VMA mapped Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 12:03 ` [PATCH v2 00/17] x86/ldt: Use a VMA based read only mapping Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-14 12:08   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:35     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 17:50       ` Peter Zijlstra

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