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From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Jue Wang <juew@google.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Jiaqi Yan <jiaqiyan@google.com>, Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>,
	Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] Expose a memory poison detector ioctl to user space.
Date: Mon, 2 May 2022 19:38:28 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d10f7c50-134b-39c1-7b24-a63d772cc731@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAPcxDJ4TfxbNgknKznnV3U9XMce=dfh9fN16iaG8nZqM39HA0A@mail.gmail.com>

On 02.05.22 19:36, Jue Wang wrote:
> On Mon, May 2, 2022 at 10:33 AM David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 02.05.22 19:30, Jue Wang wrote:
>>> On Mon, May 2, 2022 at 10:19 AM David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 26.04.22 21:39, Dave Hansen wrote:
>>>>> On 4/26/22 12:23, Jue Wang wrote:
>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 11:18 AM Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> wrote:
>>>>>>> What if you're in a normal (non-TDX) guest and some of the physical
>>>>>>> address space has been ballooned away?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Accessing to memory that gets ballooned away will cause extra EPT
>>>>>> violations and have the memory faulted in on the host side, which is
>>>>>> transparent to the guest.
>>>>>
>>>>> Yeah, but it completely subverts the whole purpose of ballooning.  In
>>>>> other words, this is for all intents and purposes also mutually
>>>>> exclusive with ballooning.
>>>>
>>>> Some balloon (or balloon-like) implementations don't support reading
>>>> memory that's mapped into the direct map. For example, with never
>>>> virtio-mem devices in the hypervisor, reading unplugged memory can
>>>> result in undefined behavior (in the worst case, you'll get your VM zapped).
>>>>
>>>> Reading random physical memory ranges without further checks is a very
>>>> bad idea. There are more corner cases, that we e.g., exclude when
>>>> reading /proc/kcore.
>>>>
>>>> Take a look at read_kcore() KCORE_RAM case, where we e.g., exclude
>>>> reading PageOffline(), is_page_hwpoison() and !pfn_is_ram(). Unaccepted
>>>> memory might be another case we want to exclude there in the future.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I assume something as you imagine could be implemented in user space
>>>> just by relying on /proc/iomem and /proc/kcore right now in an unsafe
>>>> way. So you might want something similar, however, obviously without
>>>> exporting page content to user space and requiring root permissions.
>>>
>>> Thanks.
>>>
>>> Are the following cases benign if the scan only happens on the host side?
>>>
>>> . virtio-mem - unplugged memory
>>> . Unaccepted memory
>>
>> No, only in virtualized worlds.
>>
>> I assume GART memory that implements the pfn_is_ram() callback is around
>> on physical machines.
> 
> I think host E820 provides an accurate view of which address range is
> ram or not?

On most physical machines maybe to some degree. It doesn't hold for
physically hot(un)plugged memory and I remember GART memory is special.
No idea how that is exposed in e820.

-- 
Thanks,

David / dhildenb



      reply	other threads:[~2022-05-02 17:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-04-25 16:34 Jue Wang
2022-04-26 15:40 ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-26 17:57   ` Jue Wang
2022-04-26 18:02     ` Jue Wang
2022-04-26 18:21       ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-26 19:25         ` Jue Wang
2022-04-26 19:52           ` Luck, Tony
2022-04-26 20:06             ` Jue Wang
2022-04-26 18:20     ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-26 19:23       ` Jue Wang
2022-04-26 19:39         ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-26 19:50           ` Jue Wang
2022-04-28 16:15           ` Erdem Aktas
2022-04-28 16:34             ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-29 19:46               ` Jue Wang
2022-04-29 21:10                 ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-29 21:32                   ` Jue Wang
2022-04-29 21:44                     ` Jue Wang
2022-04-29 22:29                     ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-29 22:53                       ` Jue Wang
2022-05-02 15:30                 ` Dave Hansen
2022-05-02 17:19           ` David Hildenbrand
2022-05-02 17:30             ` Jue Wang
2022-05-02 17:33               ` David Hildenbrand
2022-05-02 17:36                 ` Jue Wang
2022-05-02 17:38                   ` David Hildenbrand [this message]

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