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From: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>
To: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
	Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>,
	Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>,
	Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Maxwell Bland <mbland@motorola.com>,
	"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Pierre Langlois <pierre.langlois@arm.com>,
	Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Yang Shi <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>,
	Yeoreum Yun <yeoreum.yun@arm.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 01/30] mm: Introduce kpkeys
Date: Fri, 17 Apr 2026 14:00:53 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <cf9da9e0-310b-4dc0-81aa-3154077fff85@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <fea9c939-f955-4020-bed6-427e592f0024@arm.com>

On 4/15/26 17:50, Kevin Brodsky wrote:
> On 15/04/2026 15:00, David Hildenbrand (Arm) wrote:
>> On 2/27/26 18:54, Kevin Brodsky wrote:
>>> kpkeys is a simple framework to enable the use of protection keys
>>> (pkeys) to harden the kernel itself. This patch introduces the basic
>>> API in <linux/kpkeys.h>: a couple of functions to set and restore
>>> the pkey register and macros to define guard objects.
>>>
>>> kpkeys introduces a new concept on top of pkeys: the kpkeys level.
>>> Each level is associated to a set of permissions for the pkeys
>>> managed by the kpkeys framework. kpkeys_set_level(lvl) sets those
>>> permissions according to lvl, and returns the original pkey
>>> register, to be later restored by kpkeys_restore_pkey_reg(). To
>>> start with, only KPKEYS_LVL_DEFAULT is available, which is meant
>>> to grant RW access to KPKEYS_PKEY_DEFAULT (i.e. all memory since
>>> this is the only available pkey for now).
>>>
>>> Because each architecture implementing pkeys uses a different
>>> representation for the pkey register, and may reserve certain pkeys
>>> for specific uses, support for kpkeys must be explicitly indicated
>>> by selecting ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS and defining the following functions in
>>> <asm/kpkeys.h>, in addition to the macros provided in
>>> <asm-generic/kpkeys.h>:
>> I don't quite understand the reason for using levels. Levels sounds like
>> it would all be in some ordered fashion, where higher levels have access
>> to lower levels.
> 
> That was originally the idea indeed, but in practice I don't expect
> levels to have a strict ordering, as it's not practical for composing
> features.
> 
>> Think of that as a key that can unlock all "lower" locks, not just a
>> single lock.
>>
>> Then, the question is about the ordering once we introduce new
>> keys/locks. With two, it obviously doesn't matter :)
>>
>> So naturally I wonder whether levels is really the right abstraction
>> here, and why we are not simply using "distinct" keys, like
>>
>> KPKEY_DEFAULT
>> KPKEY_PGTABLE
>> KPKEY_SUPER_SECRET1
>> KPKEY_SUPER_SECRET2
>>
>> Is it because you want KPKEY_PGTABLE also be able to write to KPKEY_DEFAULT?
> 
> Right, and in general a given level may be able to write to any number
> of pkeys. That's why I don't want to conflate pkeys and levels. Agreed
> that "level" might not be the clearest term though, since there's no
> strict ordering.

As discussed offline, maybe the right terminology to use here would be
something like a "context".

You'd be activating/setting a context.

KPKEY_CTX_DEFAULT
KPKEY_CTX_PGTABLE
KPKEY_CTX_SUPER_SECRET1

What is accessible (and how) is defined for each context. For example, I
would assume that all context allow for read/write access to everything
that KPKEY_CTX_DEFAULT has access to.

-- 
Cheers,

David


  reply	other threads:[~2026-04-17 12:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-02-27 17:54 [PATCH v6 00/30] pkeys-based page table hardening Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:54 ` [PATCH v6 01/30] mm: Introduce kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2026-04-15 13:00   ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-04-15 15:50     ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-04-17 12:00       ` David Hildenbrand (Arm) [this message]
2026-04-17 13:10         ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:54 ` [PATCH v6 02/30] set_memory: Introduce set_memory_pkey() stub Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:54 ` [PATCH v6 03/30] arm64: mm: Enable overlays for all EL1 indirect permissions Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:54 ` [PATCH v6 04/30] arm64: Introduce por_elx_set_pkey_perms() helper Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:54 ` [PATCH v6 05/30] arm64: Implement asm/kpkeys.h using POE Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:54 ` [PATCH v6 06/30] arm64: set_memory: Implement set_memory_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:54 ` [PATCH v6 07/30] arm64: Reset POR_EL1 on exception entry Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:54 ` [PATCH v6 08/30] arm64: Context-switch POR_EL1 Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:54 ` [PATCH v6 09/30] arm64: Initialize POR_EL1 register on cpu_resume() Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:54 ` [PATCH v6 10/30] arm64: Enable kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:54 ` [PATCH v6 11/30] memblock: Move INIT_MEMBLOCK_* macros to header Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 12/30] set_memory: Introduce arch_has_pte_only_direct_map() Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 13/30] mm: kpkeys: Introduce kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 14/30] mm: kpkeys: Introduce block-based page table allocator Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 15/30] mm: kpkeys: Handle splitting of linear map Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 16/30] mm: kpkeys: Defer early call to set_memory_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 17/30] mm: kpkeys: Add shrinker for block pgtable allocator Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 18/30] mm: kpkeys: Introduce early page table allocator Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 19/30] mm: kpkeys: Introduce hook for protecting static page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 20/30] arm64: cpufeature: Add helper to directly probe CPU for POE support Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 21/30] arm64: set_memory: Implement arch_has_pte_only_direct_map() Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 22/30] arm64: kpkeys: Support KPKEYS_LVL_PGTABLES Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 23/30] arm64: kpkeys: Ensure the linear map can be modified Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 20:28   ` kernel test robot
2026-02-27 22:56   ` kernel test robot
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 24/30] arm64: kpkeys: Handle splitting of linear map Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 25/30] arm64: kpkeys: Protect early page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 26/30] arm64: kpkeys: Protect init_pg_dir Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 27/30] arm64: kpkeys: Guard page table writes Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 28/30] arm64: kpkeys: Batch KPKEYS_LVL_PGTABLES switches Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 29/30] arm64: kpkeys: Enable kpkeys_hardened_pgtables support Kevin Brodsky
2026-03-01  5:40   ` kernel test robot
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 30/30] mm: Add basic tests for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky
2026-03-02  9:27 ` [PATCH v6 00/30] pkeys-based page table hardening Kevin Brodsky
2026-04-15 12:48 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-04-15 15:48   ` Kevin Brodsky

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