From: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
To: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com>,
pmladek@suse.com, rostedt@goodmis.org, senozhatsky@chromium.org,
andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com, konrad.wilk@oracle.com,
haakon.bugge@oracle.com, john.haxby@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] vsprintf: protect kernel from panic due to non-canonical pointer dereference
Date: Wed, 19 Oct 2022 23:00:09 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cc38380a-de69-d8f6-44b5-8ae4d073d916@rasmusvillemoes.dk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221019194159.2923873-1-jane.chu@oracle.com>
On 19/10/2022 21.41, Jane Chu wrote:
> Having stepped on a local kernel bug where reading sysfs has led to
> out-of-bound pointer dereference by vsprintf() which led to GPF panic.
Just to be completely clear, the out-of-bounds dereference did not
happen in vsprintf if I understand your description right. Essentially
you have an array of char* pointers, and you accessed beyond that array,
where of course some random memory contents then turned out not to be a
real pointer, and that bogus pointer value was passed into vsprintf() as
a %s argument.
> And the reason for GPF is that the OOB pointer was turned to a
> non-canonical address such as 0x7665645f63616465.
That's ved_cade , or more properly edac_dev ...
>
> vsprintf() already has this line of defense
> if ((unsigned long)ptr < PAGE_SIZE || IS_ERR_VALUE(ptr))
> return "(efault)";
> Since a non-canonical pointer can be detected by kern_addr_valid()
> on architectures that present VM holes as well as meaningful
> implementation of kern_addr_valid() that detects the non-canonical
> addresses, this patch adds a check on non-canonical string pointer by
> kern_addr_valid() and "(efault)" to alert user that something
> is wrong instead of unecessarily panic the server.
>
> On the other hand, if the non-canonical string pointer is dereferenced
> else where in the kernel, by virtue of being non-canonical, a crash
> is expected to be immediate.
I'm with Andy on this one, we don't add random checks like this in the
kernel, not in vsprintf or elsewhere.
check_pointer_msg is/was actually more about checking the various
%p<foo> extensions, where it is (more) expected that somebody does
struct foo *f = get_a_foo();
pr_debug("got %pfoo\n", f);
if (IS_ERR(f)) { ... }
[possibly in a not so obvious path], and the PAGE_SIZE check is
similarly for cases where the "base" pointer is actually NULL but what
is passed is &f->member.
Rasmus
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-10-19 21:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-19 19:41 Jane Chu
2022-10-19 20:33 ` Andy Shevchenko
2022-10-20 14:52 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2022-10-20 16:03 ` Andy Shevchenko
2022-10-25 8:40 ` Petr Mladek
2022-10-25 9:13 ` Andy Shevchenko
2022-10-19 21:00 ` Rasmus Villemoes [this message]
2022-10-20 9:28 ` Petr Mladek
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2022-10-19 19:34 [PATCH v3 0/1] vsprintf: check non-canonical pointer by kern_addr_valid() Jane Chu
2022-10-19 19:34 ` [PATCH v3 1/1] vsprintf: protect kernel from panic due to non-canonical pointer dereference Jane Chu
2022-10-20 11:41 ` kernel test robot
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