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From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Patrick Roy <roypat@amazon.co.uk>, Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, dwmw@amazon.co.uk, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, willy@infradead.org,
	graf@amazon.com, derekmn@amazon.com, kalyazin@amazon.com,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, dmatlack@google.com, tabba@google.com,
	chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com, xmarcalx@amazon.co.uk,
	James Gowans <jgowans@amazon.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 7/8] mm: secretmem: use AS_INACCESSIBLE to prohibit GUP
Date: Wed, 10 Jul 2024 23:14:04 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <c87a4ba0-b9c4-4044-b0c3-c1112601494f@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <258b3b76-cf87-4dfc-bcfa-b2af94aba811@amazon.co.uk>

On 10.07.24 11:50, Patrick Roy wrote:
> 
> 
> On 7/10/24 08:32, Mike Rapoport wrote:
>> CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you can confirm the sender and know the content is safe.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Jul 09, 2024 at 11:09:29PM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>>> On 09.07.24 15:20, Patrick Roy wrote:
>>>> Inside of vma_is_secretmem and secretmem_mapping, instead of checking
>>>> whether a vm_area_struct/address_space has the secretmem ops structure
>>>> attached to it, check whether the address_space has the AS_INACCESSIBLE
>>>> bit set. Then set the AS_INACCESSIBLE flag for secretmem's
>>>> address_space.
>>>>
>>>> This means that get_user_pages and friends are disables for all
>>>> adress_spaces that set AS_INACCESIBLE. The AS_INACCESSIBLE flag was
>>>> introduced in commit c72ceafbd12c ("mm: Introduce AS_INACCESSIBLE for
>>>> encrypted/confidential memory") specifically for guest_memfd to indicate
>>>> that no reads and writes should ever be done to guest_memfd
>>>> address_spaces. Disallowing gup seems like a reasonable semantic
>>>> extension, and means that potential future mmaps of guest_memfd cannot
>>>> be GUP'd.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy <roypat@amazon.co.uk>
>>>> ---
>>>>    include/linux/secretmem.h | 13 +++++++++++--
>>>>    mm/secretmem.c            |  6 +-----
>>>>    2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/include/linux/secretmem.h b/include/linux/secretmem.h
>>>> index e918f96881f5..886c8f7eb63e 100644
>>>> --- a/include/linux/secretmem.h
>>>> +++ b/include/linux/secretmem.h
>>>> @@ -8,10 +8,19 @@ extern const struct address_space_operations secretmem_aops;
>>>>    static inline bool secretmem_mapping(struct address_space *mapping)
>>>>    {
>>>> -   return mapping->a_ops == &secretmem_aops;
>>>> +   return mapping->flags & AS_INACCESSIBLE;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static inline bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
>>>> +{
>>>> +   struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
>>>> +
>>>> +   if (!file)
>>>> +           return false;
>>>> +
>>>> +   return secretmem_mapping(file->f_inode->i_mapping);
>>>>    }
>>>
>>> That sounds wrong. You should leave *secretmem alone and instead have
>>> something like inaccessible_mapping that is used where appropriate.
>>>
>>> vma_is_secretmem() should not suddenly succeed on something that is not
>>> mm/secretmem.c
>>
>> I'm with David here.
>>
> 
> Right, that makes sense. My thinking here was that if memfd_secret and
> potential mappings of guest_memfd have the same behavior wrt GUP, then
> it makes sense to just have them rely on the same checks. But I guess I
> didn't follow that thought to its logical conclusion of renaming the
> "secretmem" checks into "inaccessible" checks and moving them out of
> secretmem.h.
> 
> Or do you mean to just leave secretmem untouched and add separate
> "inaccessible" checks? But then we'd have two different ways of
> disabling GUP for specific VMAs that both rely on checks in exactly the
> same places :/

You can just replace the vma_is_secretmem in relevant places by checks 
if inaccessible address spaces. No need for the additional 
vma_is_secretmem check then.

BUT, as raised in my other reply, I wonder if adding support for 
secretmem in KVM (I assume) would be simpler+cleaner.

> 
>>> --
>>> Cheers,
>>>
>>> David / dhildenb
>>>
>>
>> --
>> Sincerely yours,
>> Mike.
> 

-- 
Cheers,

David / dhildenb



  reply	other threads:[~2024-07-10 21:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-07-09 13:20 [RFC PATCH 0/8] Unmapping guest_memfd from Direct Map Patrick Roy
2024-07-09 13:20 ` [RFC PATCH 1/8] kvm: Allow reading/writing gmem using kvm_{read,write}_guest Patrick Roy
2024-07-09 13:20 ` [RFC PATCH 2/8] kvm: use slowpath in gfn_to_hva_cache if memory is private Patrick Roy
2024-07-09 13:20 ` [RFC PATCH 3/8] kvm: pfncache: enlighten about gmem Patrick Roy
2024-07-09 14:36   ` David Woodhouse
2024-07-10  9:49     ` Patrick Roy
2024-07-10 10:20       ` David Woodhouse
2024-07-10 10:46         ` Patrick Roy
2024-07-10 10:50           ` David Woodhouse
2024-07-09 13:20 ` [RFC PATCH 4/8] kvm: x86: support walking guest page tables in gmem Patrick Roy
2024-07-09 13:20 ` [RFC PATCH 5/8] kvm: gmem: add option to remove guest private memory from direct map Patrick Roy
2024-07-10  7:31   ` Mike Rapoport
2024-07-10  9:50     ` Patrick Roy
2024-07-09 13:20 ` [RFC PATCH 6/8] kvm: gmem: Temporarily restore direct map entries when needed Patrick Roy
2024-07-11  6:25   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-07-09 13:20 ` [RFC PATCH 7/8] mm: secretmem: use AS_INACCESSIBLE to prohibit GUP Patrick Roy
2024-07-09 21:09   ` David Hildenbrand
2024-07-10  7:32     ` Mike Rapoport
2024-07-10  9:50       ` Patrick Roy
2024-07-10 21:14         ` David Hildenbrand [this message]
2024-07-09 13:20 ` [RFC PATCH 8/8] kvm: gmem: Allow restricted userspace mappings Patrick Roy
2024-07-09 14:48   ` Fuad Tabba
2024-07-09 21:13     ` David Hildenbrand
2024-07-10  9:51       ` Patrick Roy
2024-07-10 21:12         ` David Hildenbrand
2024-07-10 21:53           ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-10 21:56             ` David Hildenbrand
2024-07-12 15:59           ` Patrick Roy
2024-07-30 10:15             ` David Hildenbrand
2024-08-01 10:30               ` Patrick Roy
2024-07-22 12:28 ` [RFC PATCH 0/8] Unmapping guest_memfd from Direct Map Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)
2024-07-26  6:55   ` Patrick Roy
2024-07-30 10:17     ` David Hildenbrand
2024-07-26 16:44 ` Yosry Ahmed

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