From: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
To: jeffxu@chromium.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, vbabka@suse.cz,
Liam.Howlett@oracle.com, broonie@kernel.org,
skhan@linuxfoundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, jorgelo@chromium.org, keescook@chromium.org,
pedro.falcato@gmail.com, rdunlap@infradead.org, jannh@google.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/2] mseal: allow noop mprotect
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2025 13:49:39 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c867bff9-2293-4890-af46-8a797cf512c2@lucifer.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250312002117.2556240-3-jeffxu@google.com>
On Wed, Mar 12, 2025 at 12:21:17AM +0000, jeffxu@chromium.org wrote:
> From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
>
> Initially, when mseal was introduced in 6.10, semantically, when a VMA
> within the specified address range is sealed, the mprotect will be rejected,
> leaving all of VMA unmodified. However, adding an extra loop to check the mseal
> flag for every VMA slows things down a bit, therefore in 6.12, this issue was
> solved by removing can_modify_mm and checking each VMA’s mseal flag directly
> without an extra loop [1]. This is a semantic change, i.e. partial update is
> allowed, VMAs can be updated until a sealed VMA is found.
>
> The new semantic also means, we could allow mprotect on a sealed VMA if the new
> attribute of VMA remains the same as the old one. Relaxing this avoids unnecessary
> impacts for applications that want to seal a particular mapping. Doing this also
> has no security impact.
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240817-mseal-depessimize-v3-0-d8d2e037df30@gmail.com/
>
> Fixes: 4a2dd02b0916 ("mm/mprotect: replace can_modify_mm with can_modify_vma")
> Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
> ---
> mm/mprotect.c | 6 +++---
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
> index 516b1d847e2c..a24d23967aa5 100644
> --- a/mm/mprotect.c
> +++ b/mm/mprotect.c
> @@ -613,14 +613,14 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vma_iterator *vmi, struct mmu_gather *tlb,
> unsigned long charged = 0;
> int error;
>
> - if (!can_modify_vma(vma))
> - return -EPERM;
> -
> if (newflags == oldflags) {
> *pprev = vma;
> return 0;
> }
>
> + if (!can_modify_vma(vma))
> + return -EPERM;
> +
> /*
> * Do PROT_NONE PFN permission checks here when we can still
> * bail out without undoing a lot of state. This is a rather
> --
> 2.49.0.rc0.332.g42c0ae87b1-goog
>
Hm I'm not so sure about this, to me a seal means 'don't touch', even if
the touch would be a no-op. It's simpler to be totally consistent on this
and makes the code easier everywhere.
Because if we start saying 'apply mseal rules, except if we can determine
this to be a no-op' then that implies we might have some inconsistency in
other operations that do not do that, and sometimes a 'no-op' might be
ill-defined etc.
I think generally I'd rather leave things as they are unless you have a
specific real-life case where this is causing problems?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-03-12 13:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-03-12 0:21 [RFC PATCH v1 0/2] " jeffxu
2025-03-12 0:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 1/2] selftests/mm: mseal_test: avoid using no-op mprotect jeffxu
2025-03-12 0:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 2/2] mseal: allow noop mprotect jeffxu
2025-03-12 13:49 ` Lorenzo Stoakes [this message]
2025-03-12 15:27 ` Kees Cook
2025-03-12 15:48 ` Pedro Falcato
2025-03-12 15:50 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2025-03-12 16:45 ` Kees Cook
2025-03-12 23:29 ` Jeff Xu
2025-03-13 5:29 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2025-03-13 22:50 ` Jeff Xu
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