From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: simon.guinot@sequanux.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, rkrcmar@redhat.com,
matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
linus.walleij@linaro.org, gary.hook@amd.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
paul.gortmaker@windriver.com, hpa@zytor.com, cl@linux.com,
dan.j.williams@intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
sfr@canb.auug.org.au, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, bhe@redhat.com, xemul@parallels.com,
joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
piotr.luc@intel.com, mingo@redhat.com, msalter@redhat.com,
ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com, dyoung@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de,
keescook@chromium.org, arnd@arndb.de, toshi.kani@hpe.com,
mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com, luto@kernel.org,
devel@linuxdriverproject.org, bhelgaas@google.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, mchehab@kernel.org, iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com,
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linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, tj@kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, davem@davemloft.net
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 08/32] x86: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory page
Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2017 09:55:55 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <bca182ee-a881-6290-9b94-fceabe20306f@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0a7de265-1352-6327-ef3a-4287bfca732d@amd.com>
On 3/17/2017 9:32 AM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 3/16/2017 3:04 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> On 3/7/2017 8:59 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
>>> On Thu, Mar 02, 2017 at 10:13:32AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>>>> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>>>>
>>>> In order for memory pages to be properly mapped when SEV is active, we
>>>> need to use the PAGE_KERNEL protection attribute as the base
>>>> protection.
>>>> This will insure that memory mapping of, e.g. ACPI tables, receives the
>>>> proper mapping attributes.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>>>> ---
>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
>>>> index c400ab5..481c999 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
>>>> @@ -151,7 +151,15 @@ static void __iomem
>>>> *__ioremap_caller(resource_size_t phys_addr,
>>>> pcm = new_pcm;
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * If the page being mapped is in memory and SEV is active then
>>>> + * make sure the memory encryption attribute is enabled in the
>>>> + * resulting mapping.
>>>> + */
>>>> prot = PAGE_KERNEL_IO;
>>>> + if (sev_active() && page_is_mem(pfn))
>>>
>>> Hmm, a resource tree walk per ioremap call. This could get expensive for
>>> ioremap-heavy workloads.
>>>
>>> __ioremap_caller() gets called here during boot 55 times so not a whole
>>> lot but I wouldn't be surprised if there were some nasty use cases which
>>> ioremap a lot.
>>>
>>> ...
>>>
>>>> diff --git a/kernel/resource.c b/kernel/resource.c
>>>> index 9b5f044..db56ba3 100644
>>>> --- a/kernel/resource.c
>>>> +++ b/kernel/resource.c
>>>> @@ -518,6 +518,46 @@ int __weak page_is_ram(unsigned long pfn)
>>>> }
>>>> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(page_is_ram);
>>>>
>>>> +/*
>>>> + * This function returns true if the target memory is marked as
>>>> + * IORESOURCE_MEM and IORESOUCE_BUSY and described as other than
>>>> + * IORES_DESC_NONE (e.g. IORES_DESC_ACPI_TABLES).
>>>> + */
>>>> +static int walk_mem_range(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long
>>>> nr_pages)
>>>> +{
>>>> + struct resource res;
>>>> + unsigned long pfn, end_pfn;
>>>> + u64 orig_end;
>>>> + int ret = -1;
>>>> +
>>>> + res.start = (u64) start_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
>>>> + res.end = ((u64)(start_pfn + nr_pages) << PAGE_SHIFT) - 1;
>>>> + res.flags = IORESOURCE_MEM | IORESOURCE_BUSY;
>>>> + orig_end = res.end;
>>>> + while ((res.start < res.end) &&
>>>> + (find_next_iomem_res(&res, IORES_DESC_NONE, true) >= 0)) {
>>>> + pfn = (res.start + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>>>> + end_pfn = (res.end + 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>>>> + if (end_pfn > pfn)
>>>> + ret = (res.desc != IORES_DESC_NONE) ? 1 : 0;
>>>> + if (ret)
>>>> + break;
>>>> + res.start = res.end + 1;
>>>> + res.end = orig_end;
>>>> + }
>>>> + return ret;
>>>> +}
>>>
>>> So the relevant difference between this one and walk_system_ram_range()
>>> is this:
>>>
>>> - ret = (*func)(pfn, end_pfn - pfn, arg);
>>> + ret = (res.desc != IORES_DESC_NONE) ? 1 : 0;
>>>
>>> so it seems to me you can have your own *func() pointer which does that
>>> IORES_DESC_NONE comparison. And then you can define your own workhorse
>>> __walk_memory_range() which gets called by both walk_mem_range() and
>>> walk_system_ram_range() instead of almost duplicating them.
>>>
>>> And looking at walk_system_ram_res(), that one looks similar too except
>>> the pfn computation. But AFAICT the pfn/end_pfn things are computed from
>>> res.start and res.end so it looks to me like all those three functions
>>> are crying for unification...
>>
>> I'll take a look at what it takes to consolidate these with a pre-patch.
>> Then I'll add the new support.
>
> It looks pretty straight forward to combine walk_iomem_res_desc() and
> walk_system_ram_res(). The walk_system_ram_range() function would fit
> easily into this, also, except for the fact that the callback function
> takes unsigned longs vs the u64s of the other functions. Is it worth
> modifying all of the callers of walk_system_ram_range() (which are only
> about 8 locations) to change the callback functions to accept u64s in
> order to consolidate the walk_system_ram_range() function, too?
The more I dig, the more I find that the changes keep expanding. I'll
leave walk_system_ram_range() out of the consolidation for now.
Thanks,
Tom
>
> Thanks,
> Tom
>
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Tom
>>
>>>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-03-17 14:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-03-02 15:12 [RFC PATCH v2 00/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/32] x86: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 16:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 21:01 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-04 10:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-06 20:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/32] KVM: SVM: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/32] KVM: SVM: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 0:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/32] x86: Use encrypted access of BOOT related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 19:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/32] x86/pci: Use memremap when walking setup data Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 20:42 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 21:15 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-07 0:03 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-13 20:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/32] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/32] x86: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory page Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 14:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 20:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:32 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:55 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/32] x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data Brijesh Singh
2017-03-08 8:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/32] x86: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-03-08 10:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/32] x86: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/32] x86: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-09 14:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-09 16:13 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-09 16:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 16:35 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 14:28 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 15:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 16:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 16:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/32] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV by setting the SEV_ENABLE CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-03-09 19:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/32] x86: mm: Provide support to use memblock when spliting large pages Brijesh Singh
2017-03-10 11:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 22:41 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 13:15 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 22:25 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 10:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 10:47 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 10:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 11:03 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 11:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 14:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-18 16:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-06 14:05 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-06 17:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-06 18:37 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-07 11:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-07 14:50 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 12:28 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/32] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-03-24 17:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-27 15:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/32] x86: kvm: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 11:06 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-28 18:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 15:21 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-29 15:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/32] x86: kvmclock: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/32] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk Brijesh Singh
2017-03-29 15:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 17:08 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/32] crypto: ccp: Introduce the AMD Secure Processor device Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 17:39 ` Mark Rutland
2017-03-02 19:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 13:55 ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/32] crypto: ccp: Add Platform Security Processor (PSP) interface support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 21/32] crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) " Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 22/32] kvm: svm: prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 23/32] kvm: introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:25 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 24/32] kvm: x86: prepare for SEV guest management API support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:33 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 25/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_START command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 26/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:48 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:20 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 27/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 28/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV GUEST_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 29/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV DEBUG_DECRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:54 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:41 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-17 11:09 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 30/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 11:03 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:34 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 31/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_MEASURE command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 32/32] x86: kvm: Pin the guest memory when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:38 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:17 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 20:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 20:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 21:15 ` Brijesh Singh
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