From: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>
To: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>,
Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com,
baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com, Liam.Howlett@oracle.com,
npache@redhat.com, ryan.roberts@arm.com, dev.jain@arm.com,
baohua@kernel.org, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
michael.roth@amd.com, vannapurve@google.com, ziy@nvidia.com,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
syzbot+33a04338019ac7e43a44@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
Fangrui Song <i@maskray.me>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm: thp: Deny THP for guest_memfd and secretmem in file_thp_enabled()
Date: Wed, 11 Feb 2026 10:28:28 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <bac19363-0705-4bb2-b022-66054e1f28cd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAEvNRgGg245-TQn2HFSadZ7gmz-FxsAQ6=N14BUgiYGHhZeLeQ@mail.gmail.com>
On 2/11/26 00:00, Ackerley Tng wrote:
> "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org> writes:
>
>>>
>>> I could give this a shot. 5.15.199 doesn't have AS_INACCESSIBLE. Should
>>> we backport AS_INACCESSIBLE there or could the fix for 5.15.199 just be
>>> special-casing secretmem like you suggested below?
>>
>> Yes. If there is no guest_memfd we wouldn't need it.
>>
>
> Seems like on 5.15.199 there's a hugepage_vma_check(), which will return
> false since secretmem has vma->vm_ops defined [1], so secretmem VMAs are
> skipped.
Are you sure? We check for CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS before that:
/* Only regular file is valid */
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS) && vma->vm_file &&
(vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
struct inode *inode = vma->vm_file->f_inode;
return !inode_is_open_for_write(inode) &&
S_ISREG(inode->i_mode);
}
So if you have VM_EXEC on the VMA (mmaped with PROT_EXEC), it would work.
I think secretmem sets SB_I_NOEXEC, which prevents that. Same for guest_memfd.
v6.6.123 still has that VM_EXEC check in file_thp_enabled().
The check was dropped in commit:
commit 7fbb5e188248c50f737720825da1864ce42536d1
Author: Fangrui Song <i@maskray.me>
Date: Tue Dec 19 21:41:23 2023 -0800
mm: remove VM_EXEC requirement for THP eligibility
Commit e6be37b2e7bd ("mm/huge_memory.c: add missing read-only THP checking
in transparent_hugepage_enabled()") introduced the VM_EXEC requirement,
which is not strictly needed.
lld's default --rosegment option and GNU ld's -z separate-code option
(default on Linux/x86 since binutils 2.31) create a read-only PT_LOAD
segment without the PF_X flag, which should be eligible for THP.
So that one broke secretmem.
So when we fix it, we should
Fixes: 7fbb5e188248 ("mm: remove VM_EXEC requirement for THP eligibility")
What about the following:
diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index 44ff8a648afd..9fbe5c28a6bc 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -94,6 +94,9 @@ static inline bool file_thp_enabled(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
+ if (IS_ANON_FILE(inode))
+ return false;
+
return !inode_is_open_for_write(inode) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode);
}
--
Cheers,
David
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-11 9:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-09 3:35 Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-09 10:24 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-09 10:41 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-09 13:06 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-09 18:22 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-09 19:45 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-09 20:13 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-09 21:31 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-10 9:33 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-10 23:00 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-11 0:58 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-11 2:01 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-11 9:29 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-11 16:16 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-11 16:35 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-11 16:44 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-11 1:59 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-11 9:28 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm) [this message]
2026-02-11 14:50 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-11 15:38 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-11 16:45 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-12 22:19 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-13 5:02 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-13 9:06 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-21 4:37 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-10 1:51 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-10 9:33 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-09 23:37 ` kernel test robot
2026-02-10 17:51 ` kernel test robot
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