From: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
To: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
Stephen Kitt <steve@sk2.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm: Remove usercopy_warn()
Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2022 20:25:19 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b6e9e005-1269-d591-77b0-7db2edd996f4@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5f26643fc70b05f8455b60b99c30c17d635fa640.1644231910.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
On 2022/2/7 19:05, Christophe Leroy wrote:
> Users of usercopy_warn() were removed by
> commit 53944f171a89 ("mm: remove HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK")
>
> Remote it.
s/Remote/Remove/
Except the above nit, this patch looks good to me. Thanks.
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
>
> Cc: Stephen Kitt <steve@sk2.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
> ---
> include/linux/uaccess.h | 2 --
> mm/usercopy.c | 11 -----------
> 2 files changed, 13 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> index ac0394087f7d..bca27b4e5eb2 100644
> --- a/include/linux/uaccess.h
> +++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> @@ -401,8 +401,6 @@ static inline void user_access_restore(unsigned long flags) { }
> #endif
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY
> -void usercopy_warn(const char *name, const char *detail, bool to_user,
> - unsigned long offset, unsigned long len);
> void __noreturn usercopy_abort(const char *name, const char *detail,
> bool to_user, unsigned long offset,
> unsigned long len);
> diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
> index d0d268135d96..e7b0cb49daa1 100644
> --- a/mm/usercopy.c
> +++ b/mm/usercopy.c
> @@ -70,17 +70,6 @@ static noinline int check_stack_object(const void *obj, unsigned long len)
> * kmem_cache_create_usercopy() function to create the cache (and
> * carefully audit the whitelist range).
> */
> -void usercopy_warn(const char *name, const char *detail, bool to_user,
> - unsigned long offset, unsigned long len)
> -{
> - WARN_ONCE(1, "Bad or missing usercopy whitelist? Kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %s%s%s%s (offset %lu, size %lu)!\n",
> - to_user ? "exposure" : "overwrite",
> - to_user ? "from" : "to",
> - name ? : "unknown?!",
> - detail ? " '" : "", detail ? : "", detail ? "'" : "",
> - offset, len);
> -}
> -
> void __noreturn usercopy_abort(const char *name, const char *detail,
> bool to_user, unsigned long offset,
> unsigned long len)
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-02-07 12:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-02-07 11:05 Christophe Leroy
2022-02-07 12:25 ` Miaohe Lin [this message]
2022-02-07 20:25 ` Stephen Kitt
2022-02-08 8:16 ` Muchun Song
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=b6e9e005-1269-d591-77b0-7db2edd996f4@huawei.com \
--to=linmiaohe@huawei.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=steve@sk2.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox