From: "Chen, Rong A" <rong.a.chen@intel.com>
To: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
kbuild-all@lists.01.org,
Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [kbuild-all] Re: [linux-next:master 12593/13311] mm/kfence/core.c:250:13: sparse: sparse: context imbalance in 'kfence_guarded_alloc' - wrong count at exit
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2020 17:59:11 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b486a3b8-1d54-7f0e-60d7-c62a215add5a@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CANpmjNOQOzOqHFF+v2W5MzT=O8TK-2p5OS8C+PFPfjaTv_pELw@mail.gmail.com>
On 12/17/2020 1:58 PM, Marco Elver wrote:
> On Thu, 17 Dec 2020 at 02:40, kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com> wrote:
>>
>> tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git master
>> head: 9317f948b0b188b8d2fded75957e6d42c460df1b
>> commit: e21d96503adda2ccb571d577ad32929383c710ea [12593/13311] x86, kfence: enable KFENCE for x86
>> config: x86_64-randconfig-s022-20201216 (attached as .config)
>> compiler: gcc-9 (Debian 9.3.0-15) 9.3.0
>> reproduce:
>> # apt-get install sparse
>> # sparse version: v0.6.3-184-g1b896707-dirty
>> # https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/commit/?id=e21d96503adda2ccb571d577ad32929383c710ea
>> git remote add linux-next https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git
>> git fetch --no-tags linux-next master
>> git checkout e21d96503adda2ccb571d577ad32929383c710ea
>> # save the attached .config to linux build tree
>> make W=1 C=1 CF='-fdiagnostic-prefix -D__CHECK_ENDIAN__' ARCH=x86_64
>>
>> If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
>> Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com>
>>
>>
>> "sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)"
>>>> mm/kfence/core.c:250:13: sparse: sparse: context imbalance in 'kfence_guarded_alloc' - wrong count at exit
>>>> mm/kfence/core.c:825:9: sparse: sparse: context imbalance in 'kfence_handle_page_fault' - different lock contexts for basic block
>
> This is a false positive, and sparse can't seem to follow locking done
> here. This code has been tested extensively with lockdep.
Hi Marco,
Sorry for the inconvenience, I was just wondering that is there any
chance to use the macros for lock checking?
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/dev-tools/sparse.html#using-sparse-for-lock-checking
Best Regards,
Rong Chen
>
>> vim +/kfence_guarded_alloc +250 mm/kfence/core.c
>>
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 249
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 @250 static void *kfence_guarded_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, size_t size, gfp_t gfp)
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 251 {
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 252 struct kfence_metadata *meta = NULL;
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 253 unsigned long flags;
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 254 struct page *page;
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 255 void *addr;
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 256
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 257 /* Try to obtain a free object. */
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 258 raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags);
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 259 if (!list_empty(&kfence_freelist)) {
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 260 meta = list_entry(kfence_freelist.next, struct kfence_metadata, list);
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 261 list_del_init(&meta->list);
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 262 }
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 263 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags);
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 264 if (!meta)
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 265 return NULL;
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 266
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 267 if (unlikely(!raw_spin_trylock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags))) {
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 268 /*
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 269 * This is extremely unlikely -- we are reporting on a
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 270 * use-after-free, which locked meta->lock, and the reporting
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 271 * code via printk calls kmalloc() which ends up in
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 272 * kfence_alloc() and tries to grab the same object that we're
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 273 * reporting on. While it has never been observed, lockdep does
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 274 * report that there is a possibility of deadlock. Fix it by
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 275 * using trylock and bailing out gracefully.
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 276 */
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 277 raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags);
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 278 /* Put the object back on the freelist. */
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 279 list_add_tail(&meta->list, &kfence_freelist);
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 280 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags);
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 281
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 282 return NULL;
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 283 }
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 284
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 285 meta->addr = metadata_to_pageaddr(meta);
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 286 /* Unprotect if we're reusing this page. */
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 287 if (meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED)
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 288 kfence_unprotect(meta->addr);
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 289
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 290 /*
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 291 * Note: for allocations made before RNG initialization, will always
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 292 * return zero. We still benefit from enabling KFENCE as early as
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 293 * possible, even when the RNG is not yet available, as this will allow
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 294 * KFENCE to detect bugs due to earlier allocations. The only downside
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 295 * is that the out-of-bounds accesses detected are deterministic for
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 296 * such allocations.
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 297 */
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 298 if (prandom_u32_max(2)) {
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 299 /* Allocate on the "right" side, re-calculate address. */
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 300 meta->addr += PAGE_SIZE - size;
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 301 meta->addr = ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, cache->align);
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 302 }
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 303
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 304 addr = (void *)meta->addr;
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 305
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 306 /* Update remaining metadata. */
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 307 metadata_update_state(meta, KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED);
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 308 /* Pairs with READ_ONCE() in kfence_shutdown_cache(). */
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 309 WRITE_ONCE(meta->cache, cache);
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 310 meta->size = size;
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 311 for_each_canary(meta, set_canary_byte);
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 312
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 313 /* Set required struct page fields. */
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 314 page = virt_to_page(meta->addr);
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 315 page->slab_cache = cache;
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 316
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 317 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags);
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 318
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 319 /* Memory initialization. */
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 320
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 321 /*
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 322 * We check slab_want_init_on_alloc() ourselves, rather than letting
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 323 * SL*B do the initialization, as otherwise we might overwrite KFENCE's
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 324 * redzone.
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 325 */
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 326 if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfp, cache)))
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 327 memzero_explicit(addr, size);
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 328 if (cache->ctor)
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 329 cache->ctor(addr);
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 330
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 331 if (CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS && !prandom_u32_max(CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS))
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 332 kfence_protect(meta->addr); /* Random "faults" by protecting the object. */
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 333
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 334 atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED]);
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 335 atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCS]);
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 336
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 337 return addr;
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 338 }
>> 3b295ea3a66b734 Alexander Potapenko 2020-12-10 339
>>
>> :::::: The code at line 250 was first introduced by commit
>> :::::: 3b295ea3a66b734a0cd23ae66bae0747a078725a mm: add Kernel Electric-Fence infrastructure
>>
>> :::::: TO: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
>> :::::: CC: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
>>
>> ---
>> 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
>> https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all@lists.01.org
>> _______________________________________________
>> kbuild mailing list -- kbuild@lists.01.org
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-12-18 9:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-12-17 1:39 kernel test robot
2020-12-17 5:58 ` Marco Elver
2020-12-18 9:59 ` Chen, Rong A [this message]
2020-12-18 12:20 ` [kbuild-all] " Marco Elver
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