Re: [PATCH v3] mm: Add SLUB free list pointer obfuscation

[Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>]

On Wed, 5 Jul 2017, Kees Cook wrote:

> @@ -3536,6 +3565,9 @@ static int kmem_cache_open(struct kmem_cache *s, unsigned long flags)
>  {
>  	s->flags = kmem_cache_flags(s->size, flags, s->name, s->ctor);
>  	s->reserved = 0;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED
> +	s->random = get_random_long();
> +#endif
>
>  	if (need_reserve_slab_rcu && (s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))
>  		s->reserved = sizeof(struct rcu_head);
>

So if an attacker knows the internal structure of data then he can simply
dereference page->kmem_cache->random to decode the freepointer.

Assuming someone is already targeting a freelist pointer (which indicates
detailed knowledge of the internal structure) then I would think that
someone like that will also figure out how to follow the pointer links to
get to the random value.

Not seeing the point of all of this.

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