linux-mm.kvack.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
To: 'David Hildenbrand' <david@redhat.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	"stable@vger.kernel.org" <stable@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>, Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>,
	Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>,
	Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Subject: RE: [PATCH v2] mm/gup: fix FOLL_FORCE COW security issue and remove FOLL_COW
Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2022 09:12:57 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <afab7f23d10145b590aef44b3242db64@AcuMS.aculab.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220809205640.70916-1-david@redhat.com>

From: David Hildenbrand
> Sent: 09 August 2022 21:57
...

These two functions seem to contain a lot of the same tests.
They also seem a bit large for 'inline'.

> -static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags)
> +/* FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable PTEs in COW mappings. */
> +static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, struct page *page,
> +					struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> +					unsigned int flags)
>  {
> -	return pte_write(pte) ||
> -		((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pte_dirty(pte));
> +	/* If the pte is writable, we can write to the page. */
> +	if (pte_write(pte))
> +		return true;
> +
> +	/* Maybe FOLL_FORCE is set to override it? */
> +	if (!(flags & FOLL_FORCE))
> +		return false;
> +
> +	/* But FOLL_FORCE has no effect on shared mappings */
> +	if (vma->vm_flags & (VM_MAYSHARE | VM_SHARED))
> +		return false;
> +
> +	/* ... or read-only private ones */
> +	if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYWRITE))
> +		return false;
> +
> +	/* ... or already writable ones that just need to take a write fault */
> +	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
> +		return false;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * See can_change_pte_writable(): we broke COW and could map the page
> +	 * writable if we have an exclusive anonymous page ...
> +	 */
> +	if (!page || !PageAnon(page) || !PageAnonExclusive(page))
> +		return false;
> +
> +	/* ... and a write-fault isn't required for other reasons. */
> +	if (vma_soft_dirty_enabled(vma) && !pte_soft_dirty(pte))
> +		return false;
> +	return !userfaultfd_pte_wp(vma, pte);
>  }
...
> -static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd(pmd_t pmd, unsigned int flags)
> +/* FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable PMDs in COW mappings. */
> +static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd(pmd_t pmd, struct page *page,
> +					struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> +					unsigned int flags)
>  {
> -	return pmd_write(pmd) ||
> -	       ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pmd_dirty(pmd));
> +	/* If the pmd is writable, we can write to the page. */
> +	if (pmd_write(pmd))
> +		return true;
> +
> +	/* Maybe FOLL_FORCE is set to override it? */
> +	if (!(flags & FOLL_FORCE))
> +		return false;
> +
> +	/* But FOLL_FORCE has no effect on shared mappings */
> +	if (vma->vm_flags & (VM_MAYSHARE | VM_SHARED))
> +		return false;
> +
> +	/* ... or read-only private ones */
> +	if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYWRITE))
> +		return false;
> +
> +	/* ... or already writable ones that just need to take a write fault */
> +	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
> +		return false;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * See can_change_pte_writable(): we broke COW and could map the page
> +	 * writable if we have an exclusive anonymous page ...
> +	 */
> +	if (!page || !PageAnon(page) || !PageAnonExclusive(page))
> +		return false;
> +
> +	/* ... and a write-fault isn't required for other reasons. */
> +	if (vma_soft_dirty_enabled(vma) && !pmd_soft_dirty(pmd))
> +		return false;
> +	return !userfaultfd_huge_pmd_wp(vma, pmd);
>  }

Perhaps only the initial call (common success path?) should
be inlined?
With the flags and vma tests being moved to an inline helper.

	David

-
Registered Address Lakeside, Bramley Road, Mount Farm, Milton Keynes, MK1 1PT, UK
Registration No: 1397386 (Wales)



  reply	other threads:[~2022-08-10  9:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-08-09 20:56 David Hildenbrand
2022-08-10  9:12 ` David Laight [this message]
2022-08-10  9:18   ` David Hildenbrand

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=afab7f23d10145b590aef44b3242db64@AcuMS.aculab.com \
    --to=david.laight@aculab.com \
    --cc=aarcange@redhat.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=axelrasmussen@google.com \
    --cc=david@redhat.com \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=hughd@google.com \
    --cc=jgg@nvidia.com \
    --cc=jhubbard@nvidia.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=nadav.amit@gmail.com \
    --cc=peterx@redhat.com \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=vbabka@suse.cz \
    --cc=willy@infradead.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox