From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Boris Ostrovsky" <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 34/36] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2017 12:44:46 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <af9a50f7-17ea-a840-6456-b6479e5d7e82@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170623100013.upd4or6esjvulmvg@pd.tnic>
On 6/23/2017 5:00 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 01:56:19PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> Add the support to encrypt the kernel in-place. This is done by creating
>> new page mappings for the kernel - a decrypted write-protected mapping
>> and an encrypted mapping. The kernel is encrypted by copying it through
>> a temporary buffer.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 6 +
>> arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 2
>> arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 314 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S | 150 +++++++++++++++++
>> 4 files changed, 472 insertions(+)
>> create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
>> index af835cf..7da6de3 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
>> @@ -21,6 +21,12 @@
>>
>> extern unsigned long sme_me_mask;
>>
>> +void sme_encrypt_execute(unsigned long encrypted_kernel_vaddr,
>> + unsigned long decrypted_kernel_vaddr,
>> + unsigned long kernel_len,
>> + unsigned long encryption_wa,
>> + unsigned long encryption_pgd);
>> +
>> void __init sme_early_encrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
>> unsigned long size);
>> void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
>> index 9e13841..0633142 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
>> @@ -38,3 +38,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_NUMA_EMU) += numa_emulation.o
>> obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MPX) += mpx.o
>> obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) += pkeys.o
>> obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY) += kaslr.o
>> +
>> +obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_boot.o
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>> index 842c8a6..6e87662 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>> @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
>> #include <asm/setup.h>
>> #include <asm/bootparam.h>
>> #include <asm/set_memory.h>
>> +#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
>> +#include <asm/sections.h>
>>
>> /*
>> * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
>> @@ -209,8 +211,320 @@ void swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(void *vaddr, unsigned long size)
>> set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
>> }
>>
>> +static void __init sme_clear_pgd(pgd_t *pgd_base, unsigned long start,
>> + unsigned long end)
>> +{
>> + unsigned long pgd_start, pgd_end, pgd_size;
>> + pgd_t *pgd_p;
>> +
>> + pgd_start = start & PGDIR_MASK;
>> + pgd_end = end & PGDIR_MASK;
>> +
>> + pgd_size = (((pgd_end - pgd_start) / PGDIR_SIZE) + 1);
>> + pgd_size *= sizeof(pgd_t);
>> +
>> + pgd_p = pgd_base + pgd_index(start);
>> +
>> + memset(pgd_p, 0, pgd_size);
>> +}
>> +
>> +#ifndef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
>> +#define native_make_p4d(_x) (p4d_t) { .pgd = native_make_pgd(_x) }
>> +#endif
>
> Huh, why isn't this in arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h in the #else
> branch of #if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 4 ?
Normally the __p4d() macro would be used and that would be ok whether
CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL is defined or not. But since __p4d() is part of the
paravirt ops path I have to use native_make_p4d(). I'd be the only user
of the function and thought it would be best to localize it this way.
>
> Also
>
> ERROR: Macros with complex values should be enclosed in parentheses
> #105: FILE: arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c:232:
> +#define native_make_p4d(_x) (p4d_t) { .pgd = native_make_pgd(_x) }
>
> so why isn't it a function?
I can define it as an inline function.
>
>> +
>> +#define PGD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
>> +#define P4D_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
>> +#define PUD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
>> +#define PMD_FLAGS (__PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL)
>> +
>> +static void __init *sme_populate_pgd(pgd_t *pgd_base, void *pgtable_area,
>> + unsigned long vaddr, pmdval_t pmd_val)
>> +{
>> + pgd_t *pgd_p;
>> + p4d_t *p4d_p;
>> + pud_t *pud_p;
>> + pmd_t *pmd_p;
>> +
>> + pgd_p = pgd_base + pgd_index(vaddr);
>> + if (native_pgd_val(*pgd_p)) {
>> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL))
>
> Err, I don't understand: so this is a Kconfig symbol and when it is
> enabled at build time, you do a 5level pagetable.
>
> But you can't stick a 5level pagetable to a hardware which doesn't know
> about it.
True, 5-level will only be turned on for specific hardware which is why
I originally had this as only 4-level pagetables. But in a comment from
you back on the v5 version you said it needed to support 5-level. I
guess we should have discussed this more, but I also thought that should
our hardware ever support 5-level paging in the future then this would
be good to go.
>
> Or do you mean that p4d layer folding at runtime to happen? (I admit, I
> haven't looked at that in detail.) But then I'd hope that the generic
> macros/functions would give you the ability to not care whether we have
> a p4d or not and not add a whole bunch of ifdeffery to this code.
The macros work great if you are not running identity mapped. You could
use p*d_offset() to move easily through the tables, but those functions
use __va() to generate table virtual addresses. I've seen where
boot/compressed/pagetable.c #defines __va() to work with identity mapped
pages but that would only work if I create a separate file just for this
function.
Given when this occurs it's very similar to what __startup_64() does in
regards to the IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL) checks.
Thanks,
Tom
>
> Hmmm.
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-23 17:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 81+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-16 18:49 [PATCH v7 00/36] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:49 ` [PATCH v7 01/36] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` [PATCH v7 02/36] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` [PATCH v7 03/36] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 7:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:50 ` [PATCH v7 04/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` [PATCH v7 05/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` [PATCH v7 06/36] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 20:49 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 13:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` [PATCH v7 07/36] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 20:55 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 13:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 7:37 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 13:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 7:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 15:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 7:16 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:38 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 18:30 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 18:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-16 18:51 ` [PATCH v7 09/36] x86/mm: Simplify p[gum]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` [PATCH v7 10/36] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 7:18 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 8:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:51 ` [PATCH v7 11/36] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa() Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 8:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 16:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-20 16:23 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` [PATCH v7 12/36] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` [PATCH v7 13/36] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` [PATCH v7 14/36] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 15:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:52 ` [PATCH v7 15/36] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` [PATCH v7 16/36] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 10:57 ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-16 18:53 ` [PATCH v7 17/36] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 10:03 ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-16 18:53 ` [PATCH v7 18/36] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 10:58 ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-16 18:53 ` [PATCH v7 19/36] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 20:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 11:04 ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-16 18:53 ` [PATCH v7 20/36] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 8:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:53 ` [PATCH v7 21/36] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 22/36] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 23/36] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 9:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 24/36] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 9:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 25/36] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 10:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 15:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 26/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 9:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 27/36] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 10:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 16:48 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` [PATCH v7 28/36] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` [PATCH v7 29/36] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-06-17 14:08 ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-16 18:55 ` [PATCH v7 30/36] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` [PATCH v7 31/36] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 8:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:55 ` [PATCH v7 32/36] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests Tom Lendacky
2017-06-17 10:40 ` Juergen Gross
2017-06-23 9:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:56 ` [PATCH v7 33/36] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 9:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:56 ` [PATCH v7 34/36] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 10:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 17:44 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-06-26 15:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-26 16:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` [PATCH v7 35/36] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 11:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:56 ` [PATCH v7 36/36] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 17:39 ` Borislav Petkov
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