From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <m.wieczorretman@pm.me>
To: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 13/14] x86/kasan: Logical bit shift for kasan_mem_to_shadow
Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2026 16:43:08 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aWkVn8iY27APFYy_@wieczorr-mobl1.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+fCnZd4rJvKzdMPmpYmNSto_dbJ_v6fdNYv-13_vC2+bu-4bg@mail.gmail.com>
On 2026-01-15 at 04:57:15 +0100, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
>On Wed, Jan 14, 2026 at 5:52 PM Maciej Wieczor-Retman
><maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com> wrote:
>>
>> I'm a fan of trying to keep as much arch code in the arch directories.
>>
>> How about before putting a call here instead like:
>>
>> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC)) {
>> if (addr < (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)(0ULL)) ||
>> addr > (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)(~0ULL)))
>> return;
>> }
>>
>> arch_kasan_non_canonical_hook()
>> There would be the generic non-arch part above (and anything shared that might
>> make sense here in the future) and all the arch related code would be hidden in
>> the per-arch helper.
>>
>> So then we could move the part below:
>> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64)) {
>> if (addr < (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)(0xFFULL << 56)) ||
>> addr > (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)(~0ULL)))
>> return;
>> }
>> to /arch/arm64.
>>
>> For x86 we'd need to duplicate the generic part into
>> arch_kasan_non_canonical_hook() call in /arch/x86. That seems quiet tidy to me,
>> granted the duplication isn't great but it would keep the non-arch part as
>> shared as possible. What do you think?
>
>Sounds good to me too, thanks!
x86 was easy to do because the kasan_mem_to_shadow() was already in the
asm/kasan.h. arm64 took a bit more changes since I had to write the
arch_kasan_non_canonical_hook in a separate file that would import the
linux/kasan.h header in order to use kasan_mem_to_shadow(). Anyway below are the
relevant bits from the patch - does that look okay? Or would you prefer some
different names/placements?
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kasan.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kasan.h
index b167e9d3da91..16b1f2ca3ea8 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kasan.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kasan.h
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
asmlinkage void kasan_early_init(void);
void kasan_init(void);
+bool __arch_kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr);
+#define arch_kasan_non_canonical_hook(addr) __arch_kasan_non_canonical_hook(addr)
#else
static inline void kasan_init(void) { }
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/Makefile b/arch/arm64/mm/Makefile
index c26489cf96cd..a122ea67eced 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/Makefile
@@ -15,4 +15,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_ARM64_GCS) += gcs.o
KASAN_SANITIZE_physaddr.o += n
obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN) += kasan_init.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN) += kasan.o
KASAN_SANITIZE_kasan_init.o := n
+KASAN_SANITIZE_kasan.o := n
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/kasan.c b/arch/arm64/mm/kasan.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b94d5fb480ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/kasan.c
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * This file contains ARM64 specific KASAN code.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kasan.h>
+
+bool __arch_kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr) {
+ /*
+ * For Software Tag-Based KASAN, kasan_mem_to_shadow() uses the
+ * arithmetic shift. Normally, this would make checking for a possible
+ * shadow address complicated, as the shadow address computation
+ * operation would overflow only for some memory addresses. However, due
+ * to the chosen KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET values and the fact the
+ * kasan_mem_to_shadow() only operates on pointers with the tag reset,
+ * the overflow always happens.
+ *
+ * For arm64, the top byte of the pointer gets reset to 0xFF. Thus, the
+ * possible shadow addresses belong to a region that is the result of
+ * kasan_mem_to_shadow() applied to the memory range
+ * [0xFF000000000000, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF]. Despite the overflow, the
+ * resulting possible shadow region is contiguous, as the overflow
+ * happens for both 0xFF000000000000 and 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF.
+ */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)) {
+ if (addr < (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)(0xFFULL << 56)) ||
+ addr > (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)(~0ULL)))
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
index 9c6ac4b62eb9..146eecae4e9c 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
...
@@ -403,6 +409,13 @@ static __always_inline bool kasan_check_byte(const void *addr)
return true;
}
+#ifndef arch_kasan_non_canonical_hook
+static inline bool arch_kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+#endif
+
#else /* CONFIG_KASAN */
diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
index 62c01b4527eb..1c4893729ff6 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/report.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
@@ -642,10 +642,19 @@ void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr)
const char *bug_type;
/*
- * All addresses that came as a result of the memory-to-shadow mapping
- * (even for bogus pointers) must be >= KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET.
+ * For Generic KASAN, kasan_mem_to_shadow() uses the logical right shift
+ * and never overflows with the chosen KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET values. Thus,
+ * the possible shadow addresses (even for bogus pointers) belong to a
+ * single contiguous region that is the result of kasan_mem_to_shadow()
+ * applied to the whole address space.
*/
- if (addr < KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET)
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC)) {
+ if (addr < (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)(0ULL)) ||
+ addr > (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)(~0ULL)))
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if(arch_kasan_non_canonical_hook(addr))
return;
--
Kind regards
Maciej Wieczór-Retman
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-01-15 16:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-01-12 17:26 [PATCH v8 00/14] kasan: x86: arm64: KASAN tag-based mode for x86 Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-12 17:27 ` [PATCH v8 01/14] kasan: sw_tags: Use arithmetic shift for shadow computation Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-15 22:42 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2026-01-16 13:11 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-12 17:27 ` [PATCH v8 02/14] kasan: arm64: x86: Make special tags arch specific Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-13 1:21 ` Andrey Konovalov
2026-01-13 17:32 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-16 13:32 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2026-01-12 17:27 ` [PATCH v8 04/14] x86/kasan: Add arch specific kasan functions Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-13 1:21 ` Andrey Konovalov
2026-01-13 16:12 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-16 13:35 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2026-01-12 17:27 ` [PATCH v8 06/14] mm/execmem: Untag addresses in EXECMEM_ROX related pointer arithmetic Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-12 17:28 ` [PATCH v8 13/14] x86/kasan: Logical bit shift for kasan_mem_to_shadow Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-13 1:21 ` Andrey Konovalov
2026-01-14 16:52 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-15 3:57 ` Andrey Konovalov
2026-01-15 16:43 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman [this message]
2026-01-17 1:21 ` Andrey Konovalov
2026-01-17 6:53 ` Maciej Wieczór-Retman
2026-01-19 11:40 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-12 18:29 ` [PATCH v8 00/14] kasan: x86: arm64: KASAN tag-based mode for x86 Andrew Morton
2026-01-12 20:08 ` Maciej Wieczór-Retman
2026-01-12 20:53 ` Andrew Morton
2026-01-13 1:47 ` Andrey Konovalov
2026-01-12 20:27 ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-13 11:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-01-13 17:34 ` Andrew Morton
2026-01-22 17:25 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-13 1:44 ` Andrey Konovalov
2026-01-19 16:33 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2026-01-19 19:43 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=aWkVn8iY27APFYy_@wieczorr-mobl1.localdomain \
--to=m.wieczorretman@pm.me \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=andreyknvl@gmail.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=dvyukov@google.com \
--cc=glider@google.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=kasan-dev@googlegroups.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com \
--cc=tglx@kernel.org \
--cc=vincenzo.frascino@arm.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox