* [RFC PATCH v3 1/4] compiler.h: Introduce ptr_eq() to preserve address dependency
2024-10-08 13:50 [RFC PATCH v3 0/4] sched+mm: Track lazy active mm existence with hazard pointers Mathieu Desnoyers
@ 2024-10-08 13:50 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-10-08 13:50 ` [RFC PATCH v3 2/4] Documentation: RCU: Refer to ptr_eq() Mathieu Desnoyers
` (2 subsequent siblings)
3 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Mathieu Desnoyers @ 2024-10-08 13:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Boqun Feng
Cc: linux-kernel, Mathieu Desnoyers, Linus Torvalds, Andrew Morton,
Peter Zijlstra, Nicholas Piggin, Michael Ellerman,
Greg Kroah-Hartman, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior, Paul E. McKenney,
Will Deacon, Alan Stern, John Stultz, Neeraj Upadhyay,
Frederic Weisbecker, Joel Fernandes, Josh Triplett,
Uladzislau Rezki, Steven Rostedt, Lai Jiangshan, Zqiang,
Ingo Molnar, Waiman Long, Mark Rutland, Thomas Gleixner,
Vlastimil Babka, maged.michael, Mateusz Guzik, Jonas Oberhauser,
rcu, linux-mm, lkmm, Gary Guo, Nikita Popov, llvm
Compiler CSE and SSA GVN optimizations can cause the address dependency
of addresses returned by rcu_dereference to be lost when comparing those
pointers with either constants or previously loaded pointers.
Introduce ptr_eq() to compare two addresses while preserving the address
dependencies for later use of the address. It should be used when
comparing an address returned by rcu_dereference().
This is needed to prevent the compiler CSE and SSA GVN optimizations
from using @a (or @b) in places where the source refers to @b (or @a)
based on the fact that after the comparison, the two are known to be
equal, which does not preserve address dependencies and allows the
following misordering speculations:
- If @b is a constant, the compiler can issue the loads which depend
on @a before loading @a.
- If @b is a register populated by a prior load, weakly-ordered
CPUs can speculate loads which depend on @a before loading @a.
The same logic applies with @a and @b swapped.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Reviewed-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Tested-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Acked-by: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: John Stultz <jstultz@google.com>
Cc: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: Zqiang <qiang.zhang1211@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: maged.michael@gmail.com
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Cc: Gary Guo <gary@garyguo.net>
Cc: Jonas Oberhauser <jonas.oberhauser@huaweicloud.com>
Cc: rcu@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: lkmm@lists.linux.dev
Cc: Nikita Popov <github@npopov.com>
Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev
---
Changes since v0:
- Include feedback from Alan Stern.
---
include/linux/compiler.h | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 63 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler.h b/include/linux/compiler.h
index 2df665fa2964..75a378ae7af1 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler.h
@@ -186,6 +186,69 @@ void ftrace_likely_update(struct ftrace_likely_data *f, int val,
__asm__ ("" : "=r" (var) : "0" (var))
#endif
+/*
+ * Compare two addresses while preserving the address dependencies for
+ * later use of the address. It should be used when comparing an address
+ * returned by rcu_dereference().
+ *
+ * This is needed to prevent the compiler CSE and SSA GVN optimizations
+ * from using @a (or @b) in places where the source refers to @b (or @a)
+ * based on the fact that after the comparison, the two are known to be
+ * equal, which does not preserve address dependencies and allows the
+ * following misordering speculations:
+ *
+ * - If @b is a constant, the compiler can issue the loads which depend
+ * on @a before loading @a.
+ * - If @b is a register populated by a prior load, weakly-ordered
+ * CPUs can speculate loads which depend on @a before loading @a.
+ *
+ * The same logic applies with @a and @b swapped.
+ *
+ * Return value: true if pointers are equal, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * The compiler barrier() is ineffective at fixing this issue. It does
+ * not prevent the compiler CSE from losing the address dependency:
+ *
+ * int fct_2_volatile_barriers(void)
+ * {
+ * int *a, *b;
+ *
+ * do {
+ * a = READ_ONCE(p);
+ * asm volatile ("" : : : "memory");
+ * b = READ_ONCE(p);
+ * } while (a != b);
+ * asm volatile ("" : : : "memory"); <-- barrier()
+ * return *b;
+ * }
+ *
+ * With gcc 14.2 (arm64):
+ *
+ * fct_2_volatile_barriers:
+ * adrp x0, .LANCHOR0
+ * add x0, x0, :lo12:.LANCHOR0
+ * .L2:
+ * ldr x1, [x0] <-- x1 populated by first load.
+ * ldr x2, [x0]
+ * cmp x1, x2
+ * bne .L2
+ * ldr w0, [x1] <-- x1 is used for access which should depend on b.
+ * ret
+ *
+ * On weakly-ordered architectures, this lets CPU speculation use the
+ * result from the first load to speculate "ldr w0, [x1]" before
+ * "ldr x2, [x0]".
+ * Based on the RCU documentation, the control dependency does not
+ * prevent the CPU from speculating loads.
+ */
+static __always_inline
+int ptr_eq(const volatile void *a, const volatile void *b)
+{
+ OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(a);
+ OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(b);
+ return a == b;
+}
+
#define __UNIQUE_ID(prefix) __PASTE(__PASTE(__UNIQUE_ID_, prefix), __COUNTER__)
/**
--
2.39.2
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread* [RFC PATCH v3 2/4] Documentation: RCU: Refer to ptr_eq()
2024-10-08 13:50 [RFC PATCH v3 0/4] sched+mm: Track lazy active mm existence with hazard pointers Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-10-08 13:50 ` [RFC PATCH v3 1/4] compiler.h: Introduce ptr_eq() to preserve address dependency Mathieu Desnoyers
@ 2024-10-08 13:50 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-10-08 13:50 ` [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] hazptr: Implement Hazard Pointers Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-10-08 13:50 ` [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] sched+mm: Use hazard pointers to track lazy active mm existence Mathieu Desnoyers
3 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Mathieu Desnoyers @ 2024-10-08 13:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Boqun Feng
Cc: linux-kernel, Mathieu Desnoyers, Linus Torvalds, Andrew Morton,
Peter Zijlstra, Nicholas Piggin, Michael Ellerman,
Greg Kroah-Hartman, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior, Paul E. McKenney,
Will Deacon, Alan Stern, John Stultz, Neeraj Upadhyay,
Frederic Weisbecker, Joel Fernandes, Josh Triplett,
Uladzislau Rezki, Steven Rostedt, Lai Jiangshan, Zqiang,
Ingo Molnar, Waiman Long, Mark Rutland, Thomas Gleixner,
Vlastimil Babka, maged.michael, Mateusz Guzik, Jonas Oberhauser,
rcu, linux-mm, lkmm, Gary Guo, Nikita Popov, llvm
Refer to ptr_eq() in the rcu_dereference() documentation.
ptr_eq() is a mechanism that preserves address dependencies when
comparing pointers, and should be favored when comparing a pointer
obtained from rcu_dereference() against another pointer.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: John Stultz <jstultz@google.com>
Cc: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: Zqiang <qiang.zhang1211@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: maged.michael@gmail.com
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Cc: Gary Guo <gary@garyguo.net>
Cc: Jonas Oberhauser <jonas.oberhauser@huaweicloud.com>
Cc: rcu@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: lkmm@lists.linux.dev
Cc: Nikita Popov <github@npopov.com>
Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev
---
Changes since v0:
- Include feedback from Alan Stern.
Changes since v1:
- Include feedback from Paul E. McKenney.
---
Documentation/RCU/rcu_dereference.rst | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/RCU/rcu_dereference.rst b/Documentation/RCU/rcu_dereference.rst
index 2524dcdadde2..de6175bf430f 100644
--- a/Documentation/RCU/rcu_dereference.rst
+++ b/Documentation/RCU/rcu_dereference.rst
@@ -104,11 +104,12 @@ readers working properly:
after such branches, but can speculate loads, which can again
result in misordering bugs.
-- Be very careful about comparing pointers obtained from
- rcu_dereference() against non-NULL values. As Linus Torvalds
- explained, if the two pointers are equal, the compiler could
- substitute the pointer you are comparing against for the pointer
- obtained from rcu_dereference(). For example::
+- Use operations that preserve address dependencies (such as
+ "ptr_eq()") to compare pointers obtained from rcu_dereference()
+ against non-NULL pointers. As Linus Torvalds explained, if the
+ two pointers are equal, the compiler could substitute the
+ pointer you are comparing against for the pointer obtained from
+ rcu_dereference(). For example::
p = rcu_dereference(gp);
if (p == &default_struct)
@@ -125,6 +126,29 @@ readers working properly:
On ARM and Power hardware, the load from "default_struct.a"
can now be speculated, such that it might happen before the
rcu_dereference(). This could result in bugs due to misordering.
+ Performing the comparison with "ptr_eq()" ensures the compiler
+ does not perform such transformation.
+
+ If the comparison is against another pointer, the compiler is
+ allowed to use either pointer for the following accesses, which
+ loses the address dependency and allows weakly-ordered
+ architectures such as ARM and PowerPC to speculate the
+ address-dependent load before rcu_dereference(). For example::
+
+ p1 = READ_ONCE(gp);
+ p2 = rcu_dereference(gp);
+ if (p1 == p2) /* BUGGY!!! */
+ do_default(p2->a);
+
+ The compiler can use p1->a rather than p2->a, destroying the
+ address dependency. Performing the comparison with "ptr_eq()"
+ ensures the compiler preserves the address dependencies.
+ Corrected code::
+
+ p1 = READ_ONCE(gp);
+ p2 = rcu_dereference(gp);
+ if (ptr_eq(p1, p2))
+ do_default(p2->a);
However, comparisons are OK in the following cases:
@@ -204,6 +228,10 @@ readers working properly:
comparison will provide exactly the information that the
compiler needs to deduce the value of the pointer.
+ When in doubt, use operations that preserve address dependencies
+ (such as "ptr_eq()") to compare pointers obtained from
+ rcu_dereference() against non-NULL pointers.
+
- Disable any value-speculation optimizations that your compiler
might provide, especially if you are making use of feedback-based
optimizations that take data collected from prior runs. Such
--
2.39.2
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] hazptr: Implement Hazard Pointers
2024-10-08 13:50 [RFC PATCH v3 0/4] sched+mm: Track lazy active mm existence with hazard pointers Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-10-08 13:50 ` [RFC PATCH v3 1/4] compiler.h: Introduce ptr_eq() to preserve address dependency Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-10-08 13:50 ` [RFC PATCH v3 2/4] Documentation: RCU: Refer to ptr_eq() Mathieu Desnoyers
@ 2024-10-08 13:50 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-10-08 17:05 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-10-08 13:50 ` [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] sched+mm: Use hazard pointers to track lazy active mm existence Mathieu Desnoyers
3 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Mathieu Desnoyers @ 2024-10-08 13:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Boqun Feng
Cc: linux-kernel, Mathieu Desnoyers, Linus Torvalds, Andrew Morton,
Peter Zijlstra, Nicholas Piggin, Michael Ellerman,
Greg Kroah-Hartman, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior, Paul E. McKenney,
Will Deacon, Alan Stern, John Stultz, Neeraj Upadhyay,
Frederic Weisbecker, Joel Fernandes, Josh Triplett,
Uladzislau Rezki, Steven Rostedt, Lai Jiangshan, Zqiang,
Ingo Molnar, Waiman Long, Mark Rutland, Thomas Gleixner,
Vlastimil Babka, maged.michael, Mateusz Guzik, Jonas Oberhauser,
rcu, linux-mm, lkmm
This API provides existence guarantees of objects through Hazard
Pointers (hazptr). This minimalist implementation is specific to use
with preemption disabled, but can be extended further as needed.
Each hazptr domain defines a fixed number of hazard pointer slots
(nr_cpus) across the entire system.
Its main benefit over RCU is that it allows fast reclaim of
HP-protected pointers without needing to wait for a grace period.
It also allows the hazard pointer scan to call a user-defined callback
to retire a hazard pointer slot immediately if needed. This callback
may, for instance, issue an IPI to the relevant CPU.
There are a few possible use-cases for this in the Linux kernel:
- Improve performance of mm_count by replacing lazy active mm by
hazptr.
- Guarantee object existence on pointer dereference to use refcount:
- replace locking used for that purpose in some drivers,
- replace RCU + inc_not_zero pattern,
- rtmutex: Improve situations where locks need to be taken in
reverse dependency chain order by guaranteeing existence of
first and second locks in traversal order, allowing them to be
locked in the correct order (which is reverse from traversal
order) rather than try-lock+retry on nested lock.
References:
[1]: M. M. Michael, "Hazard pointers: safe memory reclamation for
lock-free objects," in IEEE Transactions on Parallel and
Distributed Systems, vol. 15, no. 6, pp. 491-504, June 2004
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/j3scdl5iymjlxavomgc6u5ndg3svhab6ga23dr36o4f5mt333w@7xslvq6b6hmv/
Link: https://lpc.events/event/18/contributions/1731/
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: John Stultz <jstultz@google.com>
Cc: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: Zqiang <qiang.zhang1211@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: maged.michael@gmail.com
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Cc: Jonas Oberhauser <jonas.oberhauser@huaweicloud.com>
Cc: rcu@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: lkmm@lists.linux.dev
---
Changes since v0:
- Remove slot variable from hp_dereference_allocate().
Changes since v2:
- Address Peter Zijlstra's comments.
- Address Paul E. McKenney's comments.
---
include/linux/hazptr.h | 165 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/Makefile | 2 +-
kernel/hazptr.c | 51 +++++++++++++
3 files changed, 217 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 include/linux/hazptr.h
create mode 100644 kernel/hazptr.c
diff --git a/include/linux/hazptr.h b/include/linux/hazptr.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f8e36d2bdc58
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/hazptr.h
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024 Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
+//
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_HAZPTR_H
+#define _LINUX_HAZPTR_H
+
+/*
+ * HP: Hazard Pointers
+ *
+ * This API provides existence guarantees of objects through hazard
+ * pointers.
+ *
+ * It uses a fixed number of hazard pointer slots (nr_cpus) across the
+ * entire system for each hazard pointer domain.
+ *
+ * Its main benefit over RCU is that it allows fast reclaim of
+ * HP-protected pointers without needing to wait for a grace period.
+ *
+ * It also allows the hazard pointer scan to call a user-defined callback
+ * to retire a hazard pointer slot immediately if needed. This callback
+ * may, for instance, issue an IPI to the relevant CPU.
+ *
+ * References:
+ *
+ * [1]: M. M. Michael, "Hazard pointers: safe memory reclamation for
+ * lock-free objects," in IEEE Transactions on Parallel and
+ * Distributed Systems, vol. 15, no. 6, pp. 491-504, June 2004
+ */
+
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+/*
+ * Hazard pointer slot.
+ */
+struct hazptr_slot {
+ void *addr;
+};
+
+struct hazptr_domain {
+ struct hazptr_slot __percpu *percpu_slots;
+};
+
+#define DECLARE_HAZPTR_DOMAIN(domain) \
+ extern struct hazptr_domain domain
+
+#define DEFINE_HAZPTR_DOMAIN(domain) \
+ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct hazptr_slot, __ ## domain ## _slots); \
+ struct hazptr_domain domain = { \
+ .percpu_slots = &__## domain ## _slots, \
+ }
+
+/*
+ * hazptr_scan: Scan hazard pointer domain for @addr.
+ *
+ * Scan hazard pointer domain for @addr.
+ * If @on_match_cb is NULL, wait to observe that each slot contains a value
+ * that differs from @addr.
+ * If @on_match_cb is non-NULL, invoke @on_match_cb for each slot containing
+ * @addr.
+ */
+void hazptr_scan(struct hazptr_domain *domain, void *addr,
+ void (*on_match_cb)(int cpu, struct hazptr_slot *slot, void *addr));
+
+/*
+ * hazptr_try_protect: Try to protect with hazard pointer.
+ *
+ * Try to protect @addr with a hazard pointer slot. The object existence
+ * should be guaranteed by the caller. Expects to be called from preempt
+ * disable context.
+ *
+ * Returns true if protect succeeds, false otherwise.
+ * On success, if @_slot is not NULL, the protected hazptr slot is stored in @_slot.
+ */
+static inline
+bool hazptr_try_protect(struct hazptr_domain *hazptr_domain, void *addr, struct hazptr_slot **_slot)
+{
+ struct hazptr_slot __percpu *percpu_slots = hazptr_domain->percpu_slots;
+ struct hazptr_slot *slot;
+
+ if (!addr)
+ return false;
+ slot = this_cpu_ptr(percpu_slots);
+ /*
+ * A single hazard pointer slot per CPU is available currently.
+ * Other hazard pointer domains can eventually have a different
+ * configuration.
+ */
+ if (READ_ONCE(slot->addr))
+ return false;
+ WRITE_ONCE(slot->addr, addr); /* Store B */
+ if (_slot)
+ *_slot = slot;
+ return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * hazptr_load_try_protect: Load and try to protect with hazard pointer.
+ *
+ * Load @addr_p, and try to protect the loaded pointer with hazard
+ * pointers.
+ *
+ * Returns a protected address on success, NULL on failure. Expects to
+ * be called from preempt disable context.
+ *
+ * On success, if @_slot is not NULL, the protected hazptr slot is stored in @_slot.
+ */
+static inline
+void *__hazptr_load_try_protect(struct hazptr_domain *hazptr_domain,
+ void * const * addr_p, struct hazptr_slot **_slot)
+{
+ struct hazptr_slot *slot;
+ void *addr, *addr2;
+
+ /*
+ * Load @addr_p to know which address should be protected.
+ */
+ addr = READ_ONCE(*addr_p);
+retry:
+ /* Try to protect the address by storing it into a slot. */
+ if (!hazptr_try_protect(hazptr_domain, addr, &slot))
+ return NULL;
+ /* Memory ordering: Store B before Load A. */
+ smp_mb();
+ /*
+ * Re-load @addr_p after storing it to the hazard pointer slot.
+ */
+ addr2 = READ_ONCE(*addr_p); /* Load A */
+ /*
+ * If @addr_p content has changed since the first load,
+ * retire the hazard pointer and try again.
+ */
+ if (!ptr_eq(addr2, addr)) {
+ WRITE_ONCE(slot->addr, NULL);
+ if (!addr2)
+ return NULL;
+ addr = addr2;
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (_slot)
+ *_slot = slot;
+ /*
+ * Use addr2 loaded from the second READ_ONCE() to preserve
+ * address dependency ordering.
+ */
+ return addr2;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Use a comma expression within typeof: __typeof__((void)**(addr_p), *(addr_p))
+ * to generate a compile error if addr_p is not a pointer to a pointer.
+ */
+#define hazptr_load_try_protect(domain, addr_p, slot_p) \
+ ((__typeof__((void)**(addr_p), *(addr_p))) __hazptr_load_try_protect(domain, (void * const *) (addr_p), slot_p))
+
+/* Retire the protected hazard pointer from @slot. */
+static inline
+void hazptr_retire(struct hazptr_slot *slot, void *addr)
+{
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(slot->addr != addr);
+ smp_store_release(&slot->addr, NULL);
+}
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_HAZPTR_H */
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index 3c13240dfc9f..bf6ed81d5983 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ obj-y = fork.o exec_domain.o panic.o \
cpu.o exit.o softirq.o resource.o \
sysctl.o capability.o ptrace.o user.o \
signal.o sys.o umh.o workqueue.o pid.o task_work.o \
- extable.o params.o \
+ extable.o params.o hazptr.o \
kthread.o sys_ni.o nsproxy.o \
notifier.o ksysfs.o cred.o reboot.o \
async.o range.o smpboot.o ucount.o regset.o ksyms_common.o
diff --git a/kernel/hazptr.c b/kernel/hazptr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3f9f14afbf1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/hazptr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024 Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
+//
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
+
+/*
+ * hazptr: Hazard Pointers
+ */
+
+#include <linux/hazptr.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+
+/*
+ * hazptr_scan: Scan hazard pointer domain for @addr.
+ *
+ * Scan hazard pointer domain for @addr.
+ * If @on_match_cb is non-NULL, invoke @callback for each slot containing
+ * @addr.
+ * Wait to observe that each slot contains a value that differs from
+ * @addr before returning.
+ */
+void hazptr_scan(struct hazptr_domain *hazptr_domain, void *addr,
+ void (*on_match_cb)(int cpu, struct hazptr_slot *slot, void *addr))
+{
+ struct hazptr_slot __percpu *percpu_slots = hazptr_domain->percpu_slots;
+ int cpu;
+
+ /* Should only be called from preemptible context. */
+ lockdep_assert_preemption_enabled();
+
+ /*
+ * Store A precedes hazptr_scan(): it unpublishes addr (sets it to
+ * NULL or to a different value), and thus hides it from hazard
+ * pointer readers.
+ */
+ if (!addr)
+ return;
+ /* Memory ordering: Store A before Load B. */
+ smp_mb();
+ /* Scan all CPUs slots. */
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+ struct hazptr_slot *slot = per_cpu_ptr(percpu_slots, cpu);
+
+ if (on_match_cb) {
+ if (smp_load_acquire(&slot->addr) == addr) /* Load B */
+ on_match_cb(cpu, slot, addr);
+ } else {
+ /* Busy-wait if node is found. */
+ smp_cond_load_acquire(&slot->addr, VAL != addr); /* Load B */
+ }
+ }
+}
--
2.39.2
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread* Re: [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] hazptr: Implement Hazard Pointers
2024-10-08 13:50 ` [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] hazptr: Implement Hazard Pointers Mathieu Desnoyers
@ 2024-10-08 17:05 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Mathieu Desnoyers @ 2024-10-08 17:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Boqun Feng
Cc: linux-kernel, Linus Torvalds, Andrew Morton, Peter Zijlstra,
Nicholas Piggin, Michael Ellerman, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior, Paul E. McKenney, Will Deacon,
Alan Stern, John Stultz, Neeraj Upadhyay, Frederic Weisbecker,
Joel Fernandes, Josh Triplett, Uladzislau Rezki, Steven Rostedt,
Lai Jiangshan, Zqiang, Ingo Molnar, Waiman Long, Mark Rutland,
Thomas Gleixner, Vlastimil Babka, maged.michael, Mateusz Guzik,
Jonas Oberhauser, rcu, linux-mm, lkmm
On 2024-10-08 15:50, Mathieu Desnoyers wrote:
[...]
> +/* Retire the protected hazard pointer from @slot. */
> +static inline
> +void hazptr_retire(struct hazptr_slot *slot, void *addr)
> +{
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(slot->addr != addr);
> + smp_store_release(&slot->addr, NULL);
> +}
Actually, comparing this with the literature and past presentations
from Maged Michael, "retire" is not the appropriate name here.
With Hazard Pointers, AFAIU, the "retire" operation is similar to a
call_rcu() memory reclaim. It marks the object for eventual reclamation
when it is safe to do so.
The API here really just releases the recently protected hazard
pointer. So I will rename this to "hazptr_release()".
At this stage, this hazptr API does not implement any retire operation,
and only offers the hazptr_scan() for reader/updater synchronization,
leaving the actual reclaim to the caller.
Thanks,
Mathieu
--
Mathieu Desnoyers
EfficiOS Inc.
https://www.efficios.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] sched+mm: Use hazard pointers to track lazy active mm existence
2024-10-08 13:50 [RFC PATCH v3 0/4] sched+mm: Track lazy active mm existence with hazard pointers Mathieu Desnoyers
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2024-10-08 13:50 ` [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] hazptr: Implement Hazard Pointers Mathieu Desnoyers
@ 2024-10-08 13:50 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-10-08 19:51 ` Joel Fernandes
2024-10-14 8:27 ` kernel test robot
3 siblings, 2 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Mathieu Desnoyers @ 2024-10-08 13:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Boqun Feng
Cc: linux-kernel, Mathieu Desnoyers, Linus Torvalds, Andrew Morton,
Peter Zijlstra, Nicholas Piggin, Michael Ellerman,
Greg Kroah-Hartman, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior, Paul E. McKenney,
Will Deacon, Alan Stern, John Stultz, Neeraj Upadhyay,
Frederic Weisbecker, Joel Fernandes, Josh Triplett,
Uladzislau Rezki, Steven Rostedt, Lai Jiangshan, Zqiang,
Ingo Molnar, Waiman Long, Mark Rutland, Thomas Gleixner,
Vlastimil Babka, maged.michael, Mateusz Guzik, Jonas Oberhauser,
rcu, linux-mm, lkmm
Replace lazy active mm existence tracking with hazard pointers. This
removes the following implementations and their associated config
options:
- MMU_LAZY_TLB_REFCOUNT
- MMU_LAZY_TLB_SHOOTDOWN
- This removes the call_rcu delayed mm drop for RT.
It leverages the fact that each CPU only ever have at most one single
lazy active mm. This makes it a very good fit for a hazard pointer
domain implemented with one hazard pointer slot per CPU.
* Benchmarks:
will-it-scale context_switch1_threads
nr threads (-t) speedup
1 -0.2%
2 +0.4%
3 +0.2%
6 +0.6%
12 +0.8%
24 +3%
48 +12%
96 +21%
192 +28%
384 +4%
768 -0.6%
Methodology: Each test is the average of 20 iterations. Use median
result of 3 test runs.
Test hardware:
CPU(s): 384
On-line CPU(s) list: 0-383
Vendor ID: AuthenticAMD
Model name: AMD EPYC 9654 96-Core Processor
CPU family: 25
Model: 17
Thread(s) per core: 2
Core(s) per socket: 96
Socket(s): 2
Stepping: 1
Frequency boost: enabled
CPU(s) scaling MHz: 100%
CPU max MHz: 3709.0000
CPU min MHz: 400.0000
BogoMIPS: 4799.75
Memory: 768 GB ram.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: John Stultz <jstultz@google.com>
Cc: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: Zqiang <qiang.zhang1211@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: maged.michael@gmail.com
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Cc: Jonas Oberhauser <jonas.oberhauser@huaweicloud.com>
Cc: rcu@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: lkmm@lists.linux.dev
---
Documentation/mm/active_mm.rst | 9 ++--
arch/Kconfig | 32 -------------
arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 1 -
arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_tlb.c | 23 +---------
include/linux/mm_types.h | 3 --
include/linux/sched/mm.h | 68 ++++++++++------------------
kernel/exit.c | 4 +-
kernel/fork.c | 47 +++++--------------
kernel/sched/sched.h | 8 +---
lib/Kconfig.debug | 10 ----
10 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 160 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/mm/active_mm.rst b/Documentation/mm/active_mm.rst
index d096fc091e23..c225cac49c30 100644
--- a/Documentation/mm/active_mm.rst
+++ b/Documentation/mm/active_mm.rst
@@ -2,11 +2,10 @@
Active MM
=========
-Note, the mm_count refcount may no longer include the "lazy" users
-(running tasks with ->active_mm == mm && ->mm == NULL) on kernels
-with CONFIG_MMU_LAZY_TLB_REFCOUNT=n. Taking and releasing these lazy
-references must be done with mmgrab_lazy_tlb() and mmdrop_lazy_tlb()
-helpers, which abstract this config option.
+Note, the mm_count refcount no longer include the "lazy" users (running
+tasks with ->active_mm == mm && ->mm == NULL) Taking and releasing these
+lazy references must be done with mmgrab_lazy_tlb() and mmdrop_lazy_tlb()
+helpers, which are implemented with hazard pointers.
::
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index 975dd22a2dbd..d4261935f8dc 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -475,38 +475,6 @@ config ARCH_WANT_IRQS_OFF_ACTIVATE_MM
irqs disabled over activate_mm. Architectures that do IPI based TLB
shootdowns should enable this.
-# Use normal mm refcounting for MMU_LAZY_TLB kernel thread references.
-# MMU_LAZY_TLB_REFCOUNT=n can improve the scalability of context switching
-# to/from kernel threads when the same mm is running on a lot of CPUs (a large
-# multi-threaded application), by reducing contention on the mm refcount.
-#
-# This can be disabled if the architecture ensures no CPUs are using an mm as a
-# "lazy tlb" beyond its final refcount (i.e., by the time __mmdrop frees the mm
-# or its kernel page tables). This could be arranged by arch_exit_mmap(), or
-# final exit(2) TLB flush, for example.
-#
-# To implement this, an arch *must*:
-# Ensure the _lazy_tlb variants of mmgrab/mmdrop are used when manipulating
-# the lazy tlb reference of a kthread's ->active_mm (non-arch code has been
-# converted already).
-config MMU_LAZY_TLB_REFCOUNT
- def_bool y
- depends on !MMU_LAZY_TLB_SHOOTDOWN
-
-# This option allows MMU_LAZY_TLB_REFCOUNT=n. It ensures no CPUs are using an
-# mm as a lazy tlb beyond its last reference count, by shooting down these
-# users before the mm is deallocated. __mmdrop() first IPIs all CPUs that may
-# be using the mm as a lazy tlb, so that they may switch themselves to using
-# init_mm for their active mm. mm_cpumask(mm) is used to determine which CPUs
-# may be using mm as a lazy tlb mm.
-#
-# To implement this, an arch *must*:
-# - At the time of the final mmdrop of the mm, ensure mm_cpumask(mm) contains
-# at least all possible CPUs in which the mm is lazy.
-# - It must meet the requirements for MMU_LAZY_TLB_REFCOUNT=n (see above).
-config MMU_LAZY_TLB_SHOOTDOWN
- bool
-
config ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG
bool
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
index d7b09b064a8a..b1e25e75baab 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
@@ -291,7 +291,6 @@ config PPC
select MMU_GATHER_PAGE_SIZE
select MMU_GATHER_RCU_TABLE_FREE
select MMU_GATHER_MERGE_VMAS
- select MMU_LAZY_TLB_SHOOTDOWN if PPC_BOOK3S_64
select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA
select NEED_DMA_MAP_STATE if PPC64 || NOT_COHERENT_CACHE
select NEED_PER_CPU_EMBED_FIRST_CHUNK if PPC64
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_tlb.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_tlb.c
index 9e1f6558d026..ff0d4f28cf52 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_tlb.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_tlb.c
@@ -1197,28 +1197,7 @@ void radix__tlb_flush(struct mmu_gather *tlb)
* See the comment for radix in arch_exit_mmap().
*/
if (tlb->fullmm) {
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MMU_LAZY_TLB_SHOOTDOWN)) {
- /*
- * Shootdown based lazy tlb mm refcounting means we
- * have to IPI everyone in the mm_cpumask anyway soon
- * when the mm goes away, so might as well do it as
- * part of the final flush now.
- *
- * If lazy shootdown was improved to reduce IPIs (e.g.,
- * by batching), then it may end up being better to use
- * tlbies here instead.
- */
- preempt_disable();
-
- smp_mb(); /* see radix__flush_tlb_mm */
- exit_flush_lazy_tlbs(mm);
- __flush_all_mm(mm, true);
-
- preempt_enable();
- } else {
- __flush_all_mm(mm, true);
- }
-
+ __flush_all_mm(mm, true);
} else if ( (psize = radix_get_mmu_psize(page_size)) == -1) {
if (!tlb->freed_tables)
radix__flush_tlb_mm(mm);
diff --git a/include/linux/mm_types.h b/include/linux/mm_types.h
index 485424979254..db5f13554485 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm_types.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm_types.h
@@ -975,9 +975,6 @@ struct mm_struct {
atomic_t tlb_flush_batched;
#endif
struct uprobes_state uprobes_state;
-#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT
- struct rcu_head delayed_drop;
-#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE
atomic_long_t hugetlb_usage;
#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/sched/mm.h b/include/linux/sched/mm.h
index 91546493c43d..7b2f0a432f6e 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched/mm.h
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/sync_core.h>
#include <linux/sched/coredump.h>
+#include <linux/hazptr.h>
+
+/* Sched lazy mm hazard pointer domain. */
+DECLARE_HAZPTR_DOMAIN(hazptr_domain_sched_lazy_mm);
/*
* Routines for handling mm_structs
@@ -55,61 +59,37 @@ static inline void mmdrop(struct mm_struct *mm)
__mmdrop(mm);
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT
-/*
- * RCU callback for delayed mm drop. Not strictly RCU, but call_rcu() is
- * by far the least expensive way to do that.
- */
-static inline void __mmdrop_delayed(struct rcu_head *rhp)
-{
- struct mm_struct *mm = container_of(rhp, struct mm_struct, delayed_drop);
-
- __mmdrop(mm);
-}
-
-/*
- * Invoked from finish_task_switch(). Delegates the heavy lifting on RT
- * kernels via RCU.
- */
-static inline void mmdrop_sched(struct mm_struct *mm)
-{
- /* Provides a full memory barrier. See mmdrop() */
- if (atomic_dec_and_test(&mm->mm_count))
- call_rcu(&mm->delayed_drop, __mmdrop_delayed);
-}
-#else
-static inline void mmdrop_sched(struct mm_struct *mm)
-{
- mmdrop(mm);
-}
-#endif
-
/* Helpers for lazy TLB mm refcounting */
static inline void mmgrab_lazy_tlb(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MMU_LAZY_TLB_REFCOUNT))
- mmgrab(mm);
+ /*
+ * mmgrab_lazy_tlb must provide a full memory barrier, see the
+ * membarrier comment finish_task_switch which relies on this.
+ */
+ smp_mb();
+
+ /*
+ * The caller guarantees existence of mm. Post a hazard pointer
+ * to chain this existence guarantee to a hazard pointer.
+ * There is only a single lazy mm per CPU at any time.
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!hazptr_try_protect(&hazptr_domain_sched_lazy_mm, mm, NULL));
}
static inline void mmdrop_lazy_tlb(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MMU_LAZY_TLB_REFCOUNT)) {
- mmdrop(mm);
- } else {
- /*
- * mmdrop_lazy_tlb must provide a full memory barrier, see the
- * membarrier comment finish_task_switch which relies on this.
- */
- smp_mb();
- }
+ /*
+ * mmdrop_lazy_tlb must provide a full memory barrier, see the
+ * membarrier comment finish_task_switch which relies on this.
+ */
+ smp_mb();
+ this_cpu_write(hazptr_domain_sched_lazy_mm.percpu_slots->addr, NULL);
}
static inline void mmdrop_lazy_tlb_sched(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MMU_LAZY_TLB_REFCOUNT))
- mmdrop_sched(mm);
- else
- smp_mb(); /* see mmdrop_lazy_tlb() above */
+ smp_mb(); /* see mmdrop_lazy_tlb() above */
+ this_cpu_write(hazptr_domain_sched_lazy_mm.percpu_slots->addr, NULL);
}
/**
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index 7430852a8571..cb4ace06c0f0 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -545,8 +545,6 @@ static void exit_mm(void)
if (!mm)
return;
mmap_read_lock(mm);
- mmgrab_lazy_tlb(mm);
- BUG_ON(mm != current->active_mm);
/* more a memory barrier than a real lock */
task_lock(current);
/*
@@ -561,6 +559,8 @@ static void exit_mm(void)
*/
smp_mb__after_spinlock();
local_irq_disable();
+ mmgrab_lazy_tlb(mm);
+ BUG_ON(mm != current->active_mm);
current->mm = NULL;
membarrier_update_current_mm(NULL);
enter_lazy_tlb(mm, current);
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index cc760491f201..0a2e2ab1680a 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -149,6 +149,9 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, process_counts) = 0;
__cacheline_aligned DEFINE_RWLOCK(tasklist_lock); /* outer */
+/* Sched lazy mm hazard pointer domain. */
+DEFINE_HAZPTR_DOMAIN(hazptr_domain_sched_lazy_mm);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_PROVE_RCU
int lockdep_tasklist_lock_is_held(void)
{
@@ -855,50 +858,24 @@ static void do_shoot_lazy_tlb(void *arg)
WARN_ON_ONCE(current->mm);
current->active_mm = &init_mm;
switch_mm(mm, &init_mm, current);
+ this_cpu_write(hazptr_domain_sched_lazy_mm.percpu_slots->addr, NULL);
}
}
-static void cleanup_lazy_tlbs(struct mm_struct *mm)
+static void remove_lazy_mm_hp(int cpu, struct hazptr_slot *slot, void *addr)
{
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MMU_LAZY_TLB_SHOOTDOWN)) {
- /*
- * In this case, lazy tlb mms are refounted and would not reach
- * __mmdrop until all CPUs have switched away and mmdrop()ed.
- */
- return;
- }
+ smp_call_function_single(cpu, do_shoot_lazy_tlb, addr, 1);
+ smp_call_function_single(cpu, do_check_lazy_tlb, addr, 1);
+}
+static void cleanup_lazy_tlbs(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
/*
- * Lazy mm shootdown does not refcount "lazy tlb mm" usage, rather it
- * requires lazy mm users to switch to another mm when the refcount
+ * Require lazy mm users to switch to another mm when the refcount
* drops to zero, before the mm is freed. This requires IPIs here to
* switch kernel threads to init_mm.
- *
- * archs that use IPIs to flush TLBs can piggy-back that lazy tlb mm
- * switch with the final userspace teardown TLB flush which leaves the
- * mm lazy on this CPU but no others, reducing the need for additional
- * IPIs here. There are cases where a final IPI is still required here,
- * such as the final mmdrop being performed on a different CPU than the
- * one exiting, or kernel threads using the mm when userspace exits.
- *
- * IPI overheads have not found to be expensive, but they could be
- * reduced in a number of possible ways, for example (roughly
- * increasing order of complexity):
- * - The last lazy reference created by exit_mm() could instead switch
- * to init_mm, however it's probable this will run on the same CPU
- * immediately afterwards, so this may not reduce IPIs much.
- * - A batch of mms requiring IPIs could be gathered and freed at once.
- * - CPUs store active_mm where it can be remotely checked without a
- * lock, to filter out false-positives in the cpumask.
- * - After mm_users or mm_count reaches zero, switching away from the
- * mm could clear mm_cpumask to reduce some IPIs, perhaps together
- * with some batching or delaying of the final IPIs.
- * - A delayed freeing and RCU-like quiescing sequence based on mm
- * switching to avoid IPIs completely.
*/
- on_each_cpu_mask(mm_cpumask(mm), do_shoot_lazy_tlb, (void *)mm, 1);
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_SHOOT_LAZIES))
- on_each_cpu(do_check_lazy_tlb, (void *)mm, 1);
+ hazptr_scan(&hazptr_domain_sched_lazy_mm, mm, remove_lazy_mm_hp);
}
/*
diff --git a/kernel/sched/sched.h b/kernel/sched/sched.h
index 4c36cc680361..d883c2aa3518 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/sched.h
+++ b/kernel/sched/sched.h
@@ -3527,12 +3527,8 @@ static inline void switch_mm_cid(struct rq *rq,
if (!next->mm) { // to kernel
/*
* user -> kernel transition does not guarantee a barrier, but
- * we can use the fact that it performs an atomic operation in
- * mmgrab().
- */
- if (prev->mm) // from user
- smp_mb__after_mmgrab();
- /*
+ * we can use the fact that mmgrab() has a full barrier.
+ *
* kernel -> kernel transition does not change rq->curr->mm
* state. It stays NULL.
*/
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
index a30c03a66172..1cb9dab361c9 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
@@ -803,16 +803,6 @@ config DEBUG_VM
If unsure, say N.
-config DEBUG_VM_SHOOT_LAZIES
- bool "Debug MMU_LAZY_TLB_SHOOTDOWN implementation"
- depends on DEBUG_VM
- depends on MMU_LAZY_TLB_SHOOTDOWN
- help
- Enable additional IPIs that ensure lazy tlb mm references are removed
- before the mm is freed.
-
- If unsure, say N.
-
config DEBUG_VM_MAPLE_TREE
bool "Debug VM maple trees"
depends on DEBUG_VM
--
2.39.2
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread* Re: [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] sched+mm: Use hazard pointers to track lazy active mm existence
2024-10-08 13:50 ` [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] sched+mm: Use hazard pointers to track lazy active mm existence Mathieu Desnoyers
@ 2024-10-08 19:51 ` Joel Fernandes
2024-10-14 8:27 ` kernel test robot
1 sibling, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Joel Fernandes @ 2024-10-08 19:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mathieu Desnoyers
Cc: Boqun Feng, linux-kernel, Linus Torvalds, Andrew Morton,
Peter Zijlstra, Nicholas Piggin, Michael Ellerman,
Greg Kroah-Hartman, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior, Paul E. McKenney,
Will Deacon, Alan Stern, John Stultz, Neeraj Upadhyay,
Frederic Weisbecker, Josh Triplett, Uladzislau Rezki,
Steven Rostedt, Lai Jiangshan, Zqiang, Ingo Molnar, Waiman Long,
Mark Rutland, Thomas Gleixner, Vlastimil Babka, maged.michael,
Mateusz Guzik, Jonas Oberhauser, rcu, linux-mm, lkmm,
Vineeth Pillai
On Tue, Oct 8, 2024 at 9:52 AM Mathieu Desnoyers
<mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> wrote:
>
> Replace lazy active mm existence tracking with hazard pointers. This
> removes the following implementations and their associated config
> options:
>
> - MMU_LAZY_TLB_REFCOUNT
> - MMU_LAZY_TLB_SHOOTDOWN
> - This removes the call_rcu delayed mm drop for RT.
>
> It leverages the fact that each CPU only ever have at most one single
> lazy active mm. This makes it a very good fit for a hazard pointer
> domain implemented with one hazard pointer slot per CPU.
>
> -static void cleanup_lazy_tlbs(struct mm_struct *mm)
> +static void remove_lazy_mm_hp(int cpu, struct hazptr_slot *slot, void *addr)
> {
> - if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MMU_LAZY_TLB_SHOOTDOWN)) {
> - /*
> - * In this case, lazy tlb mms are refounted and would not reach
> - * __mmdrop until all CPUs have switched away and mmdrop()ed.
> - */
> - return;
> - }
> + smp_call_function_single(cpu, do_shoot_lazy_tlb, addr, 1);
> + smp_call_function_single(cpu, do_check_lazy_tlb, addr, 1);
> +}
>
> +static void cleanup_lazy_tlbs(struct mm_struct *mm)
> +{
[...]
> - on_each_cpu_mask(mm_cpumask(mm), do_shoot_lazy_tlb, (void *)mm, 1);
> - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_SHOOT_LAZIES))
> - on_each_cpu(do_check_lazy_tlb, (void *)mm, 1);
> + hazptr_scan(&hazptr_domain_sched_lazy_mm, mm, remove_lazy_mm_hp);
Hey Mathieu, Take comments with a grain of salt because I am digging
into active_mm after a while.
It seems to me IMO this seems a strange hazard pointer callback
usecase. Because "scan" here immediately retires even though the
reader has a "reference". Here it is more like, the callback is
forcing all other readers holding a "reference" to switch immediately
whether they like it or not and not wait until _they_ release the
reference. There is no such precedent in RCU for instance, where a
callback never runs before a reader even finishes.
That might work for active_mm, but it sounds like a fringe usecase to
me that it might probably be better to just force
CONFIG_MMU_LAZY_TLB_SHOOTDOWN=y for everyone and use on_each_cpu()
instead. That will give the same code simplification for this patch
without requiring hazard pointers AFAICS? Or maybe start with that,
and _then_ convert to HP if it makes sense to? These are just some
thoughts and I am Ok with all the reviewer's consensus.
And if I understand correctly, for this usecase - we are not even
grabbing a "true reference" to the mm_struct object because direct
access to mm_struct should require a proper mmgrab(), not a lazy_tlb
flavored one? -- correct me if I'm wrong though.
Also, isn't it that on x86, now with this patch there will be more
IPIs, whereas previously the global refcount was not requiring that as
the last kthread switching out would no longer access the old mm?
Might it be worth checking the performance of fork/exit and if that
scales?
thanks,
- Joel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread* Re: [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] sched+mm: Use hazard pointers to track lazy active mm existence
2024-10-08 13:50 ` [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] sched+mm: Use hazard pointers to track lazy active mm existence Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-10-08 19:51 ` Joel Fernandes
@ 2024-10-14 8:27 ` kernel test robot
2024-10-15 13:33 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
1 sibling, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2024-10-14 8:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mathieu Desnoyers
Cc: oe-lkp, lkp, Nicholas Piggin, Michael Ellerman,
Greg Kroah-Hartman, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior, Paul E. McKenney,
Will Deacon, Peter Zijlstra, Boqun Feng, Alan Stern, John Stultz,
Neeraj Upadhyay, Linus Torvalds, Andrew Morton,
Frederic Weisbecker, Joel Fernandes, Josh Triplett,
Uladzislau Rezki, Steven Rostedt, Lai Jiangshan, Zqiang,
Ingo Molnar, Waiman Long, Mark Rutland, Thomas Gleixner,
Vlastimil Babka, Mateusz Guzik, Jonas Oberhauser, linux-doc,
linux-kernel, linuxppc-dev, linux-mm, Mathieu Desnoyers,
maged.michael, rcu, lkmm, oliver.sang
Hello,
kernel test robot noticed "WARNING:at_kernel/hazptr.c:#hazptr_scan" on:
commit: c1508707268498a6fd3ca5853ad65f9482c12374 ("[RFC PATCH v3 4/4] sched+mm: Use hazard pointers to track lazy active mm existence")
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Mathieu-Desnoyers/compiler-h-Introduce-ptr_eq-to-preserve-address-dependency/20241008-215353
base: https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux.git next
patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241008135034.1982519-5-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com/
patch subject: [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] sched+mm: Use hazard pointers to track lazy active mm existence
in testcase: boot
config: i386-randconfig-013-20241011
compiler: gcc-12
test machine: qemu-system-x86_64 -enable-kvm -cpu SandyBridge -smp 2 -m 16G
(please refer to attached dmesg/kmsg for entire log/backtrace)
+-----------------------------------------+------------+------------+
| | b62696cacd | c150870726 |
+-----------------------------------------+------------+------------+
| WARNING:at_kernel/hazptr.c:#hazptr_scan | 0 | 5 |
| EIP:hazptr_scan | 0 | 5 |
+-----------------------------------------+------------+------------+
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202410141617.612a0f5b-lkp@intel.com
[ 6.951355][ T22] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 6.951920][ T22] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 22 at kernel/hazptr.c:28 hazptr_scan (kernel/hazptr.c:28)
[ 6.952580][ T22] Modules linked in:
[ 6.952880][ T22] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 22 Comm: khugepaged Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-00004-gc15087072684 #10
[ 6.953685][ T22] EIP: hazptr_scan (kernel/hazptr.c:28)
[ 6.954087][ T22] Code: c0 74 0a 85 db 8b 0a 74 45 39 c8 74 21 5b 5e 5d 31 c0 31 d2 31 c9 c3 8d b4 26 00 00 00 00 f7 05 a4 18 34 c3 ff ff ff 7f 74 14 <0f> 0b eb d1 89 c1 31 c0 ff d3 5b 5e 5d 31 c0 31 d2 31 c9 c3 8b 0d
All code
========
0: c0 74 0a 85 db shlb $0xdb,-0x7b(%rdx,%rcx,1)
5: 8b 0a mov (%rdx),%ecx
7: 74 45 je 0x4e
9: 39 c8 cmp %ecx,%eax
b: 74 21 je 0x2e
d: 5b pop %rbx
e: 5e pop %rsi
f: 5d pop %rbp
10: 31 c0 xor %eax,%eax
12: 31 d2 xor %edx,%edx
14: 31 c9 xor %ecx,%ecx
16: c3 ret
17: 8d b4 26 00 00 00 00 lea 0x0(%rsi,%riz,1),%esi
1e: f7 05 a4 18 34 c3 ff testl $0x7fffffff,-0x3ccbe75c(%rip) # 0xffffffffc33418cc
25: ff ff 7f
28: 74 14 je 0x3e
2a:* 0f 0b ud2 <-- trapping instruction
2c: eb d1 jmp 0xffffffffffffffff
2e: 89 c1 mov %eax,%ecx
30: 31 c0 xor %eax,%eax
32: ff d3 call *%rbx
34: 5b pop %rbx
35: 5e pop %rsi
36: 5d pop %rbp
37: 31 c0 xor %eax,%eax
39: 31 d2 xor %edx,%edx
3b: 31 c9 xor %ecx,%ecx
3d: c3 ret
3e: 8b .byte 0x8b
3f: 0d .byte 0xd
Code starting with the faulting instruction
===========================================
0: 0f 0b ud2
2: eb d1 jmp 0xffffffffffffffd5
4: 89 c1 mov %eax,%ecx
6: 31 c0 xor %eax,%eax
8: ff d3 call *%rbx
a: 5b pop %rbx
b: 5e pop %rsi
c: 5d pop %rbp
d: 31 c0 xor %eax,%eax
f: 31 d2 xor %edx,%edx
11: 31 c9 xor %ecx,%ecx
13: c3 ret
14: 8b .byte 0x8b
15: 0d .byte 0xd
[ 6.955564][ T22] EAX: c6087680 EBX: c1061470 ECX: 00000000 EDX: c2e104e8
[ 6.956135][ T22] ESI: c2e104e4 EDI: 00000001 EBP: c42ade88 ESP: c42ade80
[ 6.956665][ T22] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0000 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 6.957266][ T22] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 0819cd10 CR3: 04033d80 CR4: 000406b0
[ 6.957807][ T22] DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
[ 6.958380][ T22] DR6: fffe0ff0 DR7: 00000400
[ 6.958747][ T22] Call Trace:
[ 6.959005][ T22] ? show_regs (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:479)
[ 6.959362][ T22] ? hazptr_scan (kernel/hazptr.c:28)
[ 6.959694][ T22] ? __warn (kernel/panic.c:748)
[ 6.959974][ T22] ? hazptr_scan (kernel/hazptr.c:28)
[ 6.960361][ T22] ? hazptr_scan (kernel/hazptr.c:28)
[ 6.960695][ T22] ? report_bug (lib/bug.c:180 lib/bug.c:219)
[ 6.961083][ T22] ? hazptr_scan (kernel/hazptr.c:28)
[ 6.961427][ T22] ? exc_overflow (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:301)
[ 6.961778][ T22] ? handle_bug (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:260)
[ 6.962157][ T22] ? exc_invalid_op (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:309 (discriminator 1))
[ 6.962549][ T22] ? thread_stack_free_rcu (kernel/fork.c:867)
[ 6.962955][ T22] ? handle_exception (arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S:1047)
[ 6.963399][ T22] ? thread_stack_free_rcu (kernel/fork.c:867)
[ 6.963801][ T22] ? exc_overflow (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:301)
[ 6.964203][ T22] ? hazptr_scan (kernel/hazptr.c:28)
[ 6.964544][ T22] ? exc_overflow (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:301)
[ 6.964895][ T22] ? hazptr_scan (kernel/hazptr.c:28)
[ 6.965279][ T22] __mmdrop (kernel/fork.c:895 (discriminator 3))
[ 6.965599][ T22] collect_mm_slot (mm/khugepaged.c:1455)
[ 6.965952][ T22] khugepaged_scan_mm_slot+0x210/0x60c
[ 6.966493][ T22] ? khugepaged (mm/khugepaged.c:2511 mm/khugepaged.c:2571)
[ 6.966865][ T22] khugepaged (mm/khugepaged.c:2515 mm/khugepaged.c:2571)
[ 6.967239][ T22] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:97 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:155 include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:151 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:194)
[ 6.967684][ T22] ? __kthread_parkme (arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:206 arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:238 include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:142 kernel/kthread.c:280)
[ 6.968102][ T22] kthread (kernel/kthread.c:389)
[ 6.968400][ T22] ? khugepaged_scan_mm_slot+0x60c/0x60c
[ 6.968896][ T22] ? kthread_park (kernel/kthread.c:342)
[ 6.969286][ T22] ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153)
[ 6.969628][ T22] ? kthread_park (kernel/kthread.c:342)
[ 6.969961][ T22] ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S:737)
[ 6.970383][ T22] entry_INT80_32 (arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S:944)
[ 6.970758][ T22] irq event stamp: 4719
[ 6.971117][ T22] hardirqs last enabled at (4729): __up_console_sem (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:97 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:155 (discriminator 1) kernel/printk/printk.c:344 (discriminator 1))
[ 6.971790][ T22] hardirqs last disabled at (4736): __up_console_sem (kernel/printk/printk.c:342 (discriminator 1))
[ 6.972475][ T22] softirqs last enabled at (4708): handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:401 kernel/softirq.c:582)
[ 6.973162][ T22] softirqs last disabled at (4695): __do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:589)
[ 6.973771][ T22] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
The kernel config and materials to reproduce are available at:
https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20241014/202410141617.612a0f5b-lkp@intel.com
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread* Re: [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] sched+mm: Use hazard pointers to track lazy active mm existence
2024-10-14 8:27 ` kernel test robot
@ 2024-10-15 13:33 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Mathieu Desnoyers @ 2024-10-15 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kernel test robot, Peter Zijlstra
Cc: oe-lkp, lkp, Nicholas Piggin, Michael Ellerman,
Greg Kroah-Hartman, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior, Paul E. McKenney,
Will Deacon, Boqun Feng, Alan Stern, John Stultz,
Neeraj Upadhyay, Linus Torvalds, Andrew Morton,
Frederic Weisbecker, Joel Fernandes, Josh Triplett,
Uladzislau Rezki, Steven Rostedt, Lai Jiangshan, Zqiang,
Ingo Molnar, Waiman Long, Mark Rutland, Thomas Gleixner,
Vlastimil Babka, Mateusz Guzik, Jonas Oberhauser, linux-doc,
linux-kernel, linuxppc-dev, linux-mm, maged.michael, rcu, lkmm
On 2024-10-14 04:27, kernel test robot wrote:
>
>
> Hello,
>
> kernel test robot noticed "WARNING:at_kernel/hazptr.c:#hazptr_scan" on:
>
> commit: c1508707268498a6fd3ca5853ad65f9482c12374 ("[RFC PATCH v3 4/4] sched+mm: Use hazard pointers to track lazy active mm existence")
> url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Mathieu-Desnoyers/compiler-h-Introduce-ptr_eq-to-preserve-address-dependency/20241008-215353
> base: https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux.git next
> patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241008135034.1982519-5-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com/
> patch subject: [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] sched+mm: Use hazard pointers to track lazy active mm existence
>
This appears to be called from:
static int khugepaged(void *none)
{
struct khugepaged_mm_slot *mm_slot;
set_freezable();
set_user_nice(current, MAX_NICE);
while (!kthread_should_stop()) {
khugepaged_do_scan(&khugepaged_collapse_control);
khugepaged_wait_work();
}
spin_lock(&khugepaged_mm_lock);
mm_slot = khugepaged_scan.mm_slot;
khugepaged_scan.mm_slot = NULL;
if (mm_slot)
collect_mm_slot(mm_slot); <-------- here
spin_unlock(&khugepaged_mm_lock);
return 0;
}
[...]
static void collect_mm_slot(struct khugepaged_mm_slot *mm_slot)
{
struct mm_slot *slot = &mm_slot->slot;
struct mm_struct *mm = slot->mm;
lockdep_assert_held(&khugepaged_mm_lock);
if (hpage_collapse_test_exit(mm)) {
/* free mm_slot */
hash_del(&slot->hash);
list_del(&slot->mm_node);
/*
* Not strictly needed because the mm exited already.
*
* clear_bit(MMF_VM_HUGEPAGE, &mm->flags);
*/
/* khugepaged_mm_lock actually not necessary for the below */
mm_slot_free(mm_slot_cache, mm_slot);
mmdrop(mm); <---------- here
}
}
So technically, before my change, there were two things that differed here:
1) mmdrop possibly did not decrement mm_count to 0 if mm_count was held as a
lazy mm, which skipped __mmdrop entirely.
2) If it happened that mm_count did decrement to 0, __mmdrop would call
cleanup_lazy_tlbs().
With CONFIG_MMU_LAZY_TLB_SHOOTDOWN=n (which is the case here), cleanup_lazy_tlbs()
returned immediately.
With CONFIG_MMU_LAZY_TLB_SHOOTDOWN=y (only for powerpc AFAIU), it would do
on_each_cpu_mask() to send IPIs to other CPUs which are in the mm_cpumask().
It appears to be OK to call on_each_cpu_mask() from preempt-disabled context.
So changing all this to send IPIs for CPUs which have the mm in their hazard pointer
slot is technically not so different from what CONFIG_MMU_LAZY_TLB_SHOOTDOWN=y
does.
So AFAIU we have the choice between three ways forward here:
1) Modify hazptr_scan() so it only check for lockdep_assert_preemption_enabled()
when the on_match_cb() is NULL (busy-wait behavior). This would allow being
called from preempt-disabled context when a specific on-match callback is
provided.
2) Modify mm/khugepaged.c:collect_mm_slot() so it releases the khugepaged_mm_lock
spinlock around:
/* khugepaged_mm_lock actually not necessary for the below */
mm_slot_free(mm_slot_cache, mm_slot);
mmdrop(mm);
So it does not call mmdrop() from preempt-off context.
3) Approaches (1)+(2).
Thoughts ?
Thanks,
Mathieu
> in testcase: boot
>
> config: i386-randconfig-013-20241011
> compiler: gcc-12
> test machine: qemu-system-x86_64 -enable-kvm -cpu SandyBridge -smp 2 -m 16G
>
> (please refer to attached dmesg/kmsg for entire log/backtrace)
>
>
> +-----------------------------------------+------------+------------+
> | | b62696cacd | c150870726 |
> +-----------------------------------------+------------+------------+
> | WARNING:at_kernel/hazptr.c:#hazptr_scan | 0 | 5 |
> | EIP:hazptr_scan | 0 | 5 |
> +-----------------------------------------+------------+------------+
>
>
> If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
> the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
> | Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
> | Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202410141617.612a0f5b-lkp@intel.com
>
>
> [ 6.951355][ T22] ------------[ cut here ]------------
> [ 6.951920][ T22] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 22 at kernel/hazptr.c:28 hazptr_scan (kernel/hazptr.c:28)
> [ 6.952580][ T22] Modules linked in:
> [ 6.952880][ T22] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 22 Comm: khugepaged Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-00004-gc15087072684 #10
> [ 6.953685][ T22] EIP: hazptr_scan (kernel/hazptr.c:28)
> [ 6.954087][ T22] Code: c0 74 0a 85 db 8b 0a 74 45 39 c8 74 21 5b 5e 5d 31 c0 31 d2 31 c9 c3 8d b4 26 00 00 00 00 f7 05 a4 18 34 c3 ff ff ff 7f 74 14 <0f> 0b eb d1 89 c1 31 c0 ff d3 5b 5e 5d 31 c0 31 d2 31 c9 c3 8b 0d
> All code
> ========
> 0: c0 74 0a 85 db shlb $0xdb,-0x7b(%rdx,%rcx,1)
> 5: 8b 0a mov (%rdx),%ecx
> 7: 74 45 je 0x4e
> 9: 39 c8 cmp %ecx,%eax
> b: 74 21 je 0x2e
> d: 5b pop %rbx
> e: 5e pop %rsi
> f: 5d pop %rbp
> 10: 31 c0 xor %eax,%eax
> 12: 31 d2 xor %edx,%edx
> 14: 31 c9 xor %ecx,%ecx
> 16: c3 ret
> 17: 8d b4 26 00 00 00 00 lea 0x0(%rsi,%riz,1),%esi
> 1e: f7 05 a4 18 34 c3 ff testl $0x7fffffff,-0x3ccbe75c(%rip) # 0xffffffffc33418cc
> 25: ff ff 7f
> 28: 74 14 je 0x3e
> 2a:* 0f 0b ud2 <-- trapping instruction
> 2c: eb d1 jmp 0xffffffffffffffff
> 2e: 89 c1 mov %eax,%ecx
> 30: 31 c0 xor %eax,%eax
> 32: ff d3 call *%rbx
> 34: 5b pop %rbx
> 35: 5e pop %rsi
> 36: 5d pop %rbp
> 37: 31 c0 xor %eax,%eax
> 39: 31 d2 xor %edx,%edx
> 3b: 31 c9 xor %ecx,%ecx
> 3d: c3 ret
> 3e: 8b .byte 0x8b
> 3f: 0d .byte 0xd
>
> Code starting with the faulting instruction
> ===========================================
> 0: 0f 0b ud2
> 2: eb d1 jmp 0xffffffffffffffd5
> 4: 89 c1 mov %eax,%ecx
> 6: 31 c0 xor %eax,%eax
> 8: ff d3 call *%rbx
> a: 5b pop %rbx
> b: 5e pop %rsi
> c: 5d pop %rbp
> d: 31 c0 xor %eax,%eax
> f: 31 d2 xor %edx,%edx
> 11: 31 c9 xor %ecx,%ecx
> 13: c3 ret
> 14: 8b .byte 0x8b
> 15: 0d .byte 0xd
> [ 6.955564][ T22] EAX: c6087680 EBX: c1061470 ECX: 00000000 EDX: c2e104e8
> [ 6.956135][ T22] ESI: c2e104e4 EDI: 00000001 EBP: c42ade88 ESP: c42ade80
> [ 6.956665][ T22] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0000 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010202
> [ 6.957266][ T22] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 0819cd10 CR3: 04033d80 CR4: 000406b0
> [ 6.957807][ T22] DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
> [ 6.958380][ T22] DR6: fffe0ff0 DR7: 00000400
> [ 6.958747][ T22] Call Trace:
> [ 6.959005][ T22] ? show_regs (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:479)
> [ 6.959362][ T22] ? hazptr_scan (kernel/hazptr.c:28)
> [ 6.959694][ T22] ? __warn (kernel/panic.c:748)
> [ 6.959974][ T22] ? hazptr_scan (kernel/hazptr.c:28)
> [ 6.960361][ T22] ? hazptr_scan (kernel/hazptr.c:28)
> [ 6.960695][ T22] ? report_bug (lib/bug.c:180 lib/bug.c:219)
> [ 6.961083][ T22] ? hazptr_scan (kernel/hazptr.c:28)
> [ 6.961427][ T22] ? exc_overflow (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:301)
> [ 6.961778][ T22] ? handle_bug (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:260)
> [ 6.962157][ T22] ? exc_invalid_op (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:309 (discriminator 1))
> [ 6.962549][ T22] ? thread_stack_free_rcu (kernel/fork.c:867)
> [ 6.962955][ T22] ? handle_exception (arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S:1047)
> [ 6.963399][ T22] ? thread_stack_free_rcu (kernel/fork.c:867)
> [ 6.963801][ T22] ? exc_overflow (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:301)
> [ 6.964203][ T22] ? hazptr_scan (kernel/hazptr.c:28)
> [ 6.964544][ T22] ? exc_overflow (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:301)
> [ 6.964895][ T22] ? hazptr_scan (kernel/hazptr.c:28)
> [ 6.965279][ T22] __mmdrop (kernel/fork.c:895 (discriminator 3))
> [ 6.965599][ T22] collect_mm_slot (mm/khugepaged.c:1455)
> [ 6.965952][ T22] khugepaged_scan_mm_slot+0x210/0x60c
> [ 6.966493][ T22] ? khugepaged (mm/khugepaged.c:2511 mm/khugepaged.c:2571)
> [ 6.966865][ T22] khugepaged (mm/khugepaged.c:2515 mm/khugepaged.c:2571)
> [ 6.967239][ T22] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:97 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:155 include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:151 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:194)
> [ 6.967684][ T22] ? __kthread_parkme (arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:206 arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:238 include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:142 kernel/kthread.c:280)
> [ 6.968102][ T22] kthread (kernel/kthread.c:389)
> [ 6.968400][ T22] ? khugepaged_scan_mm_slot+0x60c/0x60c
> [ 6.968896][ T22] ? kthread_park (kernel/kthread.c:342)
> [ 6.969286][ T22] ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153)
> [ 6.969628][ T22] ? kthread_park (kernel/kthread.c:342)
> [ 6.969961][ T22] ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S:737)
> [ 6.970383][ T22] entry_INT80_32 (arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S:944)
> [ 6.970758][ T22] irq event stamp: 4719
> [ 6.971117][ T22] hardirqs last enabled at (4729): __up_console_sem (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:97 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:155 (discriminator 1) kernel/printk/printk.c:344 (discriminator 1))
> [ 6.971790][ T22] hardirqs last disabled at (4736): __up_console_sem (kernel/printk/printk.c:342 (discriminator 1))
> [ 6.972475][ T22] softirqs last enabled at (4708): handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:401 kernel/softirq.c:582)
> [ 6.973162][ T22] softirqs last disabled at (4695): __do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:589)
> [ 6.973771][ T22] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
>
>
>
> The kernel config and materials to reproduce are available at:
> https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20241014/202410141617.612a0f5b-lkp@intel.com
>
>
>
--
Mathieu Desnoyers
EfficiOS Inc.
https://www.efficios.com
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