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From: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com>
To: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: jglisse@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org, mhocko@kernel.org,
	labbott@redhat.com, hch@infradead.org, willy@infradead.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct
Date: Sat, 3 Feb 2018 18:13:58 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a12afe9b-79cf-d5c1-3795-89fbf61c6c9d@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.20.1802021240370.31548@nuc-kabylake>



On 02/02/18 20:43, Christopher Lameter wrote:
> On Thu, 1 Feb 2018, Igor Stoppa wrote:
> 
>>> Would it not be better to use compound page allocations here?

[...]

> Ok its compound_head(). See also the use in the SLAB and SLUB allocator.
> 
>> During hardened user copy permission check, I need to confirm if the
>> memory range that would be exposed to userspace is a legitimate
>> sub-range of a pmalloc allocation.
> 
> If you save the size in the head page struct then you could do that pretty
> fast.

Ok, now I get what you mean.
But it doesn't seem to fit the intended use case, for other reasons
(maybe the same, from 2 different POV):

- compound pages are aggregates of regular pages, in numbers that are
powers of 2, while the amount of pages to allocate is not known upfront.
One *could* give a hint to pmalloc about how many pages to allocate
every time there is a need to grow the pool.
Iow it would be the size of a chunk. But I'm afraid the granularity
would still be pretty low, so maybe it would be 2-4 times less.

- the property of the compound page will affect the property of all the
pages in the compound, so when one is write protected, it can generate a
lot of wasted memory, if there is too much slack (because of the order)
With vmalloc, I can allocate any number of pages, minimizing the waste.


Finally, there was a discussion about optimization:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/08/07/2

The patch I sent does indeed take advantage of the new information, not
just for pmalloc use.

I have not measured if/where/what there is gain, but it does look like
the extra info can be exploited also elsewhere.

--
igor

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  reply	other threads:[~2018-02-03 16:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-30 15:14 [RFC PATCH v12 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data Igor Stoppa
2018-01-30 15:14 ` [PATCH 1/6] genalloc: track beginning of allocations Igor Stoppa
2018-01-30 15:14 ` [PATCH 2/6] genalloc: selftest Igor Stoppa
2018-01-30 15:14 ` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct Igor Stoppa
2018-02-01  0:00   ` Christopher Lameter
2018-02-01 12:42     ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-01 21:11       ` Kees Cook
2018-02-02 16:01         ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-02 18:43       ` Christopher Lameter
2018-02-03 16:13         ` Igor Stoppa [this message]
2018-02-05 15:33           ` Christopher Lameter
2018-02-09 11:34             ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-06 12:37   ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-02-09 13:45     ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-30 15:14 ` [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory Igor Stoppa
2018-02-02  5:41   ` kbuild test robot
2018-02-02  5:53   ` kbuild test robot
2018-01-30 15:14 ` [PATCH 5/6] Documentation for Pmalloc Igor Stoppa
2018-01-30 17:08   ` Jonathan Corbet
2018-02-02 15:56     ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-10  3:37       ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-02-12 15:28         ` Jonathan Corbet
2018-01-30 15:14 ` [PATCH 6/6] Pmalloc: self-test Igor Stoppa
2018-02-02  6:14   ` kbuild test robot
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-02-12 16:52 [RFC PATCH v16 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct Igor Stoppa
2018-02-11  3:19 [RFC PATCH v15 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data Igor Stoppa
2018-02-11  3:19 ` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct Igor Stoppa
2018-02-11 21:16   ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-02-12 16:24     ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-20 19:53       ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-20 20:54         ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-02-21 12:01           ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-22 14:20             ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-04 16:47 [RFC PATCH v14 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data Igor Stoppa
2018-02-04 16:47 ` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct Igor Stoppa
2018-02-03 19:42 [RFC PATCH v13 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data Igor Stoppa
2018-02-03 19:42 ` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 [RFC PATCH v11 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct Igor Stoppa

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