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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-mm@kvack.org,  linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	isaku.yamahata@intel.com,  ackerleytng@google.com,
	vbabka@suse.cz, ashish.kalra@amd.com,  nikunj.dadhania@amd.com,
	jroedel@suse.de, pankaj.gupta@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC gmem v1 8/8] KVM: x86: Determine shared/private faults based on vm_type
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 17:13:00 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZbmenP05fo8hZU8N@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231016115028.996656-9-michael.roth@amd.com>

On Mon, Oct 16, 2023, Michael Roth wrote:
> For KVM_X86_SNP_VM, only the PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK flag is needed to
> determine with an #NPF is due to a private/shared access by the guest.
> Implement that handling here. Also add handling needed to deal with
> SNP guests which in some cases will make MMIO accesses with the
> encryption bit.

...

> @@ -4356,12 +4357,19 @@ static int __kvm_faultin_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault
>  			return RET_PF_EMULATE;
>  	}
>  
> -	if (fault->is_private != kvm_mem_is_private(vcpu->kvm, fault->gfn)) {
> +	/*
> +	 * In some cases SNP guests will make MMIO accesses with the encryption
> +	 * bit set. Handle these via the normal MMIO fault path.
> +	 */
> +	if (!slot && private_fault && kvm_is_vm_type(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_SNP_VM))
> +		private_fault = false;

Why?  This is inarguably a guest bug.

> +	if (private_fault != kvm_mem_is_private(vcpu->kvm, fault->gfn)) {
>  		kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault);
>  		return -EFAULT;
>  	}
>  
> -	if (fault->is_private)
> +	if (private_fault)
>  		return kvm_faultin_pfn_private(vcpu, fault);
>  
>  	async = false;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
> index 759c8b718201..e5b973051ad9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
> @@ -251,6 +251,24 @@ struct kvm_page_fault {
>  
>  int kvm_tdp_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault);
>  
> +static bool kvm_mmu_fault_is_private(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa, u64 err)
> +{
> +	bool private_fault = false;
> +
> +	if (kvm_is_vm_type(kvm, KVM_X86_SNP_VM)) {
> +		private_fault = !!(err & PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK);
> +	} else if (kvm_is_vm_type(kvm, KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM)) {
> +		/*
> +		 * This handling is for gmem self-tests and guests that treat
> +		 * userspace as the authority on whether a fault should be
> +		 * private or not.
> +		 */
> +		private_fault = kvm_mem_is_private(kvm, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT);
> +	}

This can be more simply:

	if (kvm_is_vm_type(kvm, KVM_X86_SNP_VM))
		return !!(err & PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK);

	if (kvm_is_vm_type(kvm, KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM))
		return kvm_mem_is_private(kvm, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT);


  reply	other threads:[~2024-01-31  1:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-10-16 11:50 [PATCH RFC gmem v1 0/8] KVM: gmem hooks/changes needed for x86 (other archs?) Michael Roth
2023-10-16 11:50 ` [PATCH RFC gmem v1 1/8] mm: Introduce AS_INACCESSIBLE for encrypted/confidential memory Michael Roth
2023-10-16 11:50 ` [PATCH RFC gmem v1 2/8] KVM: Use AS_INACCESSIBLE when creating guest_memfd inode Michael Roth
2023-10-16 11:50 ` [PATCH RFC gmem v1 3/8] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for initializing memory Michael Roth
2024-02-08 10:57   ` Suzuki K Poulose
2024-02-08 17:29     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-16 11:50 ` [PATCH RFC gmem v1 4/8] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for invalidating memory Michael Roth
2024-02-09 10:11   ` Steven Price
2024-02-09 14:28     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-09 15:02       ` Steven Price
2024-02-09 15:13         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-11 17:24           ` Michael Roth
2024-03-12 20:26             ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-13 17:11               ` Steven Price
2023-10-16 11:50 ` [PATCH RFC gmem v1 5/8] KVM: x86/mmu: Pass around full 64-bit error code for KVM page faults Michael Roth
2023-10-16 11:50 ` [PATCH RFC gmem v1 6/8] KVM: x86: Add KVM_X86_SNP_VM vm_type Michael Roth
2023-10-16 11:50 ` [PATCH RFC gmem v1 7/8] KVM: x86: Define RMP page fault error bits for #NPF Michael Roth
2023-10-16 11:50 ` [PATCH RFC gmem v1 8/8] KVM: x86: Determine shared/private faults based on vm_type Michael Roth
2024-01-31  1:13   ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2024-02-08  0:24     ` Michael Roth
2024-02-08 17:27       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-08 17:30         ` Paolo Bonzini

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