* Re: get_user_pages() and EXEC_ONLY mapping.
[not found] <87bkc1oe8c.fsf@linux.ibm.com>
@ 2023-11-10 14:53 ` Jason Gunthorpe
[not found] ` <9a51f827-6bf4-412b-9feb-37cc41ad3e90@linux.ibm.com>
2023-11-10 17:17 ` Catalin Marinas
1 sibling, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Jason Gunthorpe @ 2023-11-10 14:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Aneesh Kumar K.V
Cc: Catalin Marinas, David Hildenbrand, akpm, Christophe Leroy,
linux-mm, linuxppc-dev
On Fri, Nov 10, 2023 at 08:19:23PM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K.V wrote:
>
> Hello,
>
> Some architectures can now support EXEC_ONLY mappings and I am wondering
> what get_user_pages() on those addresses should return.
-EPERM
> Earlier PROT_EXEC implied PROT_READ and pte_access_permitted()
> returned true for that. But arm64 does have this explicit comment
> that says
>
> /*
> * p??_access_permitted() is true for valid user mappings (PTE_USER
> * bit set, subject to the write permission check). For execute-only
> * mappings, like PROT_EXEC with EPAN (both PTE_USER and PTE_UXN bits
> * not set) must return false. PROT_NONE mappings do not have the
> * PTE_VALID bit set.
> */
>
> Is that correct? We should be able to get struct page for PROT_EXEC
> mappings?
If the memory is unreadable then providing a back door through
O_DIRECT and everthing else to read it sounds wrong to me.
If there is some case where a get_user_pages caller is exec-only
compatible then a new FOLL_EXEC flag to permit it would make sense.
Jason
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: get_user_pages() and EXEC_ONLY mapping.
[not found] ` <9a51f827-6bf4-412b-9feb-37cc41ad3e90@linux.ibm.com>
@ 2023-11-10 15:06 ` Jason Gunthorpe
0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Jason Gunthorpe @ 2023-11-10 15:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Aneesh Kumar K V
Cc: Catalin Marinas, David Hildenbrand, akpm, Christophe Leroy,
linux-mm, linuxppc-dev
On Fri, Nov 10, 2023 at 08:27:19PM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K V wrote:
> On 11/10/23 8:23 PM, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> > On Fri, Nov 10, 2023 at 08:19:23PM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K.V wrote:
> >>
> >> Hello,
> >>
> >> Some architectures can now support EXEC_ONLY mappings and I am wondering
> >> what get_user_pages() on those addresses should return.
> >
> > -EPERM
> >
> >> Earlier PROT_EXEC implied PROT_READ and pte_access_permitted()
> >> returned true for that. But arm64 does have this explicit comment
> >> that says
> >>
> >> /*
> >> * p??_access_permitted() is true for valid user mappings (PTE_USER
> >> * bit set, subject to the write permission check). For execute-only
> >> * mappings, like PROT_EXEC with EPAN (both PTE_USER and PTE_UXN bits
> >> * not set) must return false. PROT_NONE mappings do not have the
> >> * PTE_VALID bit set.
> >> */
> >>
> >> Is that correct? We should be able to get struct page for PROT_EXEC
> >> mappings?
> >
> > If the memory is unreadable then providing a back door through
> > O_DIRECT and everthing else to read it sounds wrong to me.
> >
> > If there is some case where a get_user_pages caller is exec-only
> > compatible then a new FOLL_EXEC flag to permit it would make sense.
> >
>
> I was expecting pin_user_pages() to return -EPERM and get_user_pages()
> return struct page. This was based on Documentation/core-api/pin_user_pages.rst
Not unconditionally but you could argue that FOLL_GET should
succeed. It depends how much do you care about absolute security of
unreadable memory vs compatability.
> "Another way of thinking about these flags is as a progression of restrictions:
> FOLL_GET is for struct page manipulation, without affecting the data that the
> struct page refers to. FOLL_PIN is a *replacement* for FOLL_GET, and is for
> short term pins on pages whose data *will* get accessed. "
This was sort of aspirational - have we got rid of all the FOLL_GET
users that are touching the data? Looks like no from a quick check..
Jason
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: get_user_pages() and EXEC_ONLY mapping.
[not found] <87bkc1oe8c.fsf@linux.ibm.com>
2023-11-10 14:53 ` get_user_pages() and EXEC_ONLY mapping Jason Gunthorpe
@ 2023-11-10 17:17 ` Catalin Marinas
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Catalin Marinas @ 2023-11-10 17:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Aneesh Kumar K.V
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe, David Hildenbrand, akpm, Christophe Leroy,
linux-mm, linuxppc-dev
On Fri, Nov 10, 2023 at 08:19:23PM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K.V wrote:
> Some architectures can now support EXEC_ONLY mappings and I am wondering
> what get_user_pages() on those addresses should return. Earlier
> PROT_EXEC implied PROT_READ and pte_access_permitted() returned true for
> that. But arm64 does have this explicit comment that says
>
> /*
> * p??_access_permitted() is true for valid user mappings (PTE_USER
> * bit set, subject to the write permission check). For execute-only
> * mappings, like PROT_EXEC with EPAN (both PTE_USER and PTE_UXN bits
> * not set) must return false. PROT_NONE mappings do not have the
> * PTE_VALID bit set.
> */
>
> Is that correct? We should be able to get struct page for PROT_EXEC
> mappings?
I don't remember why we ended up with this briefly looking at the code,
pte_access_permitted() is only used on the fast GUP path. On the slow
path, there is a check_vma_flags() call which returns -EFAULT if the vma
is not readable. So the pte_access_permitted() on the fast path matches
the semantics of the slow path.
If one wants the page structure, FOLL_FORCE ignores the read check (on
the slow path), though I think it still fails if VM_MAYREAD is not set.
Unless you have a real use-case where this is not sufficient, I'd leave
the behaviour as is on arm64 (and maybe update other architectures that
support exec-only to do the same).
--
Catalin
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
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2023-11-10 14:53 ` get_user_pages() and EXEC_ONLY mapping Jason Gunthorpe
[not found] ` <9a51f827-6bf4-412b-9feb-37cc41ad3e90@linux.ibm.com>
2023-11-10 15:06 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2023-11-10 17:17 ` Catalin Marinas
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