From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/uaccess: instrument copy_from_user_nmi()
Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2022 11:30:54 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y1j+Tt9mnMDU0zO+@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221025221755.3810809-1-glider@google.com>
On Wed, Oct 26, 2022 at 12:17:55AM +0200, Alexander Potapenko wrote:
> Make sure usercopy hooks from linux/instrumented.h are invoked for
> copy_from_user_nmi().
> This fixes KMSAN false positives reported when dumping opcodes for a
> stack trace.
>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: x86@kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c | 3 +++
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c
> index f1bb186171562..24b48af274173 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c
> @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
>
> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> #include <linux/export.h>
> +#include <linux/instrumented.h>
>
> #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
>
> @@ -44,7 +45,9 @@ copy_from_user_nmi(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
> * called from other contexts.
> */
> pagefault_disable();
> + instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, from, n);
> ret = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
> + instrument_copy_from_user_after(to, from, n, ret);
> pagefault_enable();
>
> return ret;
Is all that instrumentation NMI safe? ISTR having seen locks in some of
that *SAN stuff.
Also did this want:
Fixes: 59298997df89 ("x86/uaccess: avoid check_object_size() in copy_from_user_nmi()")
?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-10-26 9:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-25 22:17 Alexander Potapenko
2022-10-26 9:30 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2022-10-26 18:38 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-10-27 8:05 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-27 18:26 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-10-27 18:58 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-27 19:26 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-27 23:24 ` Alexander Potapenko
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