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From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
To: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com>,
	pmladek@suse.com, rostedt@goodmis.org, senozhatsky@chromium.org,
	linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com,
	haakon.bugge@oracle.com, john.haxby@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] vsprintf: protect kernel from panic due to non-canonical pointer dereference
Date: Thu, 20 Oct 2022 19:03:23 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y1FxS30zVENd/1Ap@smile.fi.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Y1Fgk1iDnhL7VtAl@char.us.oracle.com>

On Thu, Oct 20, 2022 at 10:52:03AM -0400, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 19, 2022 at 11:33:47PM +0300, Andy Shevchenko wrote:
> > On Wed, Oct 19, 2022 at 01:41:59PM -0600, Jane Chu wrote:
> > > Having stepped on a local kernel bug where reading sysfs has led to
> > > out-of-bound pointer dereference by vsprintf() which led to GPF panic.
> > > And the reason for GPF is that the OOB pointer was turned to a
> > > non-canonical address such as 0x7665645f63616465.
> > > 
> > > vsprintf() already has this line of defense
> > > 	if ((unsigned long)ptr < PAGE_SIZE || IS_ERR_VALUE(ptr))
> > >                 return "(efault)";
> > > Since a non-canonical pointer can be detected by kern_addr_valid()
> > > on architectures that present VM holes as well as meaningful
> > > implementation of kern_addr_valid() that detects the non-canonical
> > > addresses, this patch adds a check on non-canonical string pointer by
> > > kern_addr_valid() and "(efault)" to alert user that something
> > > is wrong instead of unecessarily panic the server.
> > > 
> > > On the other hand, if the non-canonical string pointer is dereferenced
> > > else where in the kernel, by virtue of being non-canonical, a crash
> > > is expected to be immediate.
> > 
> > What if there is no other dereference except the one happened in printf()?
> > 
> > Just to point out here, that I formally NAKed this on the basis that NULL
> > and error pointers are special, for the bogus pointers we need crash ASAP,
> > no matter what the code issues it. I.o.w. printf() is not special for that
> > kind of pointers (i.e. bogus pointers, but not special).
> 
> Hey Andy,
> 
> Do we want to have user space programs crash the kernel?
> 
> This patch leads to making the kernel more harden so that we do
> not crash when there are bugs but continue on.

Fine, how to push a user to report a bug in the kernel if for them
there is no bug?

OK, let's assume user recognizes this as a bug, what should they do in order
to provide a better description of the bug, so developer can easily debug
and fix it?

> Would we not want that experience for users ?

Yes, if it is a bug in the kernel we want to know it with all possible details.
Hiding bugs is a way to nowhere.

-- 
With Best Regards,
Andy Shevchenko




  reply	other threads:[~2022-10-20 16:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-10-19 19:41 Jane Chu
2022-10-19 20:33 ` Andy Shevchenko
2022-10-20 14:52   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2022-10-20 16:03     ` Andy Shevchenko [this message]
2022-10-25  8:40       ` Petr Mladek
2022-10-25  9:13         ` Andy Shevchenko
2022-10-19 21:00 ` Rasmus Villemoes
2022-10-20  9:28 ` Petr Mladek
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2022-10-19 19:34 [PATCH v3 0/1] vsprintf: check non-canonical pointer by kern_addr_valid() Jane Chu
2022-10-19 19:34 ` [PATCH v3 1/1] vsprintf: protect kernel from panic due to non-canonical pointer dereference Jane Chu
2022-10-20 11:41   ` kernel test robot

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