From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: "Roberto Sassu" <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>,
<akpm@linux-foundation.org>, <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>,
<lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>, <vbabka@suse.cz>,
<jannh@google.com>
Cc: <linux-mm@kvack.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<ebpqwerty472123@gmail.com>, <paul@paul-moore.com>,
<zohar@linux.ibm.com>, <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
<eric.snowberg@oracle.com>, <jmorris@namei.org>,
<serge@hallyn.com>, <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
<stable@vger.kernel.org>,
<syzbot+1cd571a672400ef3a930@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>,
"Roberto Sassu" <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] mm: Split critical region in remap_file_pages() and invoke LSMs in between
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2024 22:04:56 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <D4Z5ZUHK76A8.18SJLAWKCZ5IX@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241018161415.3845146-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
On Fri Oct 18, 2024 at 7:14 PM EEST, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
>
> Commit ea7e2d5e49c0 ("mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in
> remap_file_pages()") fixed a security issue, it added an LSM check when
> trying to remap file pages, so that LSMs have the opportunity to evaluate
> such action like for other memory operations such as mmap() and mprotect().
>
> However, that commit called security_mmap_file() inside the mmap_lock lock,
> while the other calls do it before taking the lock, after commit
> 8b3ec6814c83 ("take security_mmap_file() outside of ->mmap_sem").
>
> This caused lock inversion issue with IMA which was taking the mmap_lock
> and i_mutex lock in the opposite way when the remap_file_pages() system
> call was called.
>
> Solve the issue by splitting the critical region in remap_file_pages() in
> two regions: the first takes a read lock of mmap_lock, retrieves the VMA
> and the file descriptor associated, and calculates the 'prot' and 'flags'
> variables; the second takes a write lock on mmap_lock, checks that the VMA
> flags and the VMA file descriptor are the same as the ones obtained in the
> first critical region (otherwise the system call fails), and calls
> do_mmap().
>
> In between, after releasing the read lock and before taking the write lock,
> call security_mmap_file(), and solve the lock inversion issue.
>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.12-rcx
> Fixes: ea7e2d5e49c0 ("mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()")
> Reported-by: syzbot+1cd571a672400ef3a930@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/66f7b10e.050a0220.46d20.0036.GAE@google.com/
> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
> Tested-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> Tested-by: syzbot+1cd571a672400ef3a930@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> mm/mmap.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
> 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
> index 9c0fb43064b5..f731dd69e162 100644
> --- a/mm/mmap.c
> +++ b/mm/mmap.c
> @@ -1640,6 +1640,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size,
> unsigned long populate = 0;
> unsigned long ret = -EINVAL;
> struct file *file;
> + vm_flags_t vm_flags;
>
> pr_warn_once("%s (%d) uses deprecated remap_file_pages() syscall. See Documentation/mm/remap_file_pages.rst.\n",
> current->comm, current->pid);
> @@ -1656,12 +1657,60 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size,
> if (pgoff + (size >> PAGE_SHIFT) < pgoff)
> return ret;
>
> - if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm))
> + if (mmap_read_lock_killable(mm))
> return -EINTR;
>
> + /*
> + * Look up VMA under read lock first so we can perform the security
> + * without holding locks (which can be problematic). We reacquire a
> + * write lock later and check nothing changed underneath us.
> + */
> vma = vma_lookup(mm, start);
>
> - if (!vma || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
> + if (!vma || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) {
> + mmap_read_unlock(mm);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_READ ? PROT_READ : 0;
> + prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE ? PROT_WRITE : 0;
> + prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC ? PROT_EXEC : 0;
Not an actual review comment but we don't have a conversion macro and/or
inline for this, do we (and opposite direction)?
> +
> + flags &= MAP_NONBLOCK;
> + flags |= MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED | MAP_POPULATE;
> + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
> + flags |= MAP_LOCKED;
> +
> + /* Save vm_flags used to calculate prot and flags, and recheck later. */
> + vm_flags = vma->vm_flags;
> + file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
> +
> + mmap_read_unlock(mm);
> +
> + /* Call outside mmap_lock to be consistent with other callers. */
> + ret = security_mmap_file(file, prot, flags);
> + if (ret) {
> + fput(file);
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> +
> + /* OK security check passed, take write lock + let it rip. */
> + if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm)) {
> + fput(file);
> + return -EINTR;
> + }
> +
> + vma = vma_lookup(mm, start);
> +
> + if (!vma)
> + goto out;
> +
> + /* Make sure things didn't change under us. */
> + if (vma->vm_flags != vm_flags)
> + goto out;
> + if (vma->vm_file != file)
> goto out;
>
> if (start + size > vma->vm_end) {
> @@ -1689,25 +1738,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size,
> goto out;
> }
>
> - prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_READ ? PROT_READ : 0;
> - prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE ? PROT_WRITE : 0;
> - prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC ? PROT_EXEC : 0;
> -
> - flags &= MAP_NONBLOCK;
> - flags |= MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED | MAP_POPULATE;
> - if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
> - flags |= MAP_LOCKED;
> -
> - file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
> - ret = security_mmap_file(vma->vm_file, prot, flags);
> - if (ret)
> - goto out_fput;
> ret = do_mmap(vma->vm_file, start, size,
> prot, flags, 0, pgoff, &populate, NULL);
> -out_fput:
> - fput(file);
> out:
> mmap_write_unlock(mm);
> + fput(file);
> if (populate)
> mm_populate(ret, populate);
> if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(ret))
BR, Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-18 19:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-18 16:14 Roberto Sassu
2024-10-18 16:48 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-10-18 19:04 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2024-10-19 15:34 ` Paul Moore
2024-10-21 7:59 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-10-22 3:06 ` Andrew Morton
2024-10-22 16:27 ` Paul Moore
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