From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-oi1-f200.google.com (mail-oi1-f200.google.com [209.85.167.200]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 24B136B0010 for ; Mon, 15 Oct 2018 18:32:36 -0400 (EDT) Received: by mail-oi1-f200.google.com with SMTP id l204-v6so14231664oia.17 for ; Mon, 15 Oct 2018 15:32:36 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-sor-f65.google.com (mail-sor-f65.google.com. [209.85.220.65]) by mx.google.com with SMTPS id i5-v6sor6793659otl.147.2018.10.15.15.32.35 for (Google Transport Security); Mon, 15 Oct 2018 15:32:35 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <153922180166.838512.8260339805733812034.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> <153922180696.838512.12621709717839260874.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> In-Reply-To: From: Dan Williams Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2018 15:32:23 -0700 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/3] mm: Shuffle initial free memory Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org List-ID: To: Kees Cook Cc: Andrew Morton , Michal Hocko , Dave Hansen , Linux MM , Linux Kernel Mailing List On Mon, Oct 15, 2018 at 3:25 PM Kees Cook wrote: > > On Wed, Oct 10, 2018 at 6:36 PM, Dan Williams wrote: > > While SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM reduces the predictability of some local slab > > caches it leaves vast bulk of memory to be predictably in order > > allocated. That ordering can be detected by a memory side-cache. > > > > The shuffling is done in terms of CONFIG_SHUFFLE_PAGE_ORDER sized free > > pages where the default CONFIG_SHUFFLE_PAGE_ORDER is MAX_ORDER-1 i.e. > > 10, 4MB this trades off randomization granularity for time spent > > shuffling. MAX_ORDER-1 was chosen to be minimally invasive to the page > > allocator while still showing memory-side cache behavior improvements, > > and the expectation that the security implications of finer granularity > > randomization is mitigated by CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM. > > Perhaps it would help some of the detractors of this feature to make > this a runtime choice? Some benchmarks show improvements, some show > regressions. It could just be up to the admin to turn this on/off > given their paranoia levels? (i.e. the shuffling could become a no-op > with a given specific boot param?) Yes, I think it's a valid concern to not turn this on for everybody given the potential for performance regression. For the next version I'll add some runtime detection for a memory-side-cache to set the default on/off, and include a command line override for the paranoid that want in on regardless of the presence of such a cache.