From: Jue Wang <juew@google.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Jiaqi Yan <jiaqiyan@google.com>,
Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>,
Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] Expose a memory poison detector ioctl to user space.
Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2022 12:25:11 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAPcxDJ6oVeH=cL4YG7n5v_JqBYNEzLcq5ySdG17N03x_uYXUcg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8eceffc0-01e8-2a55-6eb9-b26faa9e3caf@intel.com>
On Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 11:18 AM Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> wrote:
>
> On 4/26/22 11:02, Jue Wang wrote:
> >>> Are there any other physical addresses which are RAM but should not have
> >>> the detector used on them?
> > In theory, if some physical address range are never / very rarely
> > accessed, they can be exempted.
>
> How would userspace know to exempt them?
User space won't know, if kernel has this knowledge, I suppose an
appropriate error code can be returned to inform user space this
address region should be exempted from future scanning?
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-04-26 19:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-04-25 16:34 Jue Wang
2022-04-26 15:40 ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-26 17:57 ` Jue Wang
2022-04-26 18:02 ` Jue Wang
2022-04-26 18:21 ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-26 19:25 ` Jue Wang [this message]
2022-04-26 19:52 ` Luck, Tony
2022-04-26 20:06 ` Jue Wang
2022-04-26 18:20 ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-26 19:23 ` Jue Wang
2022-04-26 19:39 ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-26 19:50 ` Jue Wang
2022-04-28 16:15 ` Erdem Aktas
2022-04-28 16:34 ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-29 19:46 ` Jue Wang
2022-04-29 21:10 ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-29 21:32 ` Jue Wang
2022-04-29 21:44 ` Jue Wang
2022-04-29 22:29 ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-29 22:53 ` Jue Wang
2022-05-02 15:30 ` Dave Hansen
2022-05-02 17:19 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-05-02 17:30 ` Jue Wang
2022-05-02 17:33 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-05-02 17:36 ` Jue Wang
2022-05-02 17:38 ` David Hildenbrand
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