From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-ig0-f172.google.com (mail-ig0-f172.google.com [209.85.213.172]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3A5316B0035 for ; Thu, 10 Apr 2014 16:49:30 -0400 (EDT) Received: by mail-ig0-f172.google.com with SMTP id hn18so8304527igb.11 for ; Thu, 10 Apr 2014 13:49:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-ig0-x22f.google.com (mail-ig0-x22f.google.com [2607:f8b0:4001:c05::22f]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id ev8si90735igc.31.2014.04.10.13.49.29 for (version=TLSv1 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA bits=128/128); Thu, 10 Apr 2014 13:49:29 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ig0-f175.google.com with SMTP id ur14so8302082igb.14 for ; Thu, 10 Apr 2014 13:49:29 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: References: <1395256011-2423-1-git-send-email-dh.herrmann@gmail.com> <20140320153250.GC20618@thunk.org> <20140320163806.GA10440@thunk.org> <5346ED93.9040500@amacapital.net> <20140410203246.GB31614@thunk.org> Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2014 22:49:28 +0200 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] File Sealing & memfd_create() From: David Herrmann Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org List-ID: To: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Theodore Ts'o , linux-kernel , Kay Sievers , Daniel Mack , Lennart Poettering , John Stultz , Greg Kroah-Hartman , "dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org" , linux-fsdevel , linux-mm , Andrew Morton , Linus Torvalds , Ryan Lortie , "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" Hi On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 10:37 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > It occurs to me that, before going nuts with these kinds of flags, it > may pay to just try to fix the /proc/self/fd issue for real -- we > could just make open("/proc/self/fd/3", O_RDWR) fail if fd 3 is > read-only. That may be enough for the file sealing thing. For the sealing API, none of this is needed. As long as the inode is owned by the uid who creates the memfd, you can pass it around and no-one besides root and you can open /proc/self/fd/$fd (assuming chmod 700). If you share the fd with someone with the same uid as you, you're screwed anyway. We don't protect users against themselves (I mean, they can ptrace you, or kill()..). Therefore, I'm not really convinced that we want this for memfd. At least no-one has provided a _proper_ use-case for this so far. Thanks David -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: email@kvack.org