linux-mm.kvack.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
To: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	 Oliver Glitta <glittao@gmail.com>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	 David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	 Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>,
	Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org,  linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] mm/slub, kunit: Add a test case for kmalloc redzone check
Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 12:48:54 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CANpmjNNZhXX830jqPn9eaQZHwKhBb4b_PEuUdH6O69ELqW470w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <67e6ebce-f8cc-7d28-5e85-8a3909c2d180@suse.cz>

On Tue, 29 Nov 2022 at 12:01, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> wrote:
>
> On 11/29/22 10:31, Marco Elver wrote:
> > On Tue, 29 Nov 2022 at 07:37, Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> wrote:

> >> diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
> >> index c71590f3a22b..b6cd98b16ba7 100644
> >> --- a/mm/slab.h
> >> +++ b/mm/slab.h
> >> @@ -327,7 +327,8 @@ static inline slab_flags_t kmem_cache_flags(unsigned int object_size,
> >>  /* Legal flag mask for kmem_cache_create(), for various configurations */
> >>  #define SLAB_CORE_FLAGS (SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_CACHE_DMA | \
> >>                          SLAB_CACHE_DMA32 | SLAB_PANIC | \
> >> -                        SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_DEBUG_OBJECTS )
> >> +                        SLAB_KMALLOC | SLAB_SKIP_KFENCE | \
> >> +                        SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_DEBUG_OBJECTS)
> >
> > Shouldn't this hunk be in the previous patch, otherwise that patch
> > alone will fail?
>
> Good point.
>
> > This will also make SLAB_SKIP_KFENCE generally available to be used
> > for cache creation. This is a significant change, and before it wasn't
> > possible. Perhaps add a brief note to the commit message (or have a
> > separate patch). We were trying to avoid making this possible, as it
> > might be abused - however, given it's required for tests like these, I
> > suppose there's no way around it.
>
> For SLAB_SKIP_KFENCE, we could also add the flag after creation to avoid
> this trouble? After all there is a sysfs file to control it at runtime
> anyway (via skip_kfence_store()).
> In that case patch 1 would have to wrap kmem_cache_create() and the flag
> addition with a new function to avoid repeating. That function could also be
> adding SLAB_NO_USER_FLAGS to kmem_cache_create(), instead of the #define
> DEFAULT_FLAGS.

I wouldn't overcomplicate it, all we need is a way to say "this flag
should not be used directly" - and only have it available via an
indirect step. Availability via sysfs is one such step.

And for tests, there are 2 options:

1. we could provide a function "kmem_cache_set_test_flags(cache,
gfp_flags)" and define SLAB_TEST_FLAGS (which would include
SLAB_SKIP_KFENCE). This still allows to set it generally, but should
make abuse less likely due to the "test" in the name of that function.

2. just set it directly, s->flags |= SLAB_SKIP_KFENCE.

If you're fine with #2, that seems simplest and would be my preference.

> For SLAB_KMALLOC there's probably no such way unless we abuse the internal
> APIs even more and call e.g. create_boot_cache() instead of
> kmem_cache_create(). But that one is __init, so probably not. If we do
> instead allow the flag, I wouldn't add it to SLAB_CORE_FLAGS but rather
> SLAB_CACHE_FLAGS and SLAB_FLAGS_PERMITTED.

I'd probably go with the simplest solution here.


  reply	other threads:[~2022-11-29 14:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-11-29  6:33 [PATCH v2 1/2] mm/slub, kunit: add SLAB_SKIP_KFENCE flag for cache creation Feng Tang
2022-11-29  6:33 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] mm/slub, kunit: Add a test case for kmalloc redzone check Feng Tang
2022-11-29  9:31   ` Marco Elver
2022-11-29 11:01     ` Vlastimil Babka
2022-11-29 11:48       ` Marco Elver [this message]
2022-11-29 12:02         ` Vlastimil Babka
2022-11-29 12:50           ` Feng Tang
2022-11-29 12:56             ` Marco Elver
2022-11-29 17:48               ` Vlastimil Babka

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=CANpmjNNZhXX830jqPn9eaQZHwKhBb4b_PEuUdH6O69ELqW470w@mail.gmail.com \
    --to=elver@google.com \
    --cc=42.hyeyoo@gmail.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=cl@linux.com \
    --cc=feng.tang@intel.com \
    --cc=glittao@gmail.com \
    --cc=iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=penberg@kernel.org \
    --cc=rientjes@google.com \
    --cc=roman.gushchin@linux.dev \
    --cc=vbabka@suse.cz \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox