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Peter Anvin" , Ard Biesheuvel , Paolo Bonzini , Sean Christopherson , Vitaly Kuznetsov , Jim Mattson , Andy Lutomirski , Dave Hansen , Sergio Lopez , Peter Zijlstra , Srinivas Pandruvada , David Rientjes , Dov Murik , Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum , Borislav Petkov , Michael Roth , Vlastimil Babka , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , Andi Kleen , Tony Luck , Marc Orr , Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy , Alper Gun , "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" , jarkko@kernel.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" ARC-Seal: i=1; s=arc-20220608; d=hostedemail.com; t=1655826435; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; b=BaaA4n02I11Ld9r/4Q/3/X55/PnGSAqxlHwNXjDZDshYiwKzjSfMb4ykjzFjY0rWCFsuK0 Z0oy35p5jxmoQru6DcD+5U0WPdOLSX9lG3ctr50ZmTJle/AX1UirVRe6Mdd9ZaWtpfq7Wa jqnAtZnQhh/+7+Wp5cWDnNsXLSioA7w= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=hostedemail.com; s=arc-20220608; t=1655826435; h=from:from:sender:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references:dkim-signature; bh=42GgnITWZh+b27jV3AHdl/DcQ5SE6yXvLOohhw0wUcY=; b=GD/sWLdD5/U/nbucLTcsa5Gnr98HEQphWCn65KdFMRFISVpt4mqEqbMQIebMnzkM6Ad+xT cUUK0tNNHRkmM3sFO/e+G76R6clI0pnBQqbVV4JTkNXKPBL9XaANHY/kP/8LMCFP5V7WXW XCzu9kPSSSWFf+M3KqQBWJ1PQkoeEeQ= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; imf17.hostedemail.com; dkim=pass header.d=google.com header.s=20210112 header.b=SiYYiKh+; dmarc=pass (policy=reject) header.from=google.com; spf=pass (imf17.hostedemail.com: domain of pgonda@google.com designates 209.85.167.51 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=pgonda@google.com Authentication-Results: imf17.hostedemail.com; dkim=pass header.d=google.com header.s=20210112 header.b=SiYYiKh+; dmarc=pass (policy=reject) header.from=google.com; spf=pass (imf17.hostedemail.com: domain of pgonda@google.com designates 209.85.167.51 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=pgonda@google.com X-Rspam-User: X-Rspamd-Server: rspam09 X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: D64DE400B3 X-Stat-Signature: tw3yxrsszmi5xawf7r3uxxtdakackfsw X-HE-Tag: 1655826435-398944 X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: On Mon, Jun 20, 2022 at 5:02 PM Ashish Kalra wrote: > > From: Brijesh Singh > > The memory integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new > structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). The RMP is a single data > structure shared across the system that contains one entry for every 4K > page of DRAM that may be used by SEV-SNP VMs. The goal of RMP is to > track the owner of each page of memory. Pages of memory can be owned by > the hypervisor, owned by a specific VM or owned by the AMD-SP. See APM2 > section 15.36.3 for more detail on RMP. > > The RMP table is used to enforce access control to memory. The table itself > is not directly writable by the software. New CPU instructions (RMPUPDATE, > PVALIDATE, RMPADJUST) are used to manipulate the RMP entries. > > Based on the platform configuration, the BIOS reserves the memory used > for the RMP table. The start and end address of the RMP table must be > queried by reading the RMP_BASE and RMP_END MSRs. If the RMP_BASE and > RMP_END are not set then disable the SEV-SNP feature. > > The SEV-SNP feature is enabled only after the RMP table is successfully > initialized. > > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh > --- > arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +- > arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 6 + > arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 144 +++++++++++++++++++++++ > 3 files changed, 157 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h > index 36369e76cc63..c1be3091a383 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h > @@ -68,6 +68,12 @@ > # define DISABLE_TDX_GUEST (1 << (X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST & 31)) > #endif > > +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT > +# define DISABLE_SEV_SNP 0 > +#else > +# define DISABLE_SEV_SNP (1 << (X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP & 31)) > +#endif > + > /* > * Make sure to add features to the correct mask > */ > @@ -91,7 +97,7 @@ > DISABLE_ENQCMD) > #define DISABLED_MASK17 0 > #define DISABLED_MASK18 0 > -#define DISABLED_MASK19 0 > +#define DISABLED_MASK19 (DISABLE_SEV_SNP) > #define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20) > > #endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */ > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h > index 9e2e7185fc1d..57a8280e283a 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h > @@ -507,6 +507,8 @@ > #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED_BIT) > #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED_BIT) > #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED_BIT) > +#define MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE 0xc0010132 > +#define MSR_AMD64_RMP_END 0xc0010133 > > #define MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL 0xc001011f > > @@ -581,6 +583,10 @@ > #define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG 0xc0010010 > #define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT 23 > #define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT) > +#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN_BIT 24 > +#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN_BIT) > +#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN_BIT 25 > +#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN_BIT) > #define MSR_K8_INT_PENDING_MSG 0xc0010055 > /* C1E active bits in int pending message */ > #define K8_INTP_C1E_ACTIVE_MASK 0x18000000 > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c > index f01f4550e2c6..3a233b5d47c5 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c > @@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > +#include > > #include > #include > @@ -38,6 +40,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > > #define DR7_RESET_VALUE 0x400 > > @@ -57,6 +60,12 @@ > #define AP_INIT_CR0_DEFAULT 0x60000010 > #define AP_INIT_MXCSR_DEFAULT 0x1f80 > > +/* > + * The first 16KB from the RMP_BASE is used by the processor for the > + * bookkeeping, the range need to be added during the RMP entry lookup. > + */ > +#define RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ 0x4000 > + > /* For early boot hypervisor communication in SEV-ES enabled guests */ > static struct ghcb boot_ghcb_page __bss_decrypted __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); > > @@ -69,6 +78,10 @@ static struct ghcb *boot_ghcb __section(".data"); > /* Bitmap of SEV features supported by the hypervisor */ > static u64 sev_hv_features __ro_after_init; > > +static unsigned long rmptable_start __ro_after_init; > +static unsigned long rmptable_end __ro_after_init; > + > + > /* #VC handler runtime per-CPU data */ > struct sev_es_runtime_data { > struct ghcb ghcb_page; > @@ -2218,3 +2231,134 @@ static int __init snp_init_platform_device(void) > return 0; > } > device_initcall(snp_init_platform_device); > + > +#undef pr_fmt > +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SEV-SNP: " fmt > + > +static int __snp_enable(unsigned int cpu) > +{ > + u64 val; > + > + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP)) > + return 0; > + > + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val); > + > + val |= MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN; > + val |= MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN; > + > + wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val); > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static __init void snp_enable(void *arg) > +{ > + __snp_enable(smp_processor_id()); > +} > + > +static bool get_rmptable_info(u64 *start, u64 *len) > +{ > + u64 calc_rmp_sz, rmp_sz, rmp_base, rmp_end, nr_pages; > + > + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE, rmp_base); > + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_END, rmp_end); > + > + if (!rmp_base || !rmp_end) { > + pr_info("Memory for the RMP table has not been reserved by BIOS\n"); > + return false; > + } > + > + rmp_sz = rmp_end - rmp_base + 1; > + > + /* > + * Calculate the amount the memory that must be reserved by the BIOS to > + * address the full system RAM. The reserved memory should also cover the > + * RMP table itself. > + * > + * See PPR Family 19h Model 01h, Revision B1 section 2.1.4.2 for more > + * information on memory requirement. > + */ > + nr_pages = totalram_pages(); > + calc_rmp_sz = (((rmp_sz >> PAGE_SHIFT) + nr_pages) << 4) + RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ; > + > + if (calc_rmp_sz > rmp_sz) { > + pr_info("Memory reserved for the RMP table does not cover full system RAM (expected 0x%llx got 0x%llx)\n", > + calc_rmp_sz, rmp_sz); > + return false; > + } > + > + *start = rmp_base; > + *len = rmp_sz; > + > + pr_info("RMP table physical address 0x%016llx - 0x%016llx\n", rmp_base, rmp_end); > + > + return true; > +} > + > +static __init int __snp_rmptable_init(void) > +{ > + u64 rmp_base, sz; > + void *start; > + u64 val; > + > + if (!get_rmptable_info(&rmp_base, &sz)) > + return 1; > + > + start = memremap(rmp_base, sz, MEMREMAP_WB); > + if (!start) { > + pr_err("Failed to map RMP table 0x%llx+0x%llx\n", rmp_base, sz); > + return 1; > + } > + > + /* > + * Check if SEV-SNP is already enabled, this can happen if we are coming from > + * kexec boot. > + */ > + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val); > + if (val & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN) > + goto skip_enable; > + > + /* Initialize the RMP table to zero */ > + memset(start, 0, sz); > + > + /* Flush the caches to ensure that data is written before SNP is enabled. */ > + wbinvd_on_all_cpus(); > + > + /* Enable SNP on all CPUs. */ > + on_each_cpu(snp_enable, NULL, 1); > + > +skip_enable: > + rmptable_start = (unsigned long)start; > + rmptable_end = rmptable_start + sz; Since in get_rmptable_info() `rmp_sz = rmp_end - rmp_base + 1;` should this be `rmptable_end = rmptable_start + sz - 1;`? > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int __init snp_rmptable_init(void) > +{ > + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP)) > + return 0; > + > + if (!iommu_sev_snp_supported()) > + goto nosnp; > + > + if (__snp_rmptable_init()) > + goto nosnp; > + > + cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "x86/rmptable_init:online", __snp_enable, NULL); > + > + return 0; > + > +nosnp: > + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP); > + return 1; > +} > + > +/* > + * This must be called after the PCI subsystem. This is because before enabling > + * the SNP feature we need to ensure that IOMMU supports the SEV-SNP feature. > + * The iommu_sev_snp_support() is used for checking the feature, and it is > + * available after subsys_initcall(). > + */ > +fs_initcall(snp_rmptable_init); > -- > 2.25.1 >