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From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
To: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	 Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@huawei.com>,
	 Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] efi: stub: prefer mirrored memory for randomized allocations
Date: Thu, 5 May 2022 18:12:01 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAMj1kXEPVEzMgOM4+Yj6PxHA-jFuDOAUdDJSiSxy_XaP4P7LSw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <9472d1d5-7f03-eaaf-2846-a4340163d5c0@huawei.com>

On Thu, 5 May 2022 at 15:43, Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> wrote:
>
>
> On 2022/5/3 23:21, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > If the system exposes memory regions with the EFI_MORE_RELIABLE
> > attribute, it is implied that it is intended to be used for allocations
> > that are relatively important, such as the kernel's static image.
> >
> > Since efi_random_alloc() is mostly (only) used for allocating space for
> > the kernel image, let's update it to take this into account, and
> > disregard all memory without the EFI_MORE_RELIABLE attribute if there is
> > sufficient memory available that does have this attribute.
> >
> > Note that this change only affects booting with randomization enabled.
> > In other cases, the EFI stub runs the kernel image in place unless its
> > placement is unsuitable for some reason (i.e., misaligned, or its BSS
> > overlaps with another allocation), and it is left to the bootloader to
> > ensure that the kernel was loaded into EFI_MORE_RELIABLE memory if this
> > is desired.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
> > ---
> >   drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/randomalloc.c | 11 +++++++++++
> >   1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/randomalloc.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/randomalloc.c
> > index 724155b9e10d..07a762910312 100644
> > --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/randomalloc.c
> > +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/randomalloc.c
> > @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ efi_status_t efi_random_alloc(unsigned long size,
> >                             unsigned long random_seed)
> >   {
> >       unsigned long map_size, desc_size, total_slots = 0, target_slot;
> > +     unsigned long total_mirrored_slots = 0;
> >       unsigned long buff_size;
> >       efi_status_t status;
> >       efi_memory_desc_t *memory_map;
> > @@ -86,8 +87,14 @@ efi_status_t efi_random_alloc(unsigned long size,
> >               slots = get_entry_num_slots(md, size, ilog2(align));
> >               MD_NUM_SLOTS(md) = slots;
> >               total_slots += slots;
> > +             if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_MORE_RELIABLE)
> > +                     total_mirrored_slots += slots;
> >       }
> >
> > +     /* only consider mirrored slots for randomization if any exist */
> > +     if (total_mirrored_slots > 0)
> > +             total_slots = total_mirrored_slots;
> > +
>
> The kernel will check 4G lower limit to enable kernelcore=mirror feature.
>

Why? I mean, why is 4G a magic number also on arm64?


> Do we need some fallback mechanism in case of small mirror slots which
>
> leads to fail allocation for Image?
>

This code only counts slots that are large enough to hold the Image so
this can never happen. If total_mirrored_slots > 0, there is at least
one possible placement of the kernel where it falls entirely inside a
EFI_MORE_RELIABLE region.

>
> >       /* find a random number between 0 and total_slots */
> >       target_slot = (total_slots * (u64)(random_seed & U32_MAX)) >> 32;
> >
> > @@ -107,6 +114,10 @@ efi_status_t efi_random_alloc(unsigned long size,
> >               efi_physical_addr_t target;
> >               unsigned long pages;
> >
> > +             if (total_mirrored_slots > 0 &&
> > +                 !(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_MORE_RELIABLE))
> > +                     continue;
> > +
> >               if (target_slot >= MD_NUM_SLOTS(md)) {
> >                       target_slot -= MD_NUM_SLOTS(md);
> >                       continue;


  reply	other threads:[~2022-05-05 16:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-05-03 15:21 Ard Biesheuvel
2022-05-05 13:43 ` Kefeng Wang
2022-05-05 16:12   ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2022-05-06  1:42     ` Kefeng Wang
2022-05-06  6:19       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-05-06  1:06   ` Kefeng Wang

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