From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: jeffxu@chromium.org, skhan@linuxfoundation.org,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com,
dverkamp@chromium.org, hughd@google.com, jorgelo@chromium.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, mnissler@chromium.org, jannh@google.com,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] mm/memfd: security hook for memfd_create
Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2022 15:23:37 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALmYWFuQUcd1RYu1idS5cirAXNbynDLkxLYTHRAFS6yQE=gOmw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202212021457.EC46B27677@keescook>
On Fri, Dec 2, 2022 at 2:58 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Dec 02, 2022 at 01:34:03AM +0000, jeffxu@chromium.org wrote:
> > From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
> >
> > The new security_memfd_create allows lsm to check flags of
> > memfd_create.
> >
> > The security by default system (such as chromeos) can use this
> > to implement system wide lsm to allow only non-executable memfd
> > being created.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
> > ---
> > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
> > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++++
> > include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++
> > mm/memfd.c | 5 +++++
> > 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> > index ec119da1d89b..fd40840927c8 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> > @@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_alloc_security, struct file *file)
> > LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, file_free_security, struct file *file)
> > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_ioctl, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
> > unsigned long arg)
> > +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, memfd_create, char *name, unsigned int flags)
> > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, mmap_addr, unsigned long addr)
> > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, mmap_file, struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
> > unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
> > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > index 4ec80b96c22e..5a18a6552278 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > @@ -543,6 +543,10 @@
> > * simple integer value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it
> > * should never be used by the security module.
> > * Return 0 if permission is granted.
> > + * @memfd_create:
> > + * @name is the name of memfd file.
> > + * @flags is the flags used in memfd_create.
> > + * Return 0 if permission is granted.
> > * @mmap_addr :
> > * Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr.
> > * @addr contains virtual address that will be used for the operation.
> > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> > index ca1b7109c0db..5b87a780822a 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/security.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> > @@ -384,6 +384,7 @@ int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
> > int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
> > void security_file_free(struct file *file);
> > int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
> > +int security_memfd_create(char *name, unsigned int flags);
> > int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
> > unsigned long flags);
> > int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr);
> > @@ -963,6 +964,11 @@ static inline int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > +static inline int security_memfd_create(char *name, unsigned int flags)
> > +{
> > + return 0;
> > +}
>
> I think this is missing the security/security.c changes for the
> non-inline version?
>
Yes. I will add that in V4.
> -Kees
>
> > +
> > static inline int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
> > unsigned long flags)
> > {
> > diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c
> > index 69e897dea6d5..96dcfbfed09e 100644
> > --- a/mm/memfd.c
> > +++ b/mm/memfd.c
> > @@ -346,6 +346,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create,
> > goto err_name;
> > }
> >
> > + /* security hook for memfd_create */
> > + error = security_memfd_create(name, flags);
> > + if (error)
> > + return error;
> > +
> > if (flags & MFD_HUGETLB) {
> > file = hugetlb_file_setup(name, 0, VM_NORESERVE,
> > HUGETLB_ANONHUGE_INODE,
> > --
> > 2.39.0.rc0.267.gcb52ba06e7-goog
> >
>
> --
> Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-12-02 23:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20221202013404.163143-1-jeffxu@google.com>
[not found] ` <20221202013404.163143-6-jeffxu@google.com>
2022-12-02 10:11 ` kernel test robot
2022-12-02 12:33 ` kernel test robot
2022-12-02 22:58 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-02 23:23 ` Jeff Xu [this message]
[not found] ` <20221202013404.163143-3-jeffxu@google.com>
2022-12-02 11:32 ` [PATCH v3] mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC kernel test robot
2022-12-02 13:33 ` kernel test robot
2022-12-02 13:43 ` kernel test robot
2022-12-02 22:56 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-02 23:32 ` Jeff Xu
2022-12-02 22:41 ` [PATCH v3] mm/memfd: " Kees Cook
[not found] ` <20221202013404.163143-2-jeffxu@google.com>
2022-12-02 22:43 ` [PATCH v3] mm/memfd: add F_SEAL_EXEC Kees Cook
2022-12-02 22:45 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <20221202013404.163143-7-jeffxu@google.com>
2022-12-02 23:23 ` [PATCH v3] mm/memfd: Add write seals when apply SEAL_EXEC to executable memfd Daniel Verkamp
2022-12-03 2:29 ` Jeff Xu
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