Re: [RFC PATCH -mm 0/4] mm, security, bpf: Fine-grained control over memory policy adjustments with lsm bpf

[Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>]

On Thu, Nov 16, 2023 at 1:09 AM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> On 11/15/2023 6:26 AM, Yafang Shao wrote:
> > On Wed, Nov 15, 2023 at 5:33 PM Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> On Wed, Nov 15, 2023 at 4:45 PM Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> wrote:
> >>> On Wed 15-11-23 09:52:38, Yafang Shao wrote:
> >>>> On Wed, Nov 15, 2023 at 12:58 AM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> >>>>> On 11/14/2023 3:59 AM, Yafang Shao wrote:
> >>>>>> On Tue, Nov 14, 2023 at 6:15 PM Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> wrote:
> >>>>>>> On Mon 13-11-23 11:15:06, Yafang Shao wrote:
> >>>>>>>> On Mon, Nov 13, 2023 at 12:45 AM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>> On 11/11/2023 11:34 PM, Yafang Shao wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>> Background
> >>>>>>>>>> ==========
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> In our containerized environment, we've identified unexpected OOM events
> >>>>>>>>>> where the OOM-killer terminates tasks despite having ample free memory.
> >>>>>>>>>> This anomaly is traced back to tasks within a container using mbind(2) to
> >>>>>>>>>> bind memory to a specific NUMA node. When the allocated memory on this node
> >>>>>>>>>> is exhausted, the OOM-killer, prioritizing tasks based on oom_score,
> >>>>>>>>>> indiscriminately kills tasks. This becomes more critical with guaranteed
> >>>>>>>>>> tasks (oom_score_adj: -998) aggravating the issue.
> >>>>>>>>> Is there some reason why you can't fix the callers of mbind(2)?
> >>>>>>>>> This looks like an user space configuration error rather than a
> >>>>>>>>> system security issue.
> >>>>>>>> It appears my initial description may have caused confusion. In this
> >>>>>>>> scenario, the caller is an unprivileged user lacking any capabilities.
> >>>>>>>> While a privileged user, such as root, experiencing this issue might
> >>>>>>>> indicate a user space configuration error, the concerning aspect is
> >>>>>>>> the potential for an unprivileged user to disrupt the system easily.
> >>>>>>>> If this is perceived as a misconfiguration, the question arises: What
> >>>>>>>> is the correct configuration to prevent an unprivileged user from
> >>>>>>>> utilizing mbind(2)?"
> >>>>>>> How is this any different than a non NUMA (mbind) situation?
> >>>>>> In a UMA system, each gigabyte of memory carries the same cost.
> >>>>>> Conversely, in a NUMA architecture, opting to confine processes within
> >>>>>> a specific NUMA node incurs additional costs. In the worst-case
> >>>>>> scenario, if all containers opt to bind their memory exclusively to
> >>>>>> specific nodes, it will result in significant memory wastage.
> >>>>> That still sounds like you've misconfigured your containers such
> >>>>> that they expect to get more memory than is available, and that
> >>>>> they have more control over it than they really do.
> >>>> And again: What configuration method is suitable to limit user control
> >>>> over memory policy adjustments, besides the heavyweight seccomp
> >>>> approach?
>
> What makes seccomp "heavyweight"? The overhead? The infrastructure required?
>
> >>> This really depends on the workloads. What is the reason mbind is used
> >>> in the first place?
> >> It can improve their performance.
>
> How much? You've already demonstrated that using mbind can degrade their performance.

Pls. calm down and read the whole discussion carefully. It is not easy
to understand.

-- 
Regards
Yafang