From: Trevor Gross <tmgross@umich.edu>
To: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
Cc: "Miguel Ojeda" <ojeda@kernel.org>,
"Matthew Wilcox" <willy@infradead.org>,
"Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Alex Gaynor" <alex.gaynor@gmail.com>,
"Wedson Almeida Filho" <wedsonaf@gmail.com>,
"Boqun Feng" <boqun.feng@gmail.com>,
"Gary Guo" <gary@garyguo.net>,
"Björn Roy Baron" <bjorn3_gh@protonmail.com>,
"Benno Lossin" <benno.lossin@proton.me>,
"Andreas Hindborg" <a.hindborg@samsung.com>,
"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Arve Hjønnevåg" <arve@android.com>,
"Todd Kjos" <tkjos@android.com>,
"Martijn Coenen" <maco@android.com>,
"Joel Fernandes" <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
"Carlos Llamas" <cmllamas@google.com>,
"Suren Baghdasaryan" <surenb@google.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org,
"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] rust: uaccess: add userspace pointers
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2024 01:05:20 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALNs47vRk0cKKDkpkhy2XUkxcjtPW-CABUexAZfGZ6PHT=wKng@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240415-alice-mm-v5-1-6f55e4d8ef51@google.com>
On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 3:14 AM Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com> wrote:
>
> From: Wedson Almeida Filho <wedsonaf@gmail.com>
>
> A pointer to an area in userspace memory, which can be either read-only
> or read-write.
>
> All methods on this struct are safe: attempting to read or write on bad
> addresses (either out of the bound of the slice or unmapped addresses)
> will return `EFAULT`. Concurrent access, *including data races to/from
> userspace memory*, is permitted, because fundamentally another userspace
> thread/process could always be modifying memory at the same time (in the
> same way that userspace Rust's `std::io` permits data races with the
> contents of files on disk). In the presence of a race, the exact byte
> values read/written are unspecified but the operation is well-defined.
> Kernelspace code should validate its copy of data after completing a
> read, and not expect that multiple reads of the same address will return
> the same value.
>
> These APIs are designed to make it difficult to accidentally write
> TOCTOU bugs. Every time you read from a memory location, the pointer is
> advanced by the length so that you cannot use that reader to read the
> same memory location twice. Preventing double-fetches avoids TOCTOU
> bugs. This is accomplished by taking `self` by value to prevent
> obtaining multiple readers on a given `UserSlicePtr`, and the readers
> only permitting forward reads. If double-fetching a memory location is
> necessary for some reason, then that is done by creating multiple
> readers to the same memory location.
>
> Constructing a `UserSlicePtr` performs no checks on the provided
> address and length, it can safely be constructed inside a kernel thread
> with no current userspace process. Reads and writes wrap the kernel APIs
> `copy_from_user` and `copy_to_user`, which check the memory map of the
> current process and enforce that the address range is within the user
> range (no additional calls to `access_ok` are needed).
>
> This code is based on something that was originally written by Wedson on
> the old rust branch. It was modified by Alice by removing the
> `IoBufferReader` and `IoBufferWriter` traits, and various other changes.
>
> Signed-off-by: Wedson Almeida Filho <wedsonaf@gmail.com>
> Co-developed-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Trevor Gross <tmgross@umich.edu>
I left some suggestions for documentation improvements and one
question, but mostly LGTM.
> ---
> rust/helpers.c | 14 +++
> rust/kernel/lib.rs | 1 +
> rust/kernel/uaccess.rs | 304 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 319 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/rust/kernel/lib.rs b/rust/kernel/lib.rs
> index be68d5e567b1..37f84223b83f 100644
> --- a/rust/kernel/lib.rs
> +++ b/rust/kernel/lib.rs
> @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
> pub mod task;
> pub mod time;
> pub mod types;
> +pub mod uaccess;
> pub mod workqueue;
>
> #[doc(hidden)]
> diff --git a/rust/kernel/uaccess.rs b/rust/kernel/uaccess.rs
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..c97029cdeba1
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/rust/kernel/uaccess.rs
> @@ -0,0 +1,304 @@
> [...]
> +impl UserSlice {
> + /// Constructs a user slice from a raw pointer and a length in bytes.
> + ///
> + /// Constructing a [`UserSlice`] performs no checks on the provided address and length, it can
> + /// safely be constructed inside a kernel thread with no current userspace process. Reads and
> + /// writes wrap the kernel APIs `copy_from_user` and `copy_to_user`, which check the memory map
> + /// of the current process and enforce that the address range is within the user range (no
> + /// additional calls to `access_ok` are needed).
I would just add a note that pointer should be a valid userspace
pointer, but that gets checked at read/write time
> + /// Callers must be careful to avoid time-of-check-time-of-use (TOCTOU) issues. The simplest way
> + /// is to create a single instance of [`UserSlice`] per user memory block as it reads each byte
> + /// at most once.
> + pub fn new(ptr: *mut c_void, length: usize) -> Self {
> + UserSlice { ptr, length }
> + }
> +impl UserSliceReader {
> [...]
> + /// Reads raw data from the user slice into a kernel buffer.
> + ///
> + /// After a successful call to this method, all bytes in `out` are initialized.
If this is guaranteed, could it return `Result<&mut [u8]>`? So the
caller doesn't need to unsafely `assume_init` anything.
> + /// Fails with `EFAULT` if the read happens on a bad address.
This should also mention that the slice cannot be bigger than the
reader's length.
> + pub fn read_raw(&mut self, out: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result {
> + let len = out.len();
> + let out_ptr = out.as_mut_ptr().cast::<c_void>();
> + if len > self.length {
> + return Err(EFAULT);
> + }
> + let Ok(len_ulong) = c_ulong::try_from(len) else {
> + return Err(EFAULT);
> + };
> + // SAFETY: `out_ptr` points into a mutable slice of length `len_ulong`, so we may write
> + // that many bytes to it.
> + let res = unsafe { bindings::copy_from_user(out_ptr, self.ptr, len_ulong) };
> + if res != 0 {
> + return Err(EFAULT);
> + }
> + // Userspace pointers are not directly dereferencable by the kernel, so we cannot use `add`,
> + // which has C-style rules for defined behavior.
> + self.ptr = self.ptr.wrapping_byte_add(len);
> + self.length -= len;
> + Ok(())
> + }
> +
> + /// Reads raw data from the user slice into a kernel buffer.
> + ///
> + /// Fails with `EFAULT` if the read happens on a bad address.
> + pub fn read_slice(&mut self, out: &mut [u8]) -> Result {
> + // SAFETY: The types are compatible and `read_raw` doesn't write uninitialized bytes to
> + // `out`.
> + let out = unsafe { &mut *(out as *mut [u8] as *mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) };
> + self.read_raw(out)
> + }
If this is just a safe version of read_raw, could you crosslink the docs?
> +impl UserSliceWriter {
> +
> + /// Writes raw data to this user pointer from a kernel buffer.
> + ///
> + /// Fails with `EFAULT` if the write happens on a bad address.
> + pub fn write_slice(&mut self, data: &[u8]) -> Result {
> [...]
> + }
Could use a note about length like `read_raw`.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-04-16 5:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-15 7:13 [PATCH v5 0/4] Memory management patches needed by Rust Binder Alice Ryhl
2024-04-15 7:13 ` [PATCH v5 1/4] rust: uaccess: add userspace pointers Alice Ryhl
2024-04-15 9:36 ` Benno Lossin
2024-04-15 9:44 ` Alice Ryhl
2024-04-15 9:51 ` Benno Lossin
2024-04-15 21:53 ` Boqun Feng
2024-04-16 9:53 ` Alice Ryhl
2024-04-21 18:08 ` David Laight
2024-04-21 18:37 ` Alice Ryhl
2024-04-21 19:48 ` David Laight
2024-04-22 6:31 ` Alice Ryhl
2024-04-16 5:05 ` Trevor Gross [this message]
2024-04-16 9:53 ` Alice Ryhl
2024-04-17 14:28 ` Gary Guo
2024-04-17 14:40 ` Alice Ryhl
2024-04-17 15:27 ` Benno Lossin
2024-04-17 15:35 ` Alice Ryhl
2024-04-15 7:13 ` [PATCH v5 2/4] uaccess: always export _copy_[from|to]_user with CONFIG_RUST Alice Ryhl
2024-04-15 23:05 ` Kees Cook
2024-04-16 9:57 ` Alice Ryhl
2024-04-15 7:13 ` [PATCH v5 3/4] rust: uaccess: add typed accessors for userspace pointers Alice Ryhl
2024-04-16 5:53 ` Trevor Gross
2024-04-16 9:53 ` Alice Ryhl
2024-04-15 7:13 ` [PATCH v5 4/4] rust: add abstraction for `struct page` Alice Ryhl
2024-04-15 8:10 ` Andreas Hindborg
2024-04-15 9:54 ` Benno Lossin
2024-04-16 5:40 ` Trevor Gross
2024-04-16 9:53 ` Alice Ryhl
2024-04-16 17:47 ` Trevor Gross
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