From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-ob0-f199.google.com (mail-ob0-f199.google.com [209.85.214.199]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B03206B025F for ; Wed, 15 Jun 2016 13:23:39 -0400 (EDT) Received: by mail-ob0-f199.google.com with SMTP id at7so575650obd.0 for ; Wed, 15 Jun 2016 10:23:39 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-ob0-x230.google.com (mail-ob0-x230.google.com. [2607:f8b0:4003:c01::230]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id x143si18696049oif.121.2016.06.15.10.23.38 for (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 15 Jun 2016 10:23:38 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ob0-x230.google.com with SMTP id wj2so1517172obc.0 for ; Wed, 15 Jun 2016 10:23:38 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: References: From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Wed, 15 Jun 2016 10:23:18 -0700 Message-ID: Subject: Re: Playing with virtually mapped stacks (with guard pages!) Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org List-ID: To: Kees Cook Cc: "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , X86 ML , Borislav Petkov , "linux-mm@kvack.org" On Wed, Jun 15, 2016 at 10:05 AM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Tue, Jun 14, 2016 at 11:01 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> Hi all- >> >> If you want to play with virtually mapped stacks, I have it more or >> less working on x86 in a branch here: >> >> https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/luto/linux.git/log/?h=x86/vmap_stack >> >> The core bit (virtually map the stack and fix the accounting) is just >> a config option, but it needs the arch to opt-in. I suspect that >> every arch will have its own set of silly issues to address to make it >> work well. For x86, the silly issues are getting the OOPS to work >> right and handling some vmalloc_fault oddities to avoid panicing at >> random. > > Awesome! Some notes/questions: > > - there are a number of typos in commit messages and comments, just FYI Not surprising. I'll try to find and fix them. > > - where is the guard page added? I don't see anything leaving a hole at the end? Magic! The vmap code does this for us. > > - where is thread_info? I understand there to be two benefits from > vmalloc stack: 1) thread_info can live elsewhere, 2) guard page can > exist easily I think that thread_info is a separate issue except insofar as it's needed for full exploit protection. Moving / eliminating it has nothing to do with where the stack lives AFAIK. I'll get to it. I suspect that the hardest part will be eliminating the (mostly pointless) thread_info::task field. > > - this seems like it should Oops not warn: > WARN_ON_ONCE(vm->nr_pages != THREAD_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE); > that being wrong seems like a very bad state to continue from I'll change that. > > - bikeshed: I think the CONFIG should live in arch/Kconfig (with a > description of what an arch needs to support for it) and be called > HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK so that archs can select it instead of having > multiple definitions of CONFIG_VMAP_STACK in each arch. I'll change that, too. > > Thanks for digging into this! > > -Kees > > -- > Kees Cook > Chrome OS & Brillo Security -- Andy Lutomirski AMA Capital Management, LLC -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: email@kvack.org