From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-pf0-f197.google.com (mail-pf0-f197.google.com [209.85.192.197]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 56BD66B0003 for ; Thu, 7 Jun 2018 12:28:20 -0400 (EDT) Received: by mail-pf0-f197.google.com with SMTP id x17-v6so329766pfm.18 for ; Thu, 07 Jun 2018 09:28:20 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org. [198.145.29.99]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id y125-v6si30464598pfb.284.2018.06.07.09.28.19 for (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Thu, 07 Jun 2018 09:28:19 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-wr0-f180.google.com (mail-wr0-f180.google.com [209.85.128.180]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A640D208AC for ; Thu, 7 Jun 2018 16:28:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-wr0-f180.google.com with SMTP id w10-v6so10486582wrk.9 for ; Thu, 07 Jun 2018 09:28:18 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20180607143705.3531-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> <20180607143705.3531-3-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> <1528387137.4636.6.camel@2b52.sc.intel.com> In-Reply-To: <1528387137.4636.6.camel@2b52.sc.intel.com> From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Thu, 7 Jun 2018 09:28:05 -0700 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/9] x86/cet: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org List-ID: To: Yu-cheng Yu Cc: Andrew Lutomirski , LKML , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM , linux-arch , X86 ML , "H. Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "H. J. Lu" , "Shanbhogue, Vedvyas" , "Ravi V. Shankar" , Dave Hansen , Jonathan Corbet , Oleg Nesterov , Arnd Bergmann , mike.kravetz@oracle.com On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 9:02 AM Yu-cheng Yu wrote: > > On Thu, 2018-06-07 at 08:47 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 7:40 AM Yu-cheng Yu wrote: > > > > > > Introduce Kconfig option X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER. > > > > > > An application has shadow stack protection when all the following are > > > true: > > > > > > (1) The kernel has X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER enabled, > > > (2) The running processor supports the shadow stack, > > > (3) The application is built with shadow stack enabled tools & libs > > > and, and at runtime, all dependent shared libs can support shadow > > > stack. > > > > > > If this kernel config option is enabled, but (2) or (3) above is not > > > true, the application runs without the shadow stack protection. > > > Existing legacy applications will continue to work without the shadow > > > stack protection. > > > > > > The user-mode shadow stack protection is only implemented for the > > > 64-bit kernel. Thirty-two bit applications are supported under the > > > compatibility mode. > > > > > > > The 64-bit only part seems entirely reasonable. So please make the > > code 64-bit only :) > > Yes, I will remove changes in "arch/x86/entry/entry32.S". > We still want to support x32/ia32 in the 64-bit kernel, right? > Yes, I think. But that's not in entry_32.S >