linux-mm.kvack.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: linuxram@us.ibm.com
Cc: Andrew Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	linuxppc-dev <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Subject: Re: pkeys on POWER: Access rights not reset on execve
Date: Sat, 19 May 2018 23:06:20 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrVvQkphypn10A_rkX35DNqi29MJcXYRpRiCFNm02VYz2g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180520060425.GL5479@ram.oc3035372033.ibm.com>

On Sat, May 19, 2018 at 11:04 PM Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> wrote:

> On Sat, May 19, 2018 at 04:47:23PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On
Sat, May 19, 2018 at 1:28 PM Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> wrote:

> ...snip...
> >
> > So is it possible for two threads to each call pkey_alloc() and end up
with
> > the same key?  If so, it seems entirely broken.

> No. Two threads cannot allocate the same key; just like x86.

> > If not, then how do you
> > intend for a multithreaded application to usefully allocate a new key?
> > Regardless, it seems like the current behavior on POWER is very
difficult
> > to work with.  Can you give an example of a use case for which POWER's
> > behavior makes sense?
> >
> > For the use cases I've imagined, POWER's behavior does not make sense.
> >   x86's is not ideal but is still better.  Here are my two example use
cases:
> >
> > 1. A crypto library.  Suppose I'm writing a TLS-terminating server, and
I
> > want it to be resistant to Heartbleed-like bugs.  I could store my
private
> > keys protected by mprotect_key() and arrange for all threads and signal
> > handlers to have PKRU/AMR values that prevent any access to the memory.
> > When an explicit call is made to sign with the key, I would temporarily
> > change PKRU/AMR to allow access, compute the signature, and change
PKRU/AMR
> > back.  On x86 right now, this works nicely.  On POWER, it doesn't,
because
> > any thread started before my pkey_alloc() call can access the protected
> > memory, as can any signal handler.
> >
> > 2. A database using mmap() (with persistent memory or otherwise).  It
would
> > be nice to be resistant to accidental corruption due to stray writes.  I
> > would do more or less the same thing as (1), except that I would want
> > threads that are not actively writing to the database to be able the
> > protected memory.  On x86, I need to manually convince threads that may
> > have been started before my pkey_alloc() call as well as signal
handlers to
> > update their PKRU values.  On POWER, as in example (1), the error goes
the
> > other direction -- if I fail to propagate the AMR bits to all threads,
> > writes are not blocked.

> I see the problem from an application's point of view, on powerpc.  If
> the key allocated in one thread is not activated on all threads
> (existing one and future one), than other threads will not be able
> to modify the key's permissions. Hence they will not be able to control
> access/write to pages to which the key is associated.

> As Florian suggested, I should enable the key's bit in the UAMOR value
> corresponding to existing threads, when a new key is allocated.

> Now, looking at the implementation for x86, I see that sys_mpkey_alloc()
> makes no attempt to modify anything of any other thread. How
> does it manage to activate the key on any other thread? Is this
> magic done by the hardware?

x86 has no equivalent concept to UAMOR.  There are 16 keys no matter what.

--Andy

  reply	other threads:[~2018-05-20  6:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-05-18 14:27 Florian Weimer
2018-05-19  1:19 ` Ram Pai
2018-05-19  1:50   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-05-19  5:26     ` Florian Weimer
2018-05-19 20:27     ` Ram Pai
2018-05-19 23:47       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-05-20  6:04         ` Ram Pai
2018-05-20  6:06           ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2018-05-20 19:11             ` Ram Pai
2018-05-21 11:29               ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-03 20:18                 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-04 10:12                   ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-04 14:01                     ` Ram Pai
2018-06-04 17:57                       ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-04 19:02                         ` Ram Pai
2018-06-04 21:00                           ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-08  2:34                             ` Ram Pai
2018-06-08  5:53                               ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-08 10:15                                 ` Michal Suchánek
2018-06-08 10:44                                   ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-08 12:54                                     ` Michal Suchánek
2018-06-08 12:57                                       ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-08 13:49                                         ` Michal Suchánek
2018-06-08 13:51                                           ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-08 14:17                                             ` Michal Suchánek
2018-06-11 17:23                                 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-11 17:29                                   ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-11 20:08                                     ` Ram Pai
2018-06-12 12:17                                       ` Florian Weimer
2018-05-19  5:12   ` Florian Weimer
2018-05-19 11:11   ` Florian Weimer

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=CALCETrVvQkphypn10A_rkX35DNqi29MJcXYRpRiCFNm02VYz2g@mail.gmail.com \
    --to=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
    --cc=fweimer@redhat.com \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org \
    --cc=linuxram@us.ibm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox